54 Miss. 272 | Miss. | 1876
delivered the opinion of the court.
The court below did not err in refusing to remand the cause to rules. It did not err in decreeing for the complainant. It did not err in directing! a sale of the entire tract of land subject to the decree in tracts not to exceed one hundred and
There is no error in the decree in this case because of the failure to enter a separate order of reference to compute the sum due, or a separate order confirming the report of the commissioner. Under § 1027 of the Code it is competent, in suits for the foreclosure or satisfaction of mortgages or deeds of trust, if the court shall think the complainant entitled to a decree, to refer to a master to compute the amount due; and he shall proceed, without delay or notice to the parties, and no motion to confirm his report is necessary. Until the case is heard by the Chancellor, he cannot conclude that the complainant is entitled to a decree ; but, hearing it, and thinking the complainant is entitled to a decree, he pauses, refers to a master for computation, and, receiving his report, a final decree is prepared, which is the written memorial of what was done. The same course is applicable to a suit to enforce a vendor’s lien, or an express lien reserved in the' deed of conveyance, as in this case. Kilcrease v. Lum, 36 Miss. 569.
The only remaining question is as to the amount of the decree, it being claimed that the commissioner, in stating the account between the parties, and computing the amount due, proceeded on wrong principles in calculating interest in case
The master computed interest on the amount of the note according to its tenor to the time of the first payment, and added the interest to the principal, and from the sum deducted the payment. On the balance thus obtained he calculated interest to the time of the next payment, and added the interest, and from the sum subtracted the next payment, and after this manner until all the payments were applied: and by this course he obtained as the result $3,123.15, which,'it is claimed, is a sum too great by several hundred dollars; because it is said that, where the partial payments, severally, do not
The one rule compounds interest; the others do not. The compounding plan of computation was adopted by the commissioner, and sanctioned by the decree in this case. The question is, What is the statutory rule in this State for the computation of interest where partial payments are made, some or all of which, severally, are less in amount than the interest accrued at the time they are severally made ? In this case, some of the payments were less in amount than the interest accrued at their respective dates. The statute is, “ When partial payments are made, . . . the interest that has accrued up to the time of such payment shall be first credited, and the residue of such partial payment shall be placed to the payment of the principal” (Code of 1871, § 2282) ; and this is copied from the act of 1857, which is in the very words of the statute in Hutchinson’s Code, substituting “ residue ” for “ balance. ” Code of 1857, p. 370, art. 4 ; Hutch. Code, p. 643, art. 7, § 57.
In Houston v. Crutcher, 31 Miss. 51, an instruction by the
The language of the statute leaves no room for doubt as to the state of case to which it applies. “And the residue of such partial payment shall be placed to the payment of the principal.” There cannot be a “ residue,” if the payment does not exceed the interest. Therefore, we declare the rule to be that partial payments less than the accrued interest are not to be applied first to the payment of interest until the sum of
Chancellor Kent, in Connecticut Jackson, 1 Johns. Ch. 13, 17, declared that “ the rule for casting interest when partial payments have been made, is to apply the payment, in the first place, to the discharge of the interest then due. If the payment exceeds the interest, the surplus goes towards discharging the principal, and the subsequent interest is to be computed on the balance of principal remaining due. If the payment be less than the interest, the surplus of interest must not be taken to augment the principal; but interest continues on the former principal until the period when the payments, taken together, exceed the interest due, and then the surplus is to be applied towards discharging the principal; and interest is to be computed On the balance of principal as aforesaid.” We understand that the object of our statute, when' first adopted, was to adopt the rule announced by Chancellor Kent. It employs fit language to do this, and such is its effect. McFadden v. Fortier, 20 Ill. 509.
Decree reversed, and a decree entered here.