72 So. 366 | Ala. | 1916
This court on former appeal held that under the evidence the inference of subsequent negligence was for the jury. — Brown & Flowers v. C. of Ga. Ry. Co., 185 Ala. 659, 64 South. 581. The affirmative charge requested by defendant was properly refused on this trial. Both trials were had on counts 3 and 4, added by way_ of amendment, and in these counts there was no allegation of wanton, willful, or intentional wrong.
In Brown & Flowers v. C. of Ga. Ry. Co., supra, this court said that: “Being a trespasser in taking the team to that place,” assuming the dangerous character of the driveway, and knowledge thereof by both defendant’s agent and plaintiff’s agent, then plaintiff’s agent “was guilty of initial contributory negligence, which conclusively answered the simple initial negligence charged
“Diligence” is defined in Grant v. Moseley, Adm’r, 29 Ala. 302, by Judge Stone, as follows: “ ‘Diligence,’ when the law imposes it as a duty, implies that ‘we shall do those things we ought to do, and leave undone those things we ought not to do.’ It requires action, as well as forbearance to act.” — Randle v. B. R. L. & P. Co., 169 Ala. 314, 324, 53 South. 918.
* Judge Stone declared that, in fixing the degree of diligence required of engineers in charge of trains, “ordinary diligence does not meet the reasonable requirements of such travel and transportation.” — Tanner, Ex’r, v. L. & N. R. R. Co., 60 Ala. 621, 643. The measure of such duty is variously expressed as follows: “Due care,” “reasonable care,” and diligence to avoid injury’ (Walker v. Ala. T. & N. Co., supra; South. Ry. Co. v. Stewart, supra; Bentley v. Ga. Pac. Ry. Co., 86 Ala. 485, 6 South. 37; Cent. R. & B. Co. v. Vaughan, 93 Ala. 209, 9 South. 468, 30 Am. St. Rep. 50; Haley v. K. C., M. & B. R. R. Co., 113 Ala. 640, 649, 21 South. 357; Randle v. B. R. L. & P. Co., 158 Ala. 532, 48 South. 114); reasonable care (Weatherly v. N. C. & St. L. Ry., 166 Ala. 575, 51 South. 959; Tanner’s Case, 60 Ala. 621); due care and reasonable diligence (B. S. R. R. Co. v. Kendrick, 155 Ala. 352, 46 South. 588) ; the use of “every reasonable means” and the employment of “every reasonable agency” to “avert the catastrophe” (Pannell, Adm’x, v. N. F. & S. R. R. Co., 97 Ala. 298, 12 South. 236); the doing of no act, the omission of nothing
It follows that, for the error of the trial court in giving at defendant’s request written charges 2 and 5, the judgment must be reversed, and the cause remanded.
Reversed and remanded.