84 Wis. 381 | Wis. | 1893
1. The evidence establishes beyond doubt or question that George W. Kelso, at the time he signed the note and mortgage in question, was of unsound mind and wholly incapable of conducting the business transaction in question. Extended comment is unnecessary to establish a conclusion so manifest, and against which respondent’s counsel were unable to offer serious argument. We have collected the evidence as to the condition of George W. Kelso, and as to what took place at the time the note and mortgage were signed, with the manner of its execution and alleged delivery, because of its important bearing upon the question of notice of his incompetency to the bank defendant. Mr. Towsley, who certified to the acknowledgment of the mortgage, and signed it as a subscribing witness, was, and for some two or three years had been, cashier and general manager of the bamk, and it is fair to assume that he possessed the intelligence, quickness of perception, experience, and sound judgment necessary to fit him for his position, and which similar bank officers usually possess. George E. Kelso owned and carried on a pulp mill, and had had dealings with the bank, and was then owing it a considerable sum of money, and in almost desperate financial straits. This note and mortgage were devised as a means of relief, either by selling it, or, it would seem, by using it at the bank; and the claim was made, acquiesced in by
2. Notice to an agent is notice to his principal, and it is conceded that the principal is bound and affected bj^ such knowledge or notice as his agent obtains in negotiating or attending to the particular transaction. But if the agent acquires his information so recently as to make it incredible that he should have forgotten it, his principal will be bound, although not acquired while transacting the business of the principal. The case of Walker v. Grand Rapids F. M. Co. 70 Wis. 92, is a strong case in point to show that the bank when it acquired its interest in the note and mortgage became affected with the notice Towsley had then so recently acquired at the time the papers were executed. This conclusion is supported by Dresser v. Norwood, 17 C. B. (N. S.), 466; The Distilled Spirits, 11 Wall. 366; Hovey v. Blanchard, 13 N. H. 145; Patten v. Merchants' & F. M. F. Ins. Co. 40 N. H. 375; Hart v. F. & M. Bank, 33 Vt. 252; Holden v.
3. It is contended that the plaintiffs are estopped from disputing the validity of the note and mortgage in the hands of the bank, and the judgment of the circuit court proceeds upon this ground. There is no ground for saying that either of them is estopped by the mortgage. William A. Kelso was not a party to it, and Margaret Kelso, the wife of the mortgagor, -was not bound by it, either as to her dower or homestead right. If the mortgage did not bind her husband, it did not bind her; and if avoided as to him, it would be avoided as to her as well. Separate and apart from her husband she could not convey or bind by deed or mortgage her dower or homestead right. Munger v. Perkins, 62 Wis. 499; Godfrey v. Thornton, 46 Wis. 677. As the bank is affected with notice through Towsley, its cashier, of all the material facts, it is in no position to insist upon an estoppel by matter in pais or an equitable es-toppel as against the plaintiffs. It cannot say that it has
For these reasons the judgment of the circuit court is erroneous, and should have been in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants.
By the Court.— The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the cause remanded with directions to enter judgment declaring the note and mortgage in question void, and canceling the same as against the plaintiffs and their right, title, and interest in the lands described.