*1 Gary BROOKS, Appellant, Kentucky,
COMMONWEALTH
Appellee.
No. 2001-SC-0458-MR.
Supreme Kentucky. Court of
Sept. 2003. *2 indicated that
Brooks, others, acting in complicity with son, including Wood and minor robbed a cab driver. Brooks used a to cut knife *3 driver, the throat of the cab and during struggle followed, the he also slashed and stabbed the cab driver the face and on his hands Subsequently, and arms. an informant contacted police the and told present them he had been when .that planned Brooks the crime and that Brooks showed him a sum of money and told him that he and the others committed the rob- bery. This informant then assisted the police by wearing a wire and obtained Hoffman, Richard Assistant Ad- Public incriminating statements from Wood and vocate, Department Advocacy, of Public posi- her minor son. The cab driver/victim Frankfort, Counsel Appellant. tively identified’Brooks at trial. III, General, Attorney A.B. Chandler Brooks testified in own defense and his Jr., Floyd, Samuel J. Attorney Assistant denied planning committing or the rob- General, Division, Criminal Appellate bery. He that the testified other individu- Frankfort, Counsel for Appellee. als, informant, including the had commit- robbery ted the and that Wood framed Opinion of the Court Justice him because he marry refused to her on WINTERSHEIMER. telling several He also occasions. denied appeal This is from a judgment based on the informant that he committed the rob- jury verdict which convicted Brooks of bery driving him to the scene of the attempt murder, criminal to commit first- mistrials, occurrence. After two Brooks degree robbery and two counts second- murder, attempted was convicted of first- degree unlawful transaction with a minor. degree robbery and two counts unlawful He was found to be a second-degree per- transaction with a minor. As a second- felony sistent offender his sentence offender, degree persistent felony he was was years enhanced to a total of 70 years sentenced to a total of 70 in prison. prison. appeal This followed. The questions presented are whether judge correctly permitted the trial video- Videotaped Testimony I. Prior
taped testimony from an incarcerated wit- ness; whether the audiotape argues of the state- Brooks the trial judge police ment made prejudice witness erred to his substantial and de admissible; closing whether argument nied him the to confront witnesses by. prosecutor improper; against whether him that an in when he declared victim physical injury suffered serious recently carcerated witness who had at judge tempted per whether the trial allowed too suicide was unavailable and description much of prior videotaped testimony misde- mitted the meanor convictions of Brooks into the sen- that witness to be shown to the lieu tencing portion testimony. disagree. of the trial. of her live We were if the facts asserted to determine day before pretrial hearing At a to do declined advised the Defense counsel prosecutor correct. scheduled discussion, Wood, an incarcerat- further judge so. After witness, suicide and attempted telephoned prison ed judge himself be available to to cor- would not in order hearing in-chambers in li- a motion The filed Commonwealth to ascertain the the affidavit and roborate play videotape allowed to mine to be Nei- of the witness. apparent condition trial of testimony from an earlier objected to the trial party ther at the being present in lieu of her pris- at the representatives speaking to person. third trial Commonwealth spoke to an officer on. The trial play videotape was allowed *4 the circumstances verified prison the who 20, 2000 testimony September from reported. The had prosecutor that had ended in a mistrial. At the trial which although they could officer stated that also prose- was called earlier Wood any or- and would follow transport Wood The cution and recalled the defense. regard, in that it would be der of the court trial involved the same defendant earlier prison and that the against medical advice charges. offense on the same same in liability potential did not want the 7.20 The relied on RCr Commonwealth happened to Wood. anything event that permit 7.22 which the use of and RCr conversation, trial Following is previous where a witness the affidavit of judge found that based on objected Defense unavailable. counsel personal contact prosecutor and his claiming comport that the evidence did not that facility personnel with the correctional hearsay exception with the under trial. De- unavailable for the witness was 804(b)(1) and that the defense did not be- might, told the court that he fense counsel Mary legally unavailable. lieve Wood Brooks, a con- consulting after with seek unavailability He claimed that the was due tinuance. to the inaction of the Commonwealth The preventing attempt.
