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Brown Ex Rel. Estate of Brown v. Anderson County Hospital Ass'n
234 S.E.2d 873
S.C.
1977
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*1 Administrators of the Lydia and Charles H. Brown as Y. BROWN Brown, Appellants, v. ANDERSON COUNTY of William J. Estate ASSOCIATION, Respondents. HOSPITAL 873) (234 S. E. Joe, Jr., Isaac Mitchell, Joe,

Messrs. & Green- Bishop *2 ville, Chambers, Lesesne, Jr., and J. LeVonne and Louis L. Chambers, Stein, C., Becton, Charlotte, & Ferguson N. Appellants, for Kirven, Watkins, Vandiver, Kirven,

H. Grady Esq., Gable, Anderson, Respondemt, & Long for Blatt, Fales, Ronald L. Load- Motley, Esq., Bedinfield, holt, Barnwell, Poole & Carolina Trial Motley, South Committee, Curiae Lawyers Amicus *3 10, 1977. May

Rhodes, Justice. in their representative this action

The brought plaintiffs children of the and nine on of the widow behalf capacity Brown, deceased, damages seeking William Joseph at Anderson a patient while he was death of the deceased Memorial The defendant Hospital.1 asserted several de- fenses, that of charitable and including moved for immunity, summary The circuit judgment. judge defend- granted ant’s motion on the ground the defendant is elee- an is, mosynary corporation therefore, and immune from lia- for claims bility based upon reck- alleged negligence lessness of its servants, or agents, From employees. the order granting summary judgment the re- plaintiffs We appeal. verse and remand. 20, 1974,

On Brown was as a July admitted to patient Anderson Memorial Hospital. plaintiffs alleged upon admission to the the deceased was hospital, strapped into a bed servants, defendant’s agents thereby him rendering completely immobile and While so helpless. restrained, a fire his room. began the fire the During de- ceased received severe burns in his death. resulting The plain- tiffs that the fire and the alleged failure to subsequent pro- tect the deceased from it were a result of proximate negligent acts reckless and omissions on the of various part serv- ants, agents defendant in a employees number of as set forth in the particulars Complant. Petition,

We granted plaintiffs’ filed pursuant Rule Court, of the Rules of this §10 review the earlier decis- ions of this Court the defense of sustaining charitable im- in actions of munity the nature to us presented this appeal. we Additionally, granted permission to interested parties intervene as amici curiae and to file briefs with to the respect doctrine. A number of such briefs were filed with this Court and have received consideration.

This appeal presents but one de- question our requiring cisions : whether defendant, the a not for corporation profit, which has as its the maintenance purpose and of operation 1 Hospital Anderson operated by Memorial County is the Anderson Association, Hospital non-profit eleemosynary corporation, which is a by chartered the State of South Any Carolina in 1906. funds accumu- by lated reason of exceeding revenues expenditures are used for im- to, provements of, operation or for the hospital. the

483 a funds are from dona- and whose derived hospital, private tions, is immune from public agencies paying patients, for reckless- caused the liability injuries by negligence ness of more of its or servants. Stated one or employees another the issue is whether the doctrine of charitable way, is a defense to action. valid the plaintiffs’ decisions that the state Court indicate present of the law in im South Carolina with respect is hold It munity is following: contrary public policy of its a for the negligence charitable institution responsible care, due Lindler v. Columbia Hospi servants selected with tal, 25, servants, E. or for agents, 98 S. C. 81 S. 512 (1914), due care. Ver or officersselected without employees, superior 197, West, million v. Due Woman’s S. C. College of E. The fact that a a charitable patient 88 S. 649 (1916). for a room does not render the and attendance hospital pays liable for to the caused negli hospital injuries patient of its servants. Lindler v. Columbia Hospital, supra. gence is of no im The relation of the to the injured charity person so that it is immaterial whether injured person portance v. invitee of the institution. Vermillion is or an employee West, Due A charitable institu Woman’s College supra. for tion, however, is not from liability trespass exempt lessee. Peden out of its activities nuisance arising E. Nor Furman 155 S. C. 151 S. University, (1930). out of activity extend to a situation where does immunity commercial in charac arises is liability primarily which the with the charitable ter and unconnected wholly purpose Eiserhardt State was organized. which corporation C., Mech. S. C. 111 S. E. Soc. 235 S. Ag. also been from liability Churches have exempted (1959). Charleston, Decker v. 247 S. C. Bishop

for negligence, E. additionally 147 S. (1966), holding not insurance does liability charity procurement where the injured charity create to the liability person from where the Finally, charity otherwise immune liability. tort, defense not may interpose commits an intentional *5 484 75, Caine, coat 261 C. 198 v. S. immunity.

