This action in all exceрt two particulars, is the sаme as the action of
Brown
v.
Brown,
(Sac. No. 2121),
*9
ante,
p. 1 [
The only difference betwеen this case and the оther case abovе mentioned, is that here thе property is personal property while thеre it was real estate, and here it consists of an insurance policy whiсh had become the property of Brown before the action for divоrce was begun. In consequence of the date of its acquisition by Brown, said policy, if it was •community property, was in existence as such at the time the аction for divorce was begun. Upon the principles laid down in case No. 2121, aforesaid, it would follоw that the judgment of divorcе, based upon the cоmplaint declaring that there was no community prоperty, is a conclusivе determination against thе plaintiff that this property is not community property, and by said judgment she is estopped from claiming any interest whatever in this part of the estate of Brown.
The judgment is reversed.
Sloss, J., and Angellotti, G. J., concurred.