not suicide morning, judge the trial following The rejected judge arguments the defense meeting, in-chambers conducted another that the unavailable and found witness was present, and ruled this time with unavailability and that such was not caused playing that he would allow by the Commonwealth. in- testimony. judge also objected finding Brooks also as to if he wanted a quired directly of Brooks unavailability asserting that the Common- ruling. light of his continuance presented physical had no wealth There that he did not. Brooks stated regard to her illness. The Common- speedy for a no formal motion made presented a sworn affidavit wealth then this issue was waived. Consequently, about the information prosecutor from the exer judge properly The that the affidavit noting
he had obtained determining discretion cised his sound numbers of telephone contained the also unavailable to attend Wood was Kentucky spoken he had to at the persons infirmity or because of sickness Institute Women. Correctional 7.20(1). a decision pursuant to RCr Such countered that it did not believe defense of the trial the sound discretion is within the trial was sufficient and affidavit Commonwealth, like, Lovett v. judge. See if defense counsel would judge asked (2003); v. Ruppee see also record, 103 72 either or both S.W.3d telephone on the Commonwealth, 484 Ky., 821 S.W.2d in the affidavit prison officials listed 822
(1992),
Commonwealth,
citing
charge
Carter v.
the same offense and same
are
(1990).
Ky.,
Some
have
wealth,
(2002),
Ky.,
prosecu
testimony in cross-examination at the for agree jurisdic
mer trial. We with those Physical Injury IV. Serious tions and find that waiver occurred here deny did not The taped when defense counsel introduced the he process his to due when Brooks pur trial. The statement the second determination that the defendant made a in not ported change strategy was and that the victim was a violent offender objection. grounds sufficient to sustain the injury. The trial 804(b)(1) physical suffered serious require Nor the exclu does purposes judge determined for sion of otherwise admissible testimo ineligibility provi parole violent offender in, or ny changes because of second injuries sions of KRS 439.3401 about, thoughts strategy. were by inflicted Brooks on the victim judge correctly admitted the testimo injuries. followed physical This serious ny including taped statement Wood jury finding guilty verdict Brooks police. There was no Sixth Amendment charged offenses. violation.
824 wealth, ruling Ky.App.,
Brooks now claims that this was S.W.2d jury in error re- specifically because “the The medical in and nonmedical evidence jected finding injury” a of serious physical support decision the trial case and because there was “no record evidence inju that the victim suffered serious physical that the victim suffered a serious Thus, ries the hands of the defendant. injury.” It should be that the understood properly subject he was a for the violent statute which was amended 1998 re- parole offender limitation provided KRS quires a violent offender to serve at least 439.3401. becoming eligible 85% of a sentence before Here, jury correctly found from the parole. Myers See v. Commonwealth evidence that to kill attempted Brooks physi- S.W.3d 594 Serious victim but not mean that does 500.080(15) injury cal is defined KRS jury thereby rejected finding a of serious “physical injury a which creates substan- jury physical injury. The instructed was death, tial risk of or which causes serious first-degree on assault as lesser-included prolonged disfigurement, prolonged attempt offense of criminal to commit mur- health, impairment prolonged loss or though der —even offenses are Class- both impairment any bodily of the function of Having guilty B found Brooks felonies. organ.” offense, greater did not need Here, there was sufficient evidence to It to reach the lesser offense. should be show that the inflicted defendant wounds noted that no defense there subjected on the neck which the victim to first-degree assault instruction on substantial risk of death and seri- caused any physical the basis of lack of serious prolonged disfigurement. ous and injury ruling by evidence. The the trial most immediate risk was occasioned judge was There no con- appropriate. Hospital
victim’s loss of blood.
records
stitutional violation of
nature.
emergency
demonstrate that when
techni-
highway,
cians reached
on the
the victim
V. Prior
Convictions
Misdemeanor
large amount of blood was
his lap.
argues
Emergency room records confirm that fol-
he allowed
judge committed error when
*7
treatment,
lowing
patient
the
was to con-
far too much
the Commonwealth to enter
tinue to have close observation.