of charitable Jeff E. 258 S. (1973).2 States

Charitable was to the United imported Massachus from Court of Supreme England Judicial Hos etts in the case of McDonald v. Massachusetts General 432, pital, 120 Mass. 21 Am. : 529 Rep. (1876) in this the first case . . . was McDonald case] “[The immune from tort liability. to be charities country declaring trust, in held funds of a are charity It there held that the was The Massachu will not courts permit. the diversion of which rule, Holli court, cited establishing as authority setts 769, Leonard’s, decided in 142 day Eng. Reprint Eng St. case had followed dictum by in The Holliday land 1861. Findlater, Cottenham, in Duncan v. 7 Eng. Reprint Lord 1846, 943, in In Chancellor Cottenham handed down 1839. The Heriot’s Hos dictum in had uttered similar Feoffees of Ross, However, 1508. the dictum of 8 pital Reprint Eng. in Duncan 1866 Docks (Mersey case was overruled Gibbs, Trustees v. 11 Reprint 1500), Holliday Eng. v. Mayor case in Foreman Canterbury, was reversed 1871. court resurrected L. R. 6 B. 214. Thus the Massachusetts Q. Leonard’s after it was the rule of v. St. 5 Holliday years Hu Port in from Parker v. repudiated England.” [Quoted ron Hospital, 361 Mich. 105 N. W. 1 (1960) ]. the fact of its in the doctrine

Despite repudiation England, country, charitable momentum in this immunity gained was, intervals, and it at or modi- various in complete adopted However, commencing fied in many jurisdictions. versions Island in there began grad- with the State of Rhode doctrine, in whole or in part, ual renunciation 2 foregoing prior are the that “The in stated .Tefcoat in no doubt that the decisions . . . There can be decisions of this Court. Lindler, Vermillion, general expressions to and Lecher contain broad exempt liability. tort from all that charitable institutions the effect However, exemption from complete the broad statement of a rule of cases, and the rule liability unnecessary to a decision in those tort was beyond by our decisions never been extended of charitable has Vermillion, Lindler, Lecher. . . .” in the facts Island, R. I. states. Glavin v. Rhode Hospital, Prosser the demise of Am. 675. writes that Rep. has the doctrine is alive well been such that Maine, New Mex its form three states: only complete Prosser, Torts,

ico, Law and South Carolina. Section *6 ed. (4th 1971). the on en

While which the of the banc majority ground Court in Lindler v. Columbia rested its de- Hospital, supra, cision was that it to hold a would be against public policy charitable institution for of its the responsible negligence care, servants selected with due for this basis the decision received little discussion from This the was majority. ground criticized the dissenters strongly by speaking through Justice Fraser, who is that “It a of law as well argued principle morals, men that must be before are just they generous. There is no or more than higher just principle that a trust done, fund shall the evil itself has before it remedy attempts the evils done others”. S. remedy by 98 C. at 81 S. E. rationale, at 515. in logic expressed has as the served thrust for the decline of primary the doctrine in American many jurisdictions. The defendant that revision or of the argues abrogation doctrine of charitable in be left this State should to the General Assembly. This Court has stated on several occasions that such However, should be followed. policy we do not feel that such should deter reasoning any longer us from the of charitable doctrine re-evaluating hospitals contributing Another factor to this decline insofar as enormously hospitals expanded concerned is the fact that have rely paying patients great now on from revenue to a extent. Parker bar, Hospital, supra. v. Port Huron pital In the case at the defendant hos- $12,000,000 annually charged receives over from and received fees $100,000 patients, County paying only from and receives from Anderson pay expenses charity patients. hospital the administrator of While the defrayed expense appropriation adequately that the the of denied treating charity hospial’s come patients, he the funds admitted pay large paying patients patients from and at least of all 90% report appended deposition An to the their bids. pital hospital auditor’s hos- of defendant administrator reflects fact the assets from 13.8 in 1973 to 14.5 million dollar’s increased million dollars in 1974. whether it should be abolished or modified.

and determining be that this doctrine was It must remembered not established but, rather, enactment of this Court by opinion by legislative Lindler case. It is that in observe interesting of Fraser in Lindler the dissenting opinion following Justice but, must, not to if “Courts ought legislate, they appears: their should be wise then and safe.” 98 C. at legislation S. doctrine of charitable 81 S. E. at 517. In adopting at that time judicially the Court immunity, majority and carved an to the exception legislated public policy princi- this has not ple respondeat superior. Although taken the doctrine of chari- itself the task upon modifying now, the reason for the table until change posi- is, tion ra- of this Court reflected part, following tionale : on

