69 Ga. 712 | Ga. | 1883
Isaac T. Wyatt, in May, 1873, employed Key & Preston, attorneys at law, to procure for him a discharge in ■ bankruptcy, and in consideration of their services therefor, executed to them a deed to one hundred acres of his land. This land, as appears by an agreed statement of. facts, was “reported” in the bankruptcy proceedings, and “allowed” as fees to the attorneys, by the register and district judge, but was never taken charge of by the assignee. The testimony shows that this land was sold by the attorneys to W. H. Wyatt, a son of the bankrupt, the bankrupt acting as the agent of the son in the purchase, and taking for him a bond for titles, under which the son claimed that he went into possession.-' This bond was transferred to J. A. Broughton, to whom the attorneys named made a deed, April 23, 1878, and under which he claims to have been also in possession of the land.
An execution against the bankrupt, dated January .22, 1859, ar*d never proved in bankruptcy, was levied upon this land, March 11, 1879: a claim was interposed by Broughton, a trial had, and the property found subject; whereupon he moved for a new trial, which was refused, and he assigned the same as error. ' • '
Under this motion for a new trial, we are called on to decide:
(1.) Whether the facts stated discharged the lien of the plaintiff’s judgment on this-land; and, ■
In this connection, the judge refused to charge the following request in writing, offered by the claimant’s counsel: “ The fact that a purchaser of land had actual notice of a subsisting judgment against it, is not absolutely conclusive against said purchaser on the question of boTta fides, but the presumption of fraud, or of bad faith, arising from such actual notice at the time of the purchase, may be rebutted by proof of other circumstances antecedent or accompanying the transaction.”
This court concurs with the judge below in holding that notice to Isaac T. Wyatt, who purchased this land for his son, was notice to the son ; that is to say, actual notice to the agent of any matter connected with his agency, is also actual notice to the principal, and he is bound thereby. Upon the balance of the charge given, and that refused,
For myself, I adhere to the judgment rendered in the case of Prater vs. Cox et al., 64 Ga., 706, and refer to the opinion there delivered for the reasons which induced me to concur with the late Chief Justice Warner on the ruling then made. It is due to the learned judge, whose judgment is here reversed,' to say that, in pronouncing it, he followed the decisions made by a majority of this court in the cases of Phillips vs. Dobbins, 56 Ga., 617, and Prater vs. Cox et al., 64 Ga., 706, which contained the latest rulings on the question.
Judgment reversed.