description
misdemeanor convic
prior
incident,
During the criminal
the
sentencing
the
tions into evidence
victim had been ordered to travel miles out phase
disagree.
of the trial. We
county
into the
to a remote location where
sentencing phase, the Com-
During the
long
he was attacked. There were two
presented
probation
pa-
monwealth
a
and
victim
crossing slashes on the neck of the
felony
prior
role officer to
a
about
and he
had stab wounds
side
as-
first-degree
of Brooks for
conviction
multiple
of his face and neck and
defensive
sault under extreme emotional disturbance
upper
wounds on
both
extremities.
peniten-
year
with a sentence of one
fact that
was found
he
the victim
before
Thereafter,
in-
tiary.
the Commonwealth
life
change
bled to death does not
to
pertaining
troduced certified records
threatening
injuries.
nature of his
Al
misdemeanor convictions over defense
testimony
pre
though
may
medical
be
objections.
phys
proving
ferred method of
the serious
532.055(2)(a)(2)
intro-
injury requirement, lay testimony may
permits the
ical
KRS
prior
v.
duction of the nature of
offenses
be considered.
Johnson
Common
trative,
Here,
Com
rather than exhaustive. See
which a defendant was convicted.
introduced a criminal
Higgs, Ky.,
Commonwealth
v.
LAMBERT, C.J., GRAVES, J., Thus, jority provides. briefly: and an as- sailant, JOHNSTONE, others, acting complicity with concur. and COOPER robbed,a JJ., in rural cab driver Henderson only concur but as to result on issue I. and, KELLER, County, Kentucky, struggle, J., by separate opinion dissents STUMBO, J., used a knife to slash and stab the driver’s joined by and is who also (2) face, hands, arms; subsequently, and by separate opinion. dissents contacted “Cowboy” Kenneth McClanahan KELLER, Justice, dissenting. the authorities and informed them he Because substantial evidence supports, present Appellant planned when determination that court’s crime, and that had later (‘Wood”) Wood was unavailable money him a told him shown sum of and trial, I Appellant’s agree third with the (Appellant), Appellant’s girlfriend that he majority’s conclusion that the trial court Wood, B.W., Wood’s minor son and B.W.’s properly to in- allowed Commonwealth friend C.P. had committed the crime to- videotaped prior (3) troduce sworn tri- Wood’s gether; McClanahan then assisted the I testimony. respectfully al dissent from wearing a investigating officers wire majority the result and reached incriminating and state- obtaining taped vote to Appellant’s (the reverse convictions and getaway from initial driv- ments Wood trial, to remand the case for a er) (who new howev- and assisted the assailant B.W. er, it because the trial court erred when robbery by taking the driver’s during the permitted the introduction of au- Wood’s mother’s vehi- money bag and wallet to his unsworn, diotaped, (4) Wood, out-of-court interview cle); B.W., and C.P. Appellant, investigating part par- (5) officers and C.P.’s charged; were all B.W.’s and my In testimony. cel of her juvenile court charges disposed of were view, evidentiary issues this case guilty plea in circuit and Wood entered a (6) sentence; can—and should—be resolved under the prison and court received a Kentucky of Evidence. Because the trial, Rules his theo- Appellant proceeded to and McClanahan, finding trial court’s that Wood was unavail- ry of the case was that erroneous, clearly able was not Wood’s Wood, B.W., C.P., had committed the properly admit- robbery, up” had “cooked that Wood 804(b)(1). ted under KRE The lion’s share as the as- finger Appellant the scheme to confession, however, out-of-court refus- Appellant’s sailant as retribution hearsay that does not fall constituted rank Prior to al to become her fourth husband. hearsay exception within an rule subject present of the the trial that is the Court, ju- and thus should have been excluded.1 separate appeal two to this reach a unanimous ries were unable properly To contextualize the error guilt. Appellant’s as to verdict case, necessary give I it a more find ex- direct During recitation of the factual back- the Commonwealth’s extensive second Appellant’s ground focusing upon of this amination of Wood case— planning, prepa- Appel- defense and Wood nature of described Wood, ration, robbery. De- including lant’s and execution cross-examination consisted cross-examination the manner in out-of-court fense counsel’s which Wood’s *9 KRE 613 foundations laying the ma- primarily confession was introduced —than Kentucky.”). ("Hearsay except Supreme 1. is not admissible Court of KRE n provided by these rules or rules of the as concluded, defense tape bery. When