47 Miss. 243 | Miss. | 1872
In 1871, George W. Brooks, of Rankin county, filed his bill of complaint against the tax collector of that county, with a prayer for injunction, upon the following averments, viz.: “ That the assessor of taxes of said county for the fiscal year 1870 did assess the real and personal property of complainant above its proper valuation, in this, to wit: that the lands of complainant, 2591 acres, more or less, were assessed at the sum of $7 per acre, making the sum of $18,137; a lot at Pelahatchie depot, at $1,000; and a lot in Brandon at $1,000; 25 cattle at $15 per head — $375; 6 horses at $150 each —$900; 6 mules at $150 — $900; 20 swine at $4 per head — $80; 20 head sheep at $2 — $40; and 2 vehicles at $125, making the aggregate amount of real property so assessed, $20,137, and the personalty $2,420, which makes the total of such assessment $22,557. Complainant states and charges that the state tax upon said assessment is $113.78, and upon which was levied by the board of supervisors of said county, for the various special and county purposes, two hundred and ninety-five per cent, making such county and special tax the additional sum of $335.67, and a total tax on said property for state and county purposes the sum of $449.45.
“ Complainant would state and show that the proper valuation of said property at the said time of assessment as aforesaid was as follows, to wit: said lands, 2591 acres at $3 per acre — $7,773; house and lot at Brandon, $500, and at Pelahatchie $500, making $8,773 of real estate, and 25 head of cattle at $10 — $250 ; 6 horses at $120— $720; 6 mules at $120 — $720; 20 sheep at $1.50 — $30; 20 swine at $3-$60, and 2 vehicles at $100, making $1,880 of personal estate, and the total amount $10,653 ; and so he states and charges that said assessment was excessive, erroneous and unjust and oppressive- to the amount of $11,904, the difference between the amount assessed and the true and proper valuation of the said
“ Complainant would further state and show that he applied to the said board of supervisors on the 17th April, 1871, to correct his said assessment under the act of 22d March, 1871, but they refused to entertain his application because at that time no notice had been given under the said act, which reason, as he is' advised and believes, is not tenable; and that said board could then and ought to have heard and decided the same. And complainant further states and charges that the said board did give notice that they would be in session on the first day of May, 1871 (and not before), for the purpose of correcting assessments under said act; but as complainant states and charges, that will be too late to afford him any relief, because by the terms of that act, the power of said board will have ceased for any such purpose, and they will have no right or power to entertain any application for that purpose. # # * Complainant states and charges that he'proposed and offered to pay said (tax collector) on the 28th April, 1871, all the taxes he was justly due, to wit: $212.37, but said (tax collector) refused to accept that unless complainant would pay all, to wit: said sum of $451.45, and complainant is ready at any and all times to pay said sum of $212.37.
“ Complainant states that unless restrained, said tax collector will add 50 per cent on said tax after May, 1871, and will proceed to advertise and sell the property of complainant for the same, and that great injustice and oppression would be inflicted upon complainant ; ” whereupon he prays for a perpetual stay as to the excess above set forth.
It will be observed of this bill, that it does not charge fraud on the part of the officials, nor that property not belonging to the complainant, or not subject to taxation, was included in the levy, but that the. error was, substantially, one of judgment, and the question for our determination is, only, whether a court of equity can solve the problem presented in this record.
From our present examination we are under the impression that legislation in this state is deficient in its remedies in this class of cases, while, in most if not all the other states, statutory provisions for review, appeal, certiorari and mandamus are minute, full, and ample to meet every case that may arise.
Were it conceded by the answer that the excess of valuation and tax, as stated in the bill, correctly fixes the line between the true and the erroneous assessment, there might be no harm in enjoining the excess, but the question is, can our court of chancery, without legislation, proceed, upon the facts, stated in the bill to take testimony, doubtless conflicting in its valuation, several witnesses giving each a different estimate, and upon these various opinions, determine the proper assessment ?
We infer from the bill that the assessment of the property of the complainant was under ch. 4, p. 24, Pamphlet Acts, 1870, by which, sec. 2, it is made the duty of the assessor to call on each taxable inhabitant for a list of all taxable property under- oath. Sec. 3 requires “ the assessor to list each and every person in his county, and assess all the property, personal or real, therein,” and at the regular meeting of the supervisors
Recurring to section 3, it. will be seen that “ appeals” are allowed only from the assessment of the assessor, “ where any person shall refuse to give in a list of his property; and it is declared that the decision of the board upon such appeal shall be final.”
By the second subdivision of that section, it is provided, that “ any person who may feel aggrieved at anything in the assessment of his property may appeal before the board of equalization, either in person or by agent, and have the same corrected in such manner as to the said board shall appear just and equitable, and from the decision of the board there shall be no appeal.”
