OPINION
{1} Plaintiffs appeal the district court’s decision denying class certification under Rule 1-023 NMRA 2004. The appeal raises several issues, including the legal standards for determining whether a class definition is legally sufficient and the standards under which the predominance and superiority criteria of Rule 1-023(B)(3) are tested with regard to manageability. We also review the decision for substantial evidence. We affirm the district court.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{2} Plaintiffs sued Defendants (Norwest) on behalf of themselves and others who have held checking accounts with Norwest Bank New Mexico (Norwesb-NM) alleging violations of the Unfair Practices Act (UPA), NMSA 1978, § 57-12-3 (1971), breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing under the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.), NMSA 1978, § 55-1-203 (1961), and breach of contract. While the initial complaint sought certification of a class covering only New Mexico residents, the First Amended Complaint (FAC) requested approval of a multistate class including members from twelve additional states. Defendants moved the district court for an order denying multistate class certification on March 24, 2000. Before that motion was heard, Plaintiffs filed their motion for class certification, requesting approval of three sub-classes: one subclass for persons or entities in New Mexico and two sub-classes based on multistate membership. As a matter of efficiency, the district court heard oral arguments on the proposed multistate class certification first, and denied it on June 12, 2000. Perhaps with an eye to expediting matters, Plaintiffs declined the court’s invitation for an evidentiary hearing on the motion for state class certification. Instead, the parties presented oral argument on the motion on August 30, 2000, submitting exhibits that consisted primarily of interrogatories, deposition excerpts, and documents obtained in discovery. A letter decision denying Plaintiffs’ motion for state class certification was entered by the district court on July 26, 2002. On July 29, 2002, the district court entered an order and findings of fact and conclusions of law denying the multistate class, and a separate order with findings of fact and conclusions of law denying state class certification. Plaintiffs take their appeal solely from the order denying state class certification.
{3} In their motion, Plaintiffs sought certification of:
All persons and/or entities in New Mexico who have incurred insufficient funds or overdraft charges as a result of Norwest posting withdrawals in a highest dollar amount to lowest dollar amount sequence. The claims of these Class Members are based on violations of the New Mexico Unfair Trade Practices Act and breach of
[Low to High] Posting Order
$10.00 (Pay)
$25.00 (Pay)
$25.00 (Pay)
$40.00 (Pay)
$50.00 (OD Notice)
$60.00 (OD Notice)
Under this scenario, assuming a beginning account balance of $100, a customer would pay two OD/NSF fees for cheeks posted on the same day under a low-high posting order compared to five such fees under a high-low sequence. Plaintiffs assert that Norwest projected this new policy would increase revenues by over $18,000 per month, “a conservative 6% increase,” at Norwest-NM alone.
contract under common law and applicable U.C.C. provisions imposing obligations of good faith and fair dealing.
The factual basis for Plaintiffs’ claims rests on the order in which checks are paid from a customer’s account on a daily basis (posting order). There are several ways a bank can post checks, including for example, random order, order of presentation (the order checks are physically received on any given day), check number sequence, descending amount, and ascending amount. Plaintiffs allege that prior to September 1996, Norwesb-NM posted checks in ascending order, from the lowest amount to the largest amount (low-high). Plaintiffs contend that in late 1994, after a review by a subsidiary, Norwest branches in various states began posting checks in descending order, from the highest amount to the lowest amount (high-low). It is undisputed that Norwest Bank-NM adopted the high-low policy in September 1996.
{4} According to Plaintiffs, Defendants’ motive in adopting the high-low policy was not for legitimate business purposes but was driven solely by a desire to force more overdraft and insufficient fund (OD/NSF) events to generate more fees and increase revenues. Plaintiffs rely on Norwest documents that allegedly discuss the financial benefits and projected revenues that would result from posting checks high-low. Norwest’s own internal memoranda sets forth the following comparison:
[High to Low] Posting Order
$60.00 (Pay)
$50.00 (OD Notice)
$40.00 (OD Notice)
$25.00 (OD Notice)
$10.00 (OD Notice)
$10.00 (OD Notice)
Plaintiffs’ position is that Norwest breached its contract with customers by failing to post items for which there were sufficient funds available in a sequence that allowed the items to be paid, resulting in additional OD/NSF fees.
