30 Tex. 278 | Tex. | 1867
The only error relied upon by appellants for a reversal of the judgment in this case is the overruling by the court below of their motion for a continuance. This was the third application on their part to continue the case, and was, therefore, addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and that discretion is not, as a general thing, the subject of revision. (Hipp v. Huchett, 4 Tex., 22; Green v. Crow, 17 Tex., 180.) It was said, however, in the case first above quoted, that there might be circumstances under which a refusal to grant a continuance would, .even on a third application, operate such flagrant injustice ;as to induce its reversal by a superintending tribunal. The circumstances set forth in the affidavit for continuance now under consideration were, we think, of a character not only - to authorize, but to demand, a postponement of the trial.
The facts to be proved by the absent witness were cer
Remanded.