delivered the opinion of the court.
Thе appellee, Harry E. Brown, filed this suit in as- N sump sit on an award made under an arbitration agreement .between the parties. After issued joined, the cause was tried by the court without the intervention of a jury and judgment was rendered in favor of the appellee and against appellant for $4,413 damages and costs of suit, the above-mentioned damages being the amount found to be due on the award together with interest thеreon.
The arbitration agreement entered into between the parties to the suit contains a preamble as follows: “Whereas controversies exist and for sometime have existed between us * * * in relation to divers subjects and more particular in relation to all matters of and concerning the leasing by said Brown to said Atwood of certain lands, described in the lease hereto attached, and which sаid lease ivas not properly carried ont by the said William B. Atwood, as provided in said lease, nor has the said Atwood repaid the said Brown for moneys advanced nor has the said Atwood paid said Brown for grain, etc., bought of said Brown.” The agreement provides among other things that the parties: “Do hereby mutually covenant and agree to and with each other to submit all matters of action, cause and cаuses of actions, suits, controversies, claims and demands whatsoever now pending, existing or held by and between us to Theo. Becker, Peter Vogler, and a third disinterested party, to be selected by the two heretofore mentioned, all of Henry County, Illinois, as arbitrators,” etc. The agreement then authorizes the circuit court of Henry county, Illinois, to enter a judgment in favor of the party to whom the award may be made; and any attorney of any court of record is empowered to appear for said Atwood in term time or vacation and confess a judgment without process in favor of the said Brown for such amount as may be awarded. It further provides that the award shall be made on or before April 1, 1913. The agreement further recites that: “Said Atwood has agreed with Hammer that Hammer has four hundred and fifty dollars due him for plowing and discing, and if said arbitrators find said Atwood should pay all or part of said amount, then such amount so found by said arbitrators may be added to the amount found owing to Brown, and Brown will assume said amount.” The agreement bears date January 27, 1913.
Pursuant to said agreement the above-named arbitrators selected one Adam Gemant as the third arbitrator and the said arbitrators after taking and subscribing an oath as was provided by said ■ agreemеnt made the following award:
“Geneseo, Illinois, March 26, 1913. We, the arbitrators, selected and appointed in the foregoing arMtration agreement between Harry E. Brown and ¥m. B. Atwood, after careful consideration, after hearing all the evidence produced by both sides, have concluded that ¥m. B. Atwood, one of the parties to said arbitration agreement, is indebted to and owes the said Harry E. Browii the sum of thirty-onе hundred eighty-eight dollars and 70 cents and that said ¥m. B. Atwood should pay said amount to said Harry E. Brown. ’ ’ The award is signed by each of the above-named arbitrators.
The award was filed in the office of the circuit clerk and a judgment by confession was entered in favor of appellee and against appellant in the circuit court of Henry county for the amount of said award pursuant to the terms and conditions relating therеto as set forth in said arbitration agreement. Thereafter, appellant filed his motion to vacate said judgment on the ground that the warrant of attorney attached to the declaration conferred no jurisdiction upon the court to enter judgment. This motion was supported by an affidavit of appellant to the effect that the first knowledge or notice he had that a judgment had been rendered against him wаs when he was served with an execution issued thereon. Appellee moved to strike said motion from the files, which motion was denied. The court then sustained the motion of the appellant here to vacate the judgment. Appellee declined to proceed further in said suit and the costs thereof having been paid, a judgment was entered dismissing the suit. An appeal was taken to this court by Brown from the said judgment of thе circuit court and the judgment was affirmed. (Brown v. Atwood,
After our decision in Brown v. Atwood, supra,, had been handed down, this suit in assumpsit upon the award was instituted. The appellant Atwood, filed a plea of the general issue and also two special pleas. The first special plea alleged the former judgment by confession, the order of the circuit court vacating the same and the affirmance of said order by this court. The second special plea contained the same matters and in addition thereto averred that the judgment of the circuit court vacating the original judgment was based on the invalidity of the award.
Upon the hearing of this cáuse the above-named arbitrator, Theo. Becker, testified over the objections of the appellant that the said Adam Gemant who was selected as the third arbitrator was at the time of his selection and while he was acting as an arbitrator a resident of Henry county, Hlinois, and that he was selected as such arbitrator by him, the said Becker, and by the above-named Peter Yogler, all of whom were then residents of said Henry county, Illinois. There was also admitted over appellant’s objections plaintiff’s exhibit 1, which purports to be a notice to Atwood of the finding and award of the arbitrators. It is substantially in- the language of the award with the additional recital that Atwood should pay Brown the sum of $2,738.70, exclusive of the amount due Hammer, and that he should also pay to Brown the further sum of $450 on account -of the plowing and that Brown should pay that amount to Hammer. It further states that in the judgment of the arbitrators, Atwood is indebted to Brown under the terms of the agreеment of arbitration, including plowing to be paid to Hammer by Brown, the sum of $3,188.70. This instrument was signed by each of the arbitrators. Brown testified that he delivered a copy of said exhibit to Atwood a few days after March 26, 1913. Atwood in his testimony denies that Brown delivered him a copy of said exhibit and states that he never saw a copy thereof until it was shown him while upon the witness stand.
The appellant, Atwood, contends that the present judgment аgainst him should be reversed on the ground that the award is void, first, because it fails to show upon its face that the third arbitrator, Adam Gernant, was selected or that he was a disinterested party or that he was a resident of Henry county, Illinois, and, second, that it is not coextensive with the terms, of the submission because it does not show on its face what determination was reached in reference to the $450 due to Hammer as afоresaid. Appellant also ■ seeks a reversal on the ground, as he- claims, that the circuit court in its order vacating the' judgment by confession held that the award was invalid, which order was later affirmed by this court and therefore is res judicata with respect to the question of the invalidity of the award.
