In this suit on promissory notes and personal guaranties of the notes, William Brooks appeals from the trial court’s order granting partial summary judgment to Gwinnett Community Bank as to Brooks’ affirmative defense that he was released as a guarantor of the notes. Because such a release must be in writing and there is no evidence of a written release, we affirm.
“ ‘Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, construing the evidence in favor of the nonmovant.’ [Cit.]”
Core LaVista, LLC v. Cumming,
International Hospitality subsequently defaulted on the loans, and Gwinnett Community Bank filed suit on the promissory notes and guaranty against International Hospitality and the individual guarantors. Brooks answered, asserting, among other things, the affirmative defenses of accord and satisfaction and that he had been released from his guaranty. Gwinnett Community Bank moved for partial summary judgment as to those affirmative defenses, and the trial court granted the motion. Brooks appeals, arguing that there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether he was released from the guaranty. The argument is without merit.
As Brooks states in his brief, a release from a promise to answer for another’s debt must be in writing. Indeed,
[plursuant to OCGA § 13-5-30 (2), the personal guarantee agreement had to be and was executed in writing. As the contract of guaranty had to be in writing under the Statute of Frauds, “so likewise, under the general rule, any proposed modification thereof, to be effective, must also have been in writing.” [Cits.]
Hendricks v. Enterprise Financial Corp.,
Here, the unambiguous contract of guaranty provides, m pertinent part:
It is fully understood that until each and every one of the covenants and agreements of this Guaranty is fully performed, the [guarantors’] undertakings hereunder shall not be released, in whole or in part, by any action or thing which might, but for this provision of this Guaranty, be deemed a legal or equitable discharge of a surety or guarantor. . . . This is a continuing Guaranty and shall remain in full force and effect as to the [guarantors] until the liabilities and other amounts due under this Guaranty have been paid in full.
“It is clear from the evidence of record that no written agreement was ever entered between [Brooks and Gwinnett Community Bank] releasing, canceling, or otherwise terminating [Brooks’ continuing] personal guarantee agreement.” Hendricks, supra. Brooks cannot now seek to vary the terms of the clear and unambiguous contract of guaranty by reliance on inconsistent oral statements. See Kennerly, supra.
Contrary to Brooks’ claim, certain internal bank documents do not constitute a written modification of the contract of guaranty. Rather, as Godfrey, the bank loan officer, explained in his affidavit, they are nothing more than an expression of his personal opinion that since Brooks had sold his interest in International Hospitality, he was thereby released as a guarantor. That lay opinion, even if reduced to writing, simply does not include all the essential terms needed to create a binding written contract. See generally
Harris v. Baker,
Judgment affirmed.