Lead Opinion
Aрpellant was convicted of the offense of rape of a female under the age of consent, and his punishment fixed at five years confinement in the penitentiary.
It appears from the first bill of exceptions in the record that the prosecution made a statement of its case, as is permitted by our statute, in the opening. No objection seems to have been made to the ex *522 tended character of this statement at the time, although it was strenuously objеcted to in the presentation of the case in oral argument before this Court. After the said statement was concluded, appellant asked that he be permitted to again question the members of the jury which had been selected in аccordance with the law and duly sworn, as to whether or not any of them had formed any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused which might influence their verdict, from hearing the opening statement made by the prosecution. The request of appellant was refused by the trial court, and we see no error in such refusal. If the appellant felt that the State’s right to make a proper statement of its case was being exceeded, and that his rights were bеing invaded, and he was suffering injury from the character of statement indulged in, the time for objection was when such statement was made. We know of no rule of procedure that would authorize the granting of the request referred to, or the dischargе of any member of the jury who might be willing to state that he had concluded from the opening statement that the accused was guilty.
Appellant has several bills of exceptions pertaining to objections made to testimony of the prosеcutrix as to her family surroundings and method of daily living. We are unable to see anything presented by any of these bills of exceptions from which possible harm might have come to the appellant. Several of the matters included were material as showing the movements and situation of the girl at the various times she says she was met by appellant anterior and leading up to the occasion of the intercourse between them. It was not objectionable to permit the prosecutrix to state that her father and elder brother were away from home at the time of these occurrences, it appearing from the record that her first report of the occurrences was made to the neighbors and оfficers. Nor do we see any valid ground of objection to permitting the prosecutrix, after appellant had asked her if any one else had ever been' familiar with her, to state that no other person had had carnal connеction with her prior to the date of this offense.
Appellant offered the testimony of a physician, to the general effect that the penetration of a female organ by that of a male, would probably rupture the hymen of the female if intact and normal, and would likely give evidence as to whether or not there had been any penetration. This testimony was refused by the trial court, and we think properly. There appears no evidence in the record of any examination having theretofore been made, or testimony thereof being offered, as to the condition of the private parts of the prosecutrix, or any other evidence making such testimony material and we are unable to see what issue the offered testimony of the physician could legitimately affect.
When appellant was a witness, he was asked relative to certain portions of two applications for continuance theretofore made and signed by him, the statements in which were contradictory of his evidence, and as to both he claimed that the statements therein were untrue, but
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offered certain explanations of his action in signing same. Each of said statements sо referred to, if true, would have been very material to the defense, and if untrue, was material for the purpose of impeaching the testimony of appellant as a witness in this case. While appellant offered explanatiоns as to how he came to make such statements, we do not think the State was precluded from offering in evidence such portions of each application as appellant was questioned about, and which were contrary to his evidence as a witness. Appellant asked a special instruction to the effect that the jury would not consider the second application offered by the State, but we think the instruction was properly refused. Wilson v. State,
In his charge, the court pointedly told the jury that if they found from the evidence that appellant was not present at the McAnally Springs in San Saba County, between five o’clоck p. m. and one-half hour before sunset on July 8, 1918, but was at another and different place, or that the jury had a reasonable doubt thereof, they should acquit. This charge made unnecessary the special charge asked bjr appеllant, to the effect that if the jury found that the intercourse, if any, between appellant and the prosecutrix, took place on June 19, 1918, the jury should acquit. Prosecutrix had sworn positively that the act occurred at McAnally Springs on July 8. The сourt’s charge above referred to, limits both time and place to the one named by her, and effectually instructs an acquittal if the jury believed it occurred at any other time or place.
We have omitted an extended discussion оf the facts in this case, but are of opinion that they show an assault upon the morals of a young and inexperienced girl by a mature man of more than forty years of age; that the girl was led to believe that this man loved her, and would not undertаke to induce her to do wrong; but that other *524 girls did the same way as he was seeking to get her to do, without injury, and that she yielded her youth and innocence to his embraces. The lure of an automobile figures potently in the case, and probably hаd its effect on this prosecutrix, who first began to take rides therein harmlessly, but soon was being led on from kisses to embraces and indecencies and ruin. The jury was lenient with appellant in giving him five years in the penitentiary.
Finding no error in the judgment, the same is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Addendum
ON REHEARING.
February 23, 1921.
Appellant insists that when on the witnеss stand he admitted that he had made statements, in his two applications for continuance, contradictory of his testimony; and that having made such admission, this case should now be reversed because the State was allowed to put both оf said applications in evidence. The objection, that the applications should not be allowed because he had already admitted such facts, does not appear in the bill of exceptions. If it did so appear we would be compelled to hold that in order to justify the rejection of proof thereof his admissions would have to be without qualification, which was not the case. xThe facts show that two applications for continuance had bеen made, presented and overruled. Each of them contained matter contradictory not only of appellant’s testimony on this trial but of each other. While admitting that he signed and swore to such applications, appellant made various excuses and statements regarding the circumstances under which he made said statements if they appeared therein, stating, in effect, that he did not know that parts of the statements attributed to him were in such applicatiоns;—that they were rushed for time in preparing same;—that his mistake was as to dates;—that he called his attorney’s attention to one of the mistakes. It seems well settled that where one makes a qualified denial, the party attacking such witness is еntitled to introduce proof of the contradictory statements. We have examined the authorities cited. None of them, nor does any other known to us, hold it reversible error to allow proof of such contradictory statements whеn the denial is qualified; nor do any of the authorities cited even go to the extent of holding that a case would be reversed where the witness admitted having made the contradictory statement, and proof was thereafter admitted of sаme.
There was no error in refusing the motion of appellant to instruct the jury not to consider the preliminary statement made by the State, as evidence. The statement was made by an attorney for the prosecution, and it appears throughout to be a statement of what the State expected to show by witnesses. Nohing herein appears to make it at *525 all probable, or even possible, for the jury to consider that same was being given by said attorney as a witness or аs his testimony.
The proposition is urged that notwithstanding the fact that prosecutrix testified positively that there was but one act of intercourse between appellant and herself, which occurred on July 8, 1918; and that appellant testified with еqual positiveness that there was never any act of intercourse between them at all, still the trial court erred in not telling the jury that they could not convict if the act took place before June 19, 1918, at which time the law raising the age оf consent to eighteen became effective. It is well settled that there must be some substantial evidence calling for an instruction before it becomes the duty of the trial court to give same. In 'this case the prosecutrix testified that shе had been out with appellant in his car a few times before the 19th of June, but that no act of intercourse took place between them. She stated that on these occasions.he kissed her and fondled her person, and that he sоught her carnal favor, but she denied positively that anything of the kind occurred. It seems to us so very unlikely that the jury would have disregarded the positive testimony of the prosecutrix that the only intercourse was on July 8th; and would also have disregarded the positive testimony of appellant that no such act of intercourse occurred at any time; and that the jury would have presumed, in the face of all the testimony on that point, that the intercourse occurred before June 19th, that we are constrained to hold that it was not necessary for the trial court to have given the charge asked presenting said issue.
We have carefully considered the other grounds contained in this motion for rehearing, but believing that all of them were correctly disposed of in our former opinion, the motion will be overruled.
Overruled.