{5} The crux of Plaintiffs’ statutory UPA and bad faith claims is that Norwest knowingly failed to disclose or adequately explain to its customers its decision to change the ordering policy, the reason for the new policy, or its consequences for the customer. Plaintiffs contend that when Norwest decided to implement the new method, customers were not notified of the new posting order and the deposit agreement did not reflect the change because Norwest wanted to avoid public criticism, adverse customer reactions, and potential lawsuits.
{6} Norwest’s initial response is that it is lawful for them to post checks “in any order.” NMSA1978, § 55-4-303(b) (1992).' It points out that the “no priority rule” is
justified because of the impossibility of stating a rule that would be fair in all cases, having in mind the almost infinite number of combinations of large and small checks in relation to the available balance on hand in the drawer’s account; the possible methods of receipt; and other variables.
Id. official cmt. 7. The significance of this rule to Norwest’s position appears to be twofold: the first goes to the merits — -notice is not required because any posting order is lawfully discretionary; and second, for purposes of certification, the Rule’s official comment suggests that the effect of a posting order inherently varies from consumer to consumer, account to account. The latter supports Norwest’s argument that Plaintiffs’ class is too indefinite, individual issues of liability and damages predominate, and case management is impossible.
Standard of Review
{7} Within the confines of Rule 1-023, the district court has broad discretion whether or not to certify a class. Berry v. Federal Kemper Life Assurance Co.,
General Considerations
{8} We begin our analysis by noting that Rule 1-023(A) and, in particular (B)(3), are essentially identical to their federal counterparts. Hence, we can look to the federal law for guidance in determining the appropriate legal standards to apply to the Rule. See Pope v. Gap, Inc.,
{9} When assessing whether to certify a class action, the district court should bear in mind the twin objectives of the Rule. The core policy behind the Rule is to provide a forum for plaintiffs with small claims who otherwise would be without any practical remedy. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor,
{10} Plaintiffs bear the burden to show that all four prerequisites of Rule 1-023(A) and at least one of the requirements of Rule 1-023(B) are met. Amchem Prods., Inc.,
{11} To satisfy Rule 1-023(A), Plaintiffs must establish four prerequisites, commonly referred to as numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable;
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class;
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
To qualify as a Rule 1-023(B)(3) class, as Plaintiffs desire, they must establish both “predominance” and “superiority.” Amchem Prods., Inc.,
the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superi- or to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include:
(a) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions;
(b) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class;
(c) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum;
(d) the difficulties likely to be encountered in [its] management.
Rule 1-023(B)(3).
Analysis
{12} In its letter decision, the district court found that Plaintiffs failed to identify an objectively ascertainable class, primarily because Plaintiffs did not propose a baseline of OD/NSF fees for which Norwest would not be liable. Nonetheless, in order to continue its analysis, the district court assumed that the class included persons or entities that had incurred OD/NSF fees as a result of Norwest posting withdrawals from highest to lowest dollar amount instead of either lowest to highest amount or check number sequence. Using its assumption, the district court found that Plaintiffs met the numerosity and commonality requirements of Rule 1-023(A). The court concluded that Plaintiffs’ claims were not typical of members who were subject to counterclaims. Rather than denying certification, the district court excluded those members but noted that their exclusion would add substantial difficulties in ascertaining the class. The district court also excluded Plaintiff Donovan, whom it concluded was an inadequate class representative because of her problems with memory and reading comprehension.
{13} With respect to Rule 1-023(B)(3) requirements, the district court found that Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden to show predominance and superiority. While agreeing that Plaintiffs met some of the Rule 1-023(B)(3) factors, the court concluded that, notwithstanding a strong public policy in favor of certification in the consumer protection area, the difficulties likely to be encountered in management were “almost or totally insurmountable.” The court concluded, in summary:
[P]laintiffs’ motion for class certification should be denied because a) plaintiffs have not provided a class definition which is capable of present ascertainment; b) plaintiffs’ proposed definition includes members subject to counterclaims, thereby defeating typicality; c) Ms. Donovan cannot adequately represent the class; and d) individualized liability issues predominate over common issues, making management of the class extraordinarily difficult.
{14} Plaintiffs interpret the district court’s decision to mean that they established all of the requirements of Rule 1-023(A) and three of the four factors of Rule 1-023(B)(3), but failed on one ground, manageability. In their view, this was error because there is no practical alternative to litigate their relatively small claims, and because the reasons identified by the court were not legally sufficient.