"We will dispose of the last contention first. On the trial of this- cause Atwood, for the purpose of showing the reasons which moved the circuit court to vacate the judgment by confession, offered in evidence a copy of a printed brief and argument filed by Brown in this court when the former appeal was before us. In this printed brief it is stated that the circuit court did not vacate said judgment by confession for the reason assigned by Atwood in his motion, to wit, that the warrant of attorney was insufficient, but the court assigned other and different reasons for its aсtion, i. e., that the award fails to show that Gemant was properly qualified to act as an arbitrator under the terms of the arbitration agreement and also that the award fails to show any determination of the Hammer matter and therefore the award itself was void and consequently the judgment was void.
The only matter addressed to the circuit court for its determination was whether or not the motion to vacate the judgmеnt should be allowed or denied. The court decided that the motion should be allowed and a judgment allowing it was accordingly entered. It has been repeatedly held that it makes no difference what reasons may be assigned by the court for its action if the conclusion reached is correct. A judgment of a trial court will not be disturbed because improper or incorrect' reasons therefor may have been given. (4 Corpus Juris 1132; Jester v. Young,
We will now consider the question whether the award was void because of its failure to show that , the third arbitrator, Adam Gemant, wаs duly selected and properly qualified to act as an arbitrator. The arbitration agreement gave the other two árbitrators the power to select a third arbitrator who should be a disinterested person and also a resident of Henry county, Illinois. There is nothing in the award affirmatively showing that Gemant was selected or that he was a disinterested person or that he was a resident of Henry county, Illinois. Is it essential tо a valid award that his selection and qualifications must affirmatively appear therein? Courts look with favor upon arbitration as a method of settling disputes and every presumption in favor of the validity of an award will be indulged. In Seaton v. Kendall,
It is further urged that the award is void because of its failure to affirmatively show a disposition of the Hammer matter. All that the arbitration agreement requires of the arbitrators with respect to this matter is to determine whether or not Atwood should pay a part of the $450 due Hammer and, if so, then the arbitrators were to add that amount to whatever sum they should find due from Atwood to Brown. It was further agreed that Brown should assume said amount found to be due from Atwood to Hammer. The arbitrators had nothing to do with determining whether or not there was $450 due to Hammer. This was an already ascertained fact as stated in the agreement. The arbitrators’ duty in regard to this snm was merely to determinе whether or not Atwood was liable for the whole or any portion of it, and if they determined he was so liable, then they should add the amount found to be due from Atwood to Hammer to whatever amount they also found to be due from Atwood to Brown and Brown was to assume it. This he did and afterwards paid Hammer. It is true that the awardmiakes no specific mention of what sum the arbitrators found to be due from Atwood to Hammer. Neither doеs it specifically find the various sums to be due from Atwood to Brown on account of any of the items mentioned in the preamble of the agreement above referred to. Nor do we think it is necessary for the award to malee specific findings when the controversy relates only to money demands. In such a case it is sufficient if the award is made in a lump sum. In Stearns v. Cope,
It will be noted that the submission agreement in the case at bar is a very general submission, and following the general rule of favorable construction which is now applied to arbitration proceedings, courts will not travel out of thеir way for the purpose of overturning awards; but, on the other hand, they will refrain from exact and technical interpretation, and wjll indulge in every reasonable presumption whenever there is any room for. such indulgence, in favor of the finality and validity of an award. The invalidity of the award must be shown, by one asserting it, by clear and satisfactory evidence. (5 Corpus Juris 123.)
"Where the submission is general and inclusive, as in this case, and relates only to money demands which are capable of computation, there is every reason why the award should be made in a lump sum rather than by separate items, and it has been held that if the arbitrators professing to decide the whole subject find a balance from one to the other, the award is good, although the principles from which their balance resulted are not stated. (Stearns v. Cope, supra; Darst v. Collier,
We are of the opinion that the court did not err in admitting plaintiff’s exhibit 1. While it is well settled that where an award has once been made, the arbitrators are thereafter without power to alter the same or to make a new award, still we see no substantial objection to the arbitrators giving the parties notice of what award was made even though the submission agreement would not require such notice to be given. Appellant seeks to have plaintiff’s exhibit 1 construed as a modification of or an addition to the original award. No such interpretation can be given it. It shows on its face what its purpose was, and, more than that, the appellee testified that he actually delivered a copy theréof to appellant. If this be true, then the circumstance is indicative of the interpretation put uрon the instrument by all the parties concerned. The object of appellee in introducing the exhibit in evidence was not to have it made a part of the original award but as tending to show that the Hammer matter was in fact considered and disposed of by the arbitrators. We think it was competent for that purpose. But even if it were incompetent, its admission worked no injury to the appellant. There is no evidеnce in the case offered by either party which tended to overcome the legal presumption that all questions, which were submitted to the arbitrators had been considered and determined by them. Therefore the action of the court would have been the same whether plaintiff’s exhibit 1 had been admitted or rejected by the court. We have examined the entire record and we find no error in the admission or exclusion' of evidence.
Appellee contends that inasmuch as this cause was tried by the court without a jury and no propositions either of law or of fact were submitted to the court to be held or rejected, this court has no right to consider any question presented to us by appellant except with respect to the admission and exclusion of evidence. His contention is based to a large degree upon holdings of this court. In Burgener v. Lippold,
Affirmed.