By a part of section 1, ch. 5, p. 38, Pamphlet Acts, 1870, it would seem that the legislature intended to extend the time of meeting of the supervisors as a board of equalization, from the second Monday of August (as provided in ch. 4, sec. 12, supra) to any time between that date and the first day of November; but, by the latter paragraph of the same section, such meeting would appear to be limited to any Monday in August for the aforesaid purposes, the section being drawn with the blindness and contradiction for which legislative enactments ought not to be obnoxious.
By ch, 34, p. 92, Pamphlet Acts, 1871, the boards of supervisors of the several counties of this state were empowered to correct all erroneous assessments; for which purpose they were required to hold a meeting of not more than five, days in each county, after giving
It is a well known rule, that every citizen is presumed to know the law. Accordingly, the complainant is chargeable with knowledge of the provisions and terms of ch. 3 and ch. 4, Laws of 1870, above referred to, and of his duty and right to appear before the board of equalization on the second Monday of August, 1870, or at any time thereafter prior to the first day of November of that jrnar. Whether he attempted to avail himself of that right is not stated in the bill. He does, however, aver that he demanded the correction of the assessment of his property on the 17th of April, 1871. The inference, as well as the presumption, is, that he neglected the opportunity of seeking such correction during the period allowed in 1870. Probably, however, the assessment, as a matter of fact, was not completed in time to apply for a correction of errors within the period prescribed in chapters 3 and 4, supra, though the bill fails to so aver, and hence the case of the complainant has not the full benefit of a want of opportunity or a denial of a hearing upon a proper demand.
Under the law approved March 22, 1871, demand of correction was not made until April 17, when the time limited by that statute had nearly expired. It may be inferred from the course of legislation, that the assessors and supervisors of 1870-71 were dilatory, if not ignorant and inefficient. Whether these facts ought to have induced greater diligence on the part of the complainant, or- whether they commend him to. the favor of a court of equity, it is hardly worth while to inquire or indicate, further than to remark that, in this class of cases, the courts uniformly hold the party seeking
The Methodist Protestant Church v. the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 6 Gill, 391, was a bill filed to enjoin the collection of a tax for the improvement of streets. The court say: “Another, and it is conceived, a conclusive objection to the injunction issued in this case, is, that by the ninth section of the ordinance of March 9th, 1841, No. 10, and of May 15th, 1846, No. 59, on an appeal from the proceedings of the commissioners, the city court are authorized, after an examination into the same, in the mode therein pointed out, to amend or supply defects and omissions in the return and proceedings of the commissioners, and alter, modify and correct the said record of proceedings in all or any of its parts, as it shall deem just and proper. To the court of chancery or county court, sitting as a court of equity, no such power is delegated; nor can it be lawfully or judiciously exercised by those tribunals. To persons aggrieved by the proceedings of the commissioners in cases like the present, the legislative enactments upon the subject have provided the tribunal and means of redress, and there only can it be successfully sought. To sustain a court of equity, in the exercise of
The State v. Quaife, 3 Zab. 89, was a certiorari to review assessments. The court say: “ If an assessment is made, and sustained upon erroneous principles, the error, if made manifest, may be corrected, but this court cannot revise the judgment of the commissioners upon the mere ground of an excess of valuation. * * * * If the tax assessed upon the prosecutor was so greatly exorbitant as to show gross partiality, or be persuasive evidence of corruption and fraud, perhaps the position might be sustained. This we take to be the only aspect in which it would be proper for the court to examine into the amount of the assessment, and to consider its reasonableness, in reference to the value of the property taxed.” In that case, a portion of the tax levied, being admitted to be illegal, was set aside.
In Howe v. the City of Boston, 7 Cush. 273, the remedy of a tax-payer in case of over-valuation or too high a tax, is held to be “ by. application to the assessors for abatement; and, on their refusal, by an. application to the mayor and aldermen or county commissioners, in the manner prescribed by the statute. * * * It is an entire tax, rightfully laid, and if excessive in amount, it is an over-valuation only.”
The following cases are cited to show, 1. The legislation and practice in this class of cases in other states; 2. That the theory of the complainant in the case at bar is untenable in its broadest application; 3. That tax-payers in Mississippi are not sufficiently protected by legislative remedies against excessive, erroneous and illegal assessments. 15 Barb. S. C. 607; 40 N. H. 203; 42 ib. 282; 37 Penn. St. 371; 43 Ill. 428; 42 ib. 9; 23 Ark. 137; 18 Md. 1.'
The decree in this case is reversed and the cause remanded, with instructions to the proper court to enter a final decree in accordance with, the views herein expressed, to wit: the complainant having failed to state any title to equitable relief, the bill .will be dismissed, and the decree will include for collection by the process of the chancery court, ten.per cent on the taxes-enjoined, together with all costs of suit.