{15} In Plaintiffs’ view, when there is no reasonable alternative to class litigation, such as here, the district court must find management is impossible based on “hard data” to warrant denial of class certification. Plaintiffs advocate that the district court should be required to (1) express any management difficulties in its findings, explore solutions, , and describe its efforts to resolve them; (2) indulge in a presumption against dismissal; (3) state the alternatives and reasons why other methods of adjudication would be superior to a class action; and (4) deny certification only if “hard evidence” establishes that it is impossible to resolve them. Plaintiffs contend the court erred because it did not comply with these standards. Plaintiffs contend the district court erred as a matter of law because the reasons it articulated did not satisfy the “impossibility standard.” They also take issue with the legal standards the district court applied to its analysis of the class definition and the predominance requirements, and they maintain that these reasons are not a valid basis for denial.
{16} We disagree with Plaintiffs’ perception that the district court’s decision was based simply on manageability difficulties. Despite the presumption it applied in favor of certification, the district court concluded Plaintiffs’ evidence was insufficient in that it did not provide a reliable way to identify class members, and because individual liability issues promised to overwhelm the lawsuit, thereby making the class unmanageable and not superior. Since neither party disputes the district court’s findings as to Rule 1-023(A) requirements, we limit our analysis to the class definition and Rule 1-023(B)(3) requirements. Our analysis of these two issues subsumes the “member preference” issue listed by the district court as a separate basis for denial. Because we find the grounds for the district court’s decision are otherwise sufficient, we decline to address the issue of whether potential counterclaims might make this ease less manageable.
Class Definition
{17} Plaintiffs define the class as “all persons and/or entities in New Mexico who have incurred insufficient funds or overdraft charges as a result of Norwest posting withdrawals in a highest dollar amount to lowest dollar amount sequence.” The district court found that Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden to “identify an objectively ascertainable class.” It further found that “[a]ny definition of the class, ... is not capable of present ascertainment[:][c]lass member identification would be nearly impossible [and] ... even [ascertaining] the number of class members would be a labor intensive and enormously costly undertaking.”
{18} Plaintiffs believe their definition survives because it proposes an objective “but for” test — a class of persons who were charged OD/NSF fees that could not have been imposed but for Norwest switching to a high-low posting order. They argue that the district court added ambiguity to the definition when it modified it to include “all persons or entities in New Mexico who have incurred [OD/NSF fees] as a result of [Nor-west’s] posting of withdrawals from highest-to-lowest dollar amount instead of either lowest-to-highest amount or check number sequence.” Plaintiffs further claim that members could be “readily determined” from Norwest’s records but that the district court prevented their discovery. According to Plaintiffs, the fact it was labor intensive and costly did not make it impossible to ascertain the class, and the district court erred as a matter of law because this was an invalid reason for denial.
{19} Finally, even if their definition fails, Plaintiffs view it as the district court’s function and duty to determine the extent of class membership and to work with the parties to construct a proper class definition, rather than simply dismiss the case. Plaintiffs view the district court’s conclusion that it was enormously uneconomical in terms of time and money as a “flimsy” reason that violated their constitutional right to access courts.
{20} We conclude that the district court applied the correct legal standard to the class definition and that its analysis was supported by substantial evidence. An “implicit primary requirement” of Rule 1-023, often referred to as the “definiteness” requirement, is that plaintiffs bear the burden to demonstrate the existence of an identifiable class that is “capable of ascertainment under some objective standard.” Neumont,
{21} The class definition “provides the court with a framework with which to apply Rule 23 criteria and thus to reach an initial determination whether a class action may be maintained.” 2 Alba Conte & Herbert B. Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions § 6:14 at 614 (4th ed.2002) (hereinafter Newberg). It also serves an important function in Rule 1-023(B)(3) class actions because it allows the court to determine who is entitled to notice. Garrish v. United Auto., Aerospace, & Agric. Implement Workers of Am.,
{22} This is not to say that the definition must be so precise that every potential member can be immediately identified or the precise number ascertained at the outset. O’Connor,
{23} Whether a class definition is legally sufficient depends on the facts of each case and must be determined on a case-by-case basis. Alliance to End Repression,
{24} Critically, the class definition here lacks any objective criteria from which to gauge membership without first determining the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims. First, it is overly broad because it would include any single OD/NSF event that resulted in a fee which would have been charged under any posting method. Second, Plaintiffs’ proposed class of “[a]ll persons and/or entities in New Mexico who have incurred insufficient funds or overdraft charges as a result of Norwest posting withdrawals in a highest dollar amount to lowest dollar amount sequence” offers no guidance for the district court to gauge who is included and who is excluded from this class. The “but for the high-low posting” formula leaves a range of possibilities given the “almost infinite number of combinations of large and small checks in relation to the available balance on hand in the drawer’s account; the possible methods of receipt; and other variables.” § 55-4-303(b) official cmt. 7.
