BROOKS v. THE STATE
S08G1898
Supreme Court of Georgia
April 28, 2009
Reconsideration Denied June 1, 2009
285 Ga. 424 | 677 SE2d 68
THOMPSON, Justice
Gaslowitz Frankel, Craig M. Frankel, Lisa C. Lambert, LeAnne M. Gilbert, for Kleber et al.
THOMPSON, Justice.
We granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals in Brooks v. State, 292 Ga. App. 445 (664 SE2d 827) (2008), to consider whether reasonable grounds were required to justify a seаrch and seizure of probationer Jerry Matthew Brooks person and/or property despite the existence of a validly imposed special condition of probation that prospeсtively waived Brooks Fourth Amendment rights. Upon further scrutiny of the record, however, we conclude that this is not the appropriate case to address that issue because this case turns on the validity of a consent to search. We thus leave for another day the question of whether a probation search must be supported by reasonable grounds despite a Fourth Amendment waiver.
During a period of time thаt Brooks was serving the probated portion of a sentence for a prior felony drug conviction, officers assigned to the Cherokee County Multi-Agency Narcotics Squad (CMANS) were informed by the Cherokee County Sheriff s Department about complaints that Brooks had lodged accusing CMANS agents of conducting annoying surveillance of his property and interfering with his privacy. In addition, CMANS officers received two anоnymous tips that Brooks was in possession of methamphetamine. The officers inquired into the terms of Brooks probation agreement and learned that certain special conditions had been impоsed. In pertinent part, Brooks was prohibited from consuming alcohol or controlled substances; he was required to produce urine and/or blood specimens to be tested for the presencе of such prohibited substances upon request of law enforcement officers; and he was subject to a search of his home and/or person with or without a warrant whenever requested to do so by law enforcement officers. Based on the foregoing information, several officers went to Brooks residence to conduct a probation search. The officers identified themselves and stated thаt they were there to conduct a probation search in accordance with Brooks probation agreement. Brooks replied, “okay,” and voiced no objection to the search. Thе officers found nothing of interest in the house and asked if they could have a key to a padlocked barn on the property. Brooks replied that he did not have the key but he offered to crawl inside thrоugh a hole
After the state crime lab determined the presence of methamphetamine in Brooks urine, an indictment was returned charging him with possession of methamphetamine and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. A pretrial motion to suppress was denied. A bench trial was held in which Brooks conceded that he possessed both methamphetamine and the weapon. He also stipulаted that during the search of his home he informed the officers of the location of the shotgun and acknowledged having used it a few days earlier. Brooks was found guilty as charged, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Brooks, supra.
In Fox v. State, 272 Ga. 163 (2) (527 SE2d 847) (2000), this Court determined that a special condition of probation pursuant to which a defendant waived his Fourth Amendment rights was invalid because it was not properly obtained as part of the plea bargaining process. The Court went on to consider whether reasonable grounds existed to justify the search despite an invalidly imposed condition of probation. In analyzing the issue, we acknowledged that “when a probationer has not consented to a search, a warrantless search of probationer s home must be based upon reasonable grounds to believe that the probationer has contraband in the home or is engaged in some criminal activity there.” (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 166 (2). We thus address whether Brooks validly gave consent to the search and seizure which led to his indictment and conviction.
It is well settled that a valid consent to a search eliminates the need for either probable cause or a search warrant. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218, 219 (93 SC 2041, 36 LE2d 854) (1973); Meschino v. State, 259 Ga. 611 (4) (385 SE2d 281) (1989). “In order to justify a warrantless search on the grounds of consent, the State has the burden of proving that the consent was freely and voluntarily given under the totality of the circumstances.” Raulerson v. State, 268 Ga. 623, 625 (2) (a) (491 SE2d 791) (1997). “[I]t is only by
Accordingly, we hold that under the totality of the circumstances, the State has carried its burden of demonstrating that Brooks’ consent to search wаs freely and voluntarily given. Because the Court of Appeals upheld the denial of the motion to suppress, albeit for another reason, we affirm the judgment below.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Carley and Melton, JJ., who concur specially.
I respectfully disagree with the majority‘s conclusion that we do not need to presently answer the question addressed to the parties on certiorari of “[w]hether the State must demonstrate ‘reasonable grounds’ to justify a search or seizure despite the existence of a validly imposed condition of probation or parole that prospectively waived the probationer or parolee‘s Fourth Amendment rights.” In this case, the facts make it difficult to determine whether there was adequate independent consent at the time of the seаrch as opposed to mere acquiescence. There is no showing that the police asked for and received consent to search. There is a showing that the police represеnted Brooks’ probation agreement as authority to search and that Brooks accommodated them. The majority equates the act of accommodation as consent. Rather than rule оn this basis, I would reach the question presented on certiorari and find that reasonable grounds are not necessary to justify a probation search like the one in this case.
As a special condition of probation, Jerry Matthew Brooks knowingly and voluntarily waived his Fourth Amendment rights with regard to future searches. Under these circumstances, I would hold that, because Brooks agreed to this special condition, hе consented to a search like the one in this case. See Samson v. California, 547 U. S. 843, 857 (IV) (126 SC 2193, 165 LE2d 250) (2006) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment does not prohibit a police officer from conducting a suspicionless search of a parolee” where parole conditions include parolee s consent to such searches); Fox v. State, 272 Ga. 163, 166 (2) (527 SE2d 847) (2000) (“when a probationer has not consented to a search, a warrantless search of a probationer s home must be based upon reasonable grounds“) (emphasis supplied); People v. Robles, 23 Cal. 4th 789, 795 (2000) (“[A] person may validly consent in advance to warrantless searches and seizures in exchange for the opportunity to avoid serving а state prison term“) (emphasis supplied). As a result of his conviction, Brooks chose to pay this price for his freedom, and the State has the right to the full benefit of that bargain.
I am authorized to state that Justiсe Carley joins me in this special concurrence.
DECIDED APRIL 28, 2009 —
RECONSIDERATION DENIED JUNE 1, 2009.
John A. Nuckolls, Sr., John A. Nuckolls, Jr., for appellant.