inconsisten- alleged with impeach to Wood follow-up ques- in fewa testimony engaged and a counsel trial between her cies inconsisten- alleged to given had to establish that Wood tions previous statement (10) tell yourself ten heard e.g., you her arrest upon officers “Now police cies— n go, go’ defense Specifically, Gary ‘go, the crime. said days after officer that includ- inconsistencies his cross- counsel addressed then he concluded right?” —and (1) leaping Appellant, while no ing: whether The Commonwealth examination. robbing the cab driv- However, car after into Wood’s defense examination. redirect throat, ex- slicing and the driver’s er to to the stand later recalled Wood counsel (as bitch, “Drive, Wood drive!” claimed Appellant’s for groundwork lay additional (as trial) go” Wood “go, go, at testified I take wouldn’t “you lied on me because to audiotaped in statement had stated her i.e., more my as you bride” defense — (2) during her trial police); whether regarding questions 613 foundational the knife testimony, in she described which marry to Appellant she had asked whether and ex- allegedly used Appellant that and people of other presence in the his beard plained shaved whether, Appel- she discovered when immediately pur- after the crime for else, already married to someone lant was Wood changing appearance, his pose “pay- to the effect of made statements she regarding the crime disclosed new details The case pay.” and “he’ll are hell” backs (3) whether, time”; “for the first and jury to the subsequently submitted contrast to her earlier statement deliberations, de- and the trial court its “getting in which she described police unable jury when the a mistrial clared it,” trial ‘hype’ of Wood’s caught up a unanimous verdict. to reach testimony emphasize to that her attempted Ap- to trial court ruled After the of her own role in the crime and the role trial the Common- pellant’s third result of coercion. Appellant’s son was the videotaped introduce Wood’s wealth could response many In of these KRE trial, Ap- the second from stated that questions, foundational Wood requested counsel new defense pellant’s she could not remember the exact words videotape to used her statement to trial court redact the that she had that the (2) years After a hand- former police portion Appellant’s two earlier. where omit I ful “I remember what audiotaped of Wood’s can’t played trial counsel had Wood’s responses, back defense counsel said then” police. out-of-court statement just “Why play don’t we stated/inquired And, Appellant’s motion. court denied lengthy After a bench confer- tape?” trial, thus, after all of Appellant’s third ence, exactly transpired. that is what in person” “live and the Commonwealth’s (1) rolled a the bailiff witnesses testified: remained seated on the witness
Wood jury; cart” front “media TWVCR counsel stand while (2) jury that informed the the trial court jury approximately- for the played person was unavailable Wood fifteen-minute-long audiotaped interview admonished but During officers. investigating “hear- from give Wood’s she was interview, indicated that Wood if it would credibility much as authorities, ing” started “cooperating” with the person because had testified Wood stating that of the events her narrative time she under oath at the had been Wood job,” pro- and “Gary go wanted to do prior “hearing”; at the in soli- testified Appellant’s role ceeded to describe testimony and her out- both Wood’s executing the rob- citing, planning, *10 828 audiotaped police descriptions Appel-
of-court
statement
to
sion” consisted of
(with
played
Simply
were
for the
lant’s conduct rather than her own.
804(b)(3)
stated,
clerk
KRE
muting
court’s bench
and fast-for-
neither
nor
oth-
conferences).
warding through
permitted
the bench
er
rule
introduction
extrajudicial
Ap-
Wood’s
statements about
The trial court
it
erred when
denied
pellant’s conduct.7
Appellant’s motion to redact
out-
Wood’s
however,
videotape
majority,
of-court confession from the
that
not address
does
testimony.
contained
former trial
Wood’s
substantive issue of whether Wood’s
was,
fact,
Despite
majority’s suggestion
extrajudicial
to the
“confession”
n
confession,
contrary,2
Appellant’s
out-of-court
trial.
properly
Wood’s
admissible at
Instead,
although played during
majority
her earlier testi-
holds that
not, itself,
mony,
object
playing
to the
testimony,3
and was waived his
not, therefore,
certainly
“testimony given
Appellant’s
former
audiotape because
audiotape
hearing
as a witness
another
trial counsel had introduced
proceeding”4
police
same or a different
interview
his
Wood’s
804(b)(1).