{25} There is substantial evidence to conclude that there is no general method to determine who falls into this category. Nor-west tendered evidence that, depending on the particular OD/NSF event, customers were sometimes charged more, sometimes charged less, and sometimes charged the same fees that they would have been charged under a low-high or check number sequence. As we will describe in more detail below, the evidence indicates that only an individual and thorough analysis of each member’s account and a comparison to other methods would define who was in the class, even under a “but for” standard. Hence, the district court properly considered the administrative feasibility of such an endeavor, including the enormous time and expense involved. New-berg, supra § 4:35 at 307-08 (stating management issues associated with complexity and expense of notice are viable considerations).
{26} Economic feasibility aside, the highly individualized nature of the endeavor, together with all of the potential variables, including the bank officer’s discretion to waive any fees, in whole or in part, and whether the bank would have waived fees under any other method, makes any class definition highly speculative and virtually impossible. As such, we find it was reasonable for the district court to conclude that Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden under the definiteness requirement.
{27} To the extent that Plaintiffs argue that the district court has an affirmative duty to define the class, we respond that it is Plaintiffs who bear the burden to properly define the class or any subclasses; any duty on the court is discretionary. U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty,
{28} Moreover, the district court did attempt to devise a viable class definition by adding objective criteria and excluding members. As it stated, “[t]he Court has struggled to discern a proper class definition, and is unable to, based on plaintiffs’ failure to indicate what the proper method of posting would be.” See Newberg, supra § 6:17 at 633 (“Courts may redefine the classes themselves, if they possess adequate information.”). In this regard, the terms added by the court did not create any ambiguities, as Plaintiffs contend. It is the highly individualized nature of the case that renders this class incapable of definition. See Lazar v. Hertz Corp.,
{29} We also find Plaintiffs’ claims that the district court impeded its discovery of a “readily identifiable” class to be without merit. This case was “vigorously” litigated by counsel, as Plaintiffs state, for over eighteen months prior to the certification hearing. Plaintiffs not only assured the court that they had all of the facts necessary for certification and that they were ready to go, it was Plaintiffs who urged the court to expedite the matter. In any event, we have found that the information necessary to ascertain membership is not “readily available” given the nature of Plaintiffs’ claims and Norwest’s records, and Plaintiffs proposed no method to extract and compile this information.
Rule 1-023(B)(3) Requirements
{30} Plaintiffs’ attempt to conflate the predominance and superiority issues into one criterion is flawed. Under Rule 1-023(B)(3), Plaintiffs must prove two requirements: “[c]ommon [issues must] predominate over any questions affecting only individual members[;] and class resolution must be superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.” Amchem Prods., Inc.,
{31} Predominance tests whether a proposed class is sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation. Amchem Prods., Inc.,
{32} Superiority, on the other hand, compares the fairness and efficiency of the class action to alternative methods of litigation. Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp.,
{33} Although Plaintiffs must establish both the predominance and superiority requirements, these criteria are also intertwined, and the manageability issue is relevant to both. Jackson v. Motel 6 Multipurpose, Inc.,
{34} The court’s discretion is paramount when it determines whether a class action is manageable. See In re Visa Check/Master Money Antitrust Litig.,
The District Court Decision
{35} With these principles in mind, we conclude that the district court properly applied the law to its analysis of the Rule 1-023(B)(3) requirements. The court found that Plaintiffs failed to carry their burden that common issues predominate. It found there were crucial issues as to liability that would require individualized determinations, including what oral or written disclosures were made, the date when members learned or were put on notice of the posting order change, a determination of any individual adjustments to the posting order by Nor-west’s staff, and the fact that some members prefer the high-low posting order. The court concluded that these factors, together with the difficulties in determining which members were subject to counterclaims, presented management difficulties that were “almost or totally insurmountable.”
