94 Conn. App. 181 | Conn. App. Ct. | 2006
Opinion
The plaintiff Mark Brown
The plaintiff commenced two separate actions against the defendants for injuries that he suffered on February 5, 1998, when he fell from the roof of Bright Clouds’ church, which was under construction in Dan-bury. The plaintiff had been installing fire alarm wiring near several large windows located at the top of the church. All of those windows were glassed in except one, which was covered by plywood. The plaintiff claimed that the plywood was missing when he was working near the window and that he consequently fell through the window, slid down the roof and landed on a pickup truck. The defendants maintained that the
I
The plaintiff first claims that the court should have admitted into evidence a written statement of Charles Galda, clerk of the works for Bright Clouds’ church construction project. We disagree.
Galda testified at trial that he had seen the plywood covering the window shortly before the plaintiffs accident. On February 17, 1998, twelve days after the accident, Galda provided a two page, handwritten statement to an investigator hired by Bright Clouds. In that statement, Galda did not refer to the plywood. The plaintiff moved to admit Galda’s statement as a prior inconsistent statement or, alternatively, a statement by a party opponent, but the court determined that Galda’s statement was inadmissible hearsay not within an exception to the rule against hearsay.
We first set forth the applicable standard of review. “The trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence is entitled to great deference. . . . [T]he trial court has broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility ... of evidence . . . [and its] ruling on evidentiary matters will be overturned only upon a showing of a clear abuse of the court’s discretion. . . . We will make every reasonable presumption in favor of upholding the trial court’s ruling, and only upset it for a manifest abuse of discretion.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Jacobs v. General Electric Co., 275 Conn. 395, 406, 880 A.2d 151 (2005).
“An out-of-court statement used to prove the truth of the matter asserted is hearsay and is generally inadmissible unless an exception applies.” DeMarkey v. Fratturo, 80 Conn. App. 650, 654, 836 A.2d 1257 (2003). Section 8-5 (1) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence exempts from the rule against hearsay “[a] prior inconsistent statement of a witness, provided (A) the statement is in writing, (B) the statement is signed by the witness, and (C) the witness has personal knowledge of the contents of the statement.” In determining whether a former statement qualifies as a prior inconsistent statement, “[i]f a former statement fails to mention a material fact presently testified to, which it should have been natural to mention in the prior statement, the prior statement is sufficiently inconsistent.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Vasquez, 68 Conn. App. 194, 201, 792 A.2d 856 (2002).
We next address the plaintiffs argument that Galda’s statement was a statement by a party opponent. Section 8-3 (1) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence exempts from the rule against hearsay “ [a] statement that is being offered against a party and is . . . (C) a statement by a person authorized by the party to make a statement concerning the subject . . . .” The plaintiff argues that Galda had authority to make the statement on behalf of Bright Clouds because he served as clerk of the works for the church construction project, but we disagree. “The mere existence of an employment relationship without more does not render statements of an employee admissible against an employer. . . . Before evidence can be admitted to show what an agent said, it must be established that the agent was authorized by the principal to make an admission.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Chieffalo v. Norden Systems, Inc., 49 Conn. App. 474, 478, 714 A.2d 1261 (1998).
The facts clearly indicate that Galda provided the statement to an investigator hired by Bright Clouds to determine what had happened on the date of the
II
The plaintiff next claims that the court should have admitted into evidence two reports written by an inspector with the federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration. We disagree.
The reports included a summary of the circumstances of the plaintiffs accident, based on the inspector’s interviews with Galda and other individuals connected with the defendants, but the reports did not refer to the plywood covering the window in the front of the church. The court determined that the reports were inadmissible hearsay and therefore excluded them.
In support of his claim, the plaintiff argues that the inspector’s failure to refer to the plywood constituted a statement by the defendants that the plywood was not present at the time of the accident, and, therefore, the reports were admissible pursuant to the hearsay exception for statements by a party opponent. We find that argument entirely implausible because the reports represented the statements of the inspector, not the defendants. A statement by a party opponent must be “the party’s own statement, in either an individual or a representative capacity . . . .” Conn. Code Evid. § 8-3 (1) (A). The court therefore did not abuse its discretion in excluding the reports as hearsay.
The judgments are affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
Brown’s wife, Geri M. Brown, was the other plaintiff in these cases, but is not a party to this appeal. We therefore refer to Mark Brown as the plaintiff.
At least three of this court’s decisions state that the admissibility of evidence pursuant to an exception to the rale against hearsay is a question of law subject to plenary review. See State v. Saucier, 90 Conn. App. 132, 144, 876 A.2d 572, cert. granted on other grounds, 275 Conn. 928, 883 A.2d 1251 (2005); Doe v. Christoforo, 87 Conn. App. 359, 363, 865 A.2d 444, cert.