“The law’s not emphasis ordinarily liability, immun- has ity, widened it in wrongdoing. Respondeat superior *7 an and to a extent institutionally, large corporately, organiz- is no ed defense. When it has community. Charity generally been as a trust or has shift- organized corporation, emphasis ed from to The conditions of liability law and of immuntiy. The rule of im- the shift have changed. fact which created trend of of with the general legislative is out munity step losses incurred individ- by in distributing and judicial policy all who of an enterprise among the operation uals through borne them to be wholly benefit it rather than leaving by President Directors those sustain them. . . .” who by of D. 76 U. S. C. Georgetown College Hughes, App. 130 F. 810 (2d) (1942). the law of

The defendant that no argues change this should be made Court by charitable immunity This this reason of stare decisis. We reject argument. is not intended “to effect a ‘petrifying rigidity,’ doctrine and stabili that flows from certainty but to assure the justice 163 N. Y. S. N. Y. Thunig, (2d) ty”. Bing decisis stare Fundamentally, 143 N. E. (1957). 20 Am. of law; of it is a matter judicial policy. is not rule a immu- It does not render Courts (1965). (2d), §184 Jur. rules. of common law table formulations judicial time, however, that hospitals same we recognize At the health care and role in this in the of vital State area play of the sick It is essential injured. the rehabilitation at level that function the highest public good hospitals Therefore, of limitation of the immunity performance. any as insensitiv- defense as to should not be hospitals interpreted on the charitable concerns. ity part legitimate abolition of the in favor of advanced arguments are not of charitable persuasive.

doctrine result in the of the doctrine would Total abrogation interests yet equally important failure to balance competing who of the objects of those persons hospitals We, therefore, an intermediate ground torts. adopt hospitals’ tortious acts of com anyone injured through and hold that servants, of the or or omission agents, employees mission in this State recover may a charitable hospital officers of if the can such hospital, aggrieved party against damages because the hospital’s occurred injuries that the establish disregard plaintiff’s rights. reckless heedlessness is than is one which higher of proof This standard that standard proof required It parallels simple negligence. known (1962), popularly Code under S. C. §46-801 fosters Immunity neglect Automobile Guest Statute. the exercise of liability encourages while and irresponsibility, our common system cornerstone of law This basic due care. immunity. is frustrated total of jurisprudence our applicable only We holding emphasize *8 not this defendant. We do extend including hospitals, of charita or defense modify it so to abrogate as missions, churches, rescue orphanages, as to ble starting adequate an 46-801 serve as dealing with Section The cases necessary proof we set forth interpreting the standard point holdings may in such cases opinion, to the extent in this in a the one at bar. to the facts case such as applied logically be and other institutions

colleges, nature, which are and purpose operation. decisions of this previous inconsistent with set forth herein are overruled. holding in this

We aware State have acted hospitals in reliance the old rule of charitable upon and not have taken themselves may steps protect Therefore, with insurance. we follow the liability adequate states, Carolina, of other such as procedure North and hold that the modification of the doctrine of charitable immunity, as set forth in this to this case opinion, only and to applies those causes of action after arising filing opinion, 10, 1977. See Rabon v. Rowan May Memorial Hospital, Inc., 269 N. C. 152 S. E. (1967). circuit

We reverse the Order sum- judge granting defendant on the to the that it is an mary ground judgment thus entitled tO' from eleemosynary corporation, suit, remand the case for further and consistent proceedings with this opinion.

Reversed Remanded. J.,C.

Lewis, A. concur. J., Littlejohn, JJ., Gregory, Ñess and dissent.

Ness, (dissenting). Justice of the majority I concur in that which opinion portion the doctrine charitable immunity, minimumly qualifies however, I think the is sufficient do not change suggested doctrine, I I abolish dissent. would as hospitals, in its entirety.

This in the United States doctrine was accepted after been The first court in this England. had repudiated doctrine was Rhode Island. See Glavin country reject Island, v. Rhode 12 R. I. 34 Am. Rep. (1879). fact, In in the stated the doctrine in majority opinion, its states, form has been in all but three complete repudiated Maine, Prosser, New Mexico South Carolina. Law Torts, Section 133 Ed. (4th 1971).