{36} Although the district court identified some of the crucial liability issues that would require individual determinations, it did not identify Plaintiffs’ required proof or how the individual issues related to that proof. While we do not find the district court’s omissions are fatal in this case, we nevertheless remind the district courts that given the highly deferential standard under which we review class certification, and the inherent complexities of the issue, the court should be as specific as possible in its findings of fact and conclusions of law. State v. Ferguson,
Plaintiffs’ Legal Claims
{37} Plaintiffs allege that Norwest knowingly deceived and defrauded Plaintiffs by using unfair, deceptive and/or unconscionable trade practices as a regular part of their business practices. According to Plaintiffs, the applicable statutory provisions arise under NMSA 1978, Section 57-12-2(D) (1999):
Any false or misleading oral or written statement, visual description or other representation of any kind knowingly made in connection with the sale ... or services ... by a person in the regular course of his trade or commerce, which may, tends to or does deceive or mislead any person and includes [but is not limited to]:
(14) using exaggeration, innuendo or ambiguity as to a material fact or failing to state a material fact if doing so deceives or tends to deceive;
(15) stating that a transaction involves rights, remedies or obligations that it does not involve;
(16) stating that services ... are needed if they are not needed; or
(17) failure to deliver the quality or quantity of goods or services contracted for.
and Section 57-12-2(E):
[A]ny act or practice in connection with the sale ... of any ... services ... or in the extension of credit or in the collection of debts which to a person’s detriment:
(1) takes advantage of the lack of knowledge, ability, experience or capacity of a person to a grossly unfair degree; or
(2) results in a gross disparity between the value received by a person and the price paid.
Plaintiffs have identified the deceptive practices as: a failure to notify class members of the decision to change the posting order policy to a high-low sequence, and a failure to fully disclose and/or explain the purpose or practical effects of this policy. To prove their claim at trial, Plaintiffs must first establish that Norwest had a duty to disclose material facts reasonably necessary to prevent any statements from being misleading. Smoot v. Physicians Life Ins. Co.,
an oral or written statement ... that was either false or misleading; (2) the false or misleading representation must have been knowingly made in connection with the sale ... or services; (3) the conduct complained of ... occurred in the regular course of [Norwest’s business]; and (4) the representation ... may, tends to or does, deceive or mislead any person.
Ashlock v. Sunwest Bank of Roswell, N.A.,
{38} Under Plaintiffs’ breach of contract theory, they must prove that by the terms of their depositor agreements, Norwest “agreed to post items for which there were sufficient funds available;” that it “breached the contract by failing to post items for which there were sufficient funds available in a sequence or order that allowed for the items to be paid, and ... additional fees on posted items [were charged as a result of the high-low posting order]”. To establish both liability and a breach of contract in this case, Plaintiffs would be required to prove for each member that (1) an OD/NSF event occurred as a result of multiple checks being presented; (2) fees were charged; (3) more fees were incurred than under some alternative ordering method; and (4) the fees were not waived or refunded. Plaintiffs have provided no evidence to suggest that it can establish these elements by generalized proof. To the contrary, there is substantial evidence that each of these elements will require highly individualized proof.
{39} To recover punitive damages for a breach of contract, Plaintiffs must establish a cause of action for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Paiz v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.,
{40} The individual issues identified by the district court are relevant to each of these claims, and its decision that they would require individual proof is supported by substantial evidence. The critical issues of whether Norwest breached its duty under the UPA by failing to disclose the new policy to its customers, and whether that omission was made in bad faith will require proof of whether and when members received notice of the high-low policy. Individual preferences for one posting order over another goes to the issue of contract formation: what was agreed to, customers’ “reasonable expectations,” and whether Norwest acted in bad faith. Id. ¶¶ 28-29 (discussing whether there was a bad faith breach of contract, the court noted that bad faith “undermine[s] the stability of expectations essential to contractual relationships”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Customer preferences for one method over another also relate to causation — whether the omission was “detrimental” to class members who might actually prefer that method.
{41} There was substantial evidence to support the district court’s conclusion that individualized determinations would be required to establish what type of notice was given, when it was given, and that individual preferences varied between members. Nor-west presented evidence that written disclosures were made at various times: effective August 1997, Norwest-NM published notice in its deposit agreement that it could “pay items presented against your account in the order of highest dollar amount to lowest dollar amount,” and, on October 21, 1998, the agreement notified customers that “[t]he Bank may pay Items presented against your account in any order it chooses, including highest dollar amount to lowest dollar amount.” Given that the extent of any customer’s knowledge, experience, and capabilities inevitably vary among customers, and the personal nature of their relationship with a bank, it was reasonable for the district court to conclude that oral disclosures were sometimes made to customers, or even that customers discovered the policy on their own initiative. In fact, the evidence established that the class representatives became aware of the high-low posting order at different times and under different circumstances. There was also evidence that individual preferences varied; one Plaintiff preferred check number sequence, another preferred order of receipt, and a third preferred any method that caused the least number of checks to bounce.