489 been soundly The doctrine has and criticized universally archaic, irrational unreasonable. It to tends foster the institution negligence protects well able afford the financial payment damages, placing on burden the one is least bear it. who able to The seminal charitable in decision South Caro- lina was Lindler1 and the rested court there sharply divided its on holding public This was criti- policy grounds. strongly cized dissenters who argued: morals,

“It is of law that men must a as well as principle be before is no more There or just they generous. higher a trust evil than that fund shall just principle remedy done, has itself before it done attempts remedy evils 35, At others.” S. E. 81 at 515. page page that the an This has recognized opinions appel- Court as the adminis- court should remain as constant proper late an will enlightened per- tration of under justice government Timmerman, 35, 234 106 S. Dean v. C. E. mit. S. (2d) the issue before us whether the Thus squarely 665 (1969). are valid today. public policy underpinnings doctrine The doctrine of charitable have been immunity may justi- at time. we in under facts live a existing Today fied a new world with set of facts. changing is not the endeavors public policy Discouraging doctrine, State, however, of the as to the abrogation charities fade will away. does not mean hospitals, chaos were inevitably follow the “If havoc financial doctrine, as the advocates for its abrogation insist, have become certainly would retention this apparent is no where that doctrine defense.” longer States 486, 503, 417 Pa. Hospital, 208 Pennsylvania Flagiello Accord, v. Rowan Rabon 201. Memorial 193 at A. (2d) E. 485 (1967). 269 N. C. S. Hospital, (1914). 98 S. 81 S. E. 512 C. Hospital, v. Columbia Lindler there was for the doctrine Assuming justification when announced, was first it has lost that In justification today. 1960, Supreme Parker Port Michigan Huron Hospital, Mich. 105 N. W. 1 held: “It is our conclusion that there is no today factual justifi- this, cation for in a case such as that principles *10 law, of and intrinsic logic demand that the justice mantle of be immunity withdrawn. The almost unanimous ex- view in the recent decisions of pressed our sister States is that insofar as the rule of was ever justified, changed conditions have rendered the rule no longer necessary.” rule, is the As in

Liability stated exception. Flaqiello Pennsylvania Hospital, supra, 494, v. 417 Pa. at 208 A. at 198:

“A recover person may if he is damages injured, hotel, theater, store, rink, result of in a negligence, skating train or he cannot he is bowling alley, yet recover if ship, hurt in the where accidents place are considered most un- to occur—in a likely one hospital, where to be cured goes of an already and not to existing infirmity be saddled with additional woe and torment. This is indeed the of paradox reason, paradoxes. all, It no of has and least logic, justice that, And still more is the support it. paradoxical argument by to the victim of a own refusing recovery hospital’s negli- one is gence, somehow serving charity!”

Here the application immunity favors hos- large which derives pital substantial revenue from paying patients over a at the hands of paying patient allegedly injured those with care. charged patient

I conclude that the interst is public ill served continu- ation of the exemption.

“Neither the of encouragement charity philanthropy nor the doctrine of on the of ground public policy can the fact that dispel interest and primary welfare of that one public should not suffer an in- requires person in merely his or her life or limb without recompense jury should all of the of a charitable hospital order that earnings for others.” charity be to the purpose providing devoted 939, Holmes, Miss. Baptist Hospital Mississippi in Rabon 156. with Cited approval So. (2d) E. Memorial 269 N. C. 152 S. Hospital, Rowan 485, 493 (1967). is insurance. of funds for hospitals source

The primary of its more than charges paid It is estimated 70% insurance makes the Another benefits. type insurance insurance avail- Liability more unrealistic. doctrine even of this cost would not rates. effect at reasonable able fact, could be passed funds of the hospital, deplete anticipation costs. Some hospitals, on as patient now this cloak of immunity, not have will they when day insurance. carry does not suggest as to hospitals immunty Abolition I of charities. concerns to legitimate that I am insensitive *11 in- as a business functions that if a hospital believe firmly patients from paying by receiving payments stitution establishment also offers, a business must be it what its meeting obligations. its

I abolish the doctrine would the case for further remand toas entirety, hospitals, with this opinion. consistent proceedings concurs. J., Gregory, Charleston, Bishop 247 S. C. in Decker charity (1966) was insured.

S. E.

Case Details

Case Name: Brown Ex Rel. Estate of Brown v. Anderson County Hospital Ass'n
Court Name: Supreme Court of South Carolina
Date Published: May 10, 1977
Citation: 234 S.E.2d 873
Docket Number: 20420
Court Abbreviation: S.C.
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