{42} There is other evidence in the record supporting the district court’s decision that the case would require a myriad of individualized determinations. Meiboom v. Watson,
I perceive no pattern in the fees incurred by the Plaintiffs versus the fees they might have paid under any other posting method which permits reliable generalization with respect to whether and to what extent proposed unnamed class members, individually or collectively, paid more fees than they might have paid had Norwesb-NM employed alternative posting methods.
He opined that general conclusions about all accounts were impossible primarily because bank officers have substantial discretion to pay or return an item notwithstanding insufficient funds and there are several individual considerations, unique to each account, that are factored into a decision to charge or waive a fee. There was also evidence from an NSI employee that while Norwesb-NM maintained computerized records dating back to May 17,1997, it has no means to electronically access the records from this point back to September 1, 1996. These records, she testified, are on microfiche and a manual review of some 150,000-200,000 records would be required. In addition, she attested to the fact that the current computer system was not subject to manipulation to determine whether a customer paid more fees under a high-low policy than under any alternative methods on a day-by-day basis, over the course of dealings in any account. She further opined that it might be possible to develop a program to compile a list of all members who had two or more OD/NSF events, but that a manual review of each account and comparison of alternative posting methods would still be required to establish whether those events were the result of high-low posting. According to her, this process still would not determine whether a customer actually paid two or more fees. Although, in her opinion, this information may be compiled from audit reports, each account would have to be manually reviewed for several months after each OD/NSF event to determine whether any fees were refunded, and each event would have to be individually analyzed to determine whether more fees were paid under the high-low method than under other methods. This still would not account for whether the bank officer might employ the same discretion if another posting method were used.
{43} Even if Norwest’s “course of conduct” might be the type of generalized evidence necessary to establish the duty elements as Plaintiffs contend, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to determine that significant and complex individual issues of liability dominate this class action. Griffin v. Guadalupe Med. Ctr., Inc.,
Superiority
{44} Plaintiffs’ failure to establish that common issues predominate and the difficulty with identifying the class are sufficient to deny certification, without addressing superiority. See Amchem Prods., Inc.,
{45} Plaintiffs emphasize that their claims are too small to justify the cost of individual actions so there is no other practical alternative to litigate their claims. We disagree with the premise that there is no other practical alternative. It is entirely feasible for Plaintiffs to bring their claims individually under the UPA. Theirs is the very type of claim the legislature envisioned when it enacted the UPA. See Jones v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
{46} There are other significant benefits to individual actions under the UPA. First, the issues of whether a bank has a duty to disclose its posting order or whether an omission is unlawful appear to be questions that are common to the class. If Plaintiffs are successful in their individual claims, these issues might be sufficiently established to collaterally estop Norwest from raising the same issue in subsequent litigations. See Rex, Inc. v. Manufactured Housing Comm,.,
{47} We also disagree with Plaintiffs to the extent they would require the district court to make specific findings regarding the alternative methods of litigating Plaintiffs’ claims and why such alternatives would be superior. Foremost, it is Plaintiffs’ burden to establish that the class action is sufficiently effective to justify an expenditure of judicial time and resources and the risk of prejudice to class members who are not before the court. Second, the district court did consider individual actions as an alternative and concluded that an individual action was the only fair and efficient remedy for Plaintiffs. While we encourage the district court to be as specific as possible when it makes findings and conclusions, especially in a class action, the district court is not required to state the reasons why an alternative is superior, particularly in this case where denial of certification is proper in light of Plaintiffs’ failure to satisfy the predominance test.
CONCLUSION
{48} In sum, we affirm the district court’s decision to deny class certification in this proceeding. The district court applied the correct legal standards, and its decision is supported by substantial evidence in accordance with those standards.
{49} IT IS SO ORDERED.
Notes
. We recognize that Lazar was decided under a statute that appears unique to California, but we believe the principle cited is applicable to Rule 1-023.
. The requisite proof for materiality is unclear under the current law. For purposes of this opinion, we assume there is a presumption that any omissions were material.