In
would be admissible under KRE
cross-examination at the
so
Instead,
it ac-
doing,
majority adopts
interview contained extra-
what
Wood’s
judicial
minority position,
knowledges
statements5
could be admit-
to be a
“you
ted into evidence at
trial
if
characterized as
made
only
which could be
it,”
bed,
they independently
exception your
you
sleep
satisfied an
get
now
hearsay
Although
upon pre-WWI
rule.6
a handful
authori-
apparent reliance
ty,
by any
of individual statements contained within
not been cited
court
which has
WWII,
holds,
only
on a
interview would have
admissi-
since
Wood’s
before
801A(a)(l)
statutory interpretation,
that a
ble under KRE
state- matter of
objections
por-
permit
ments that were
statute did not
inconsistent
Wood’s
signifi-
Most
testimony,
inculpatory
testimony.8
and certain
tions of former
however,'
may
majority opinion’s
un-
cantly,
statements
have been admissible
804(b)(3)
analysis
ignores
all
our own
against
der
as statements
waiver
but
interest,
former
addressing objections
much of
“eonfes-
rules
testi-
Wood’s
Commonwealth,
(holding that "state-
2. Brooks v.
114 S.W.3d
questions are waived unless served through to the states applicable tion made writing party propounding on the Amendment, guarantees the Fourteenth the time allowed for them within 7.20(1) ("At any ("For upon duly the trial or purposes a 10. RCr of Rule 7.20 9.RCr 7.22 deposition, hearing, part or all of a so given by transcript authenticated far evi- under the rules otherwise admissible previous the same in a trial of witness used_” added)). dence, may (emphasis be district or circuit court on offense in depo- charge equivalent of a shall be the same 7.20(2). sition.”). 11. RCr *12 confession, all criminal the ac- prosecutions, including: immanency “[i]n enjoy cused shall ... con- status; be charges; her co-defendant against fronted with him.” To witnesses blame; participants’ tendency to shift guarantee overcome this there must abe procedural safeguards omission viable v. exception. Maryland Craig, 497 of oath and limited or- restricted cross- 836, 3157, 111 U.S. 110 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 666 examination, any all create doubt as to (1990). “particularized guarantees of trustworthi- Roberts, 66, ness.” at supra, 100 S.Ct. case, In pre- the Commonwealth 2531. sented an affidavit and the
made a personal inquiry as to Ms. Wood’s Ms. unavailability Appel- Wood’s denied unavailability. Satisfied that Ms. Wood opportunity lant the to confront his accus- unavailable, was indeed judge per- er at his third trial. The trial court be- prior mitted admission of Ms. Wood’s testi- lieved there was sufficient evidence mony videotape. via Appellant’s overcome the denial of Sixth
If
only
issue was whether
guarantee.
disagree.
Ms. Wood Amendment
I
Ms.
successfully
was
un-
characterized as an
confession did not bear
“indi-
Wood’s
witness,
available
Appellant’s argument
reliability”
cia of
“particularized guaran-
would fail. The
was satisfied
tees of
and thus
in-
trustworthiness”
adequately
the Commonwealth
dem-
admissible.
unavailability,
onstrated Ms. Wood’s
thus
Defense counsel
that the con-
requested
meeting the rule of necessity required by
fession be redacted from the
the Confrontation Clause.
Idaho
v.
being presented
the second trial
805,
Wright,
3139,
497 U.S.
110
111
S.Ct.
third trial. The
(1990);
Roberts,
L.Ed.2d 638
Ohio v.
448
judge’s
to allow the unredact-
decision
56,
2531,
U.S.
100 S.Ct.
unavailable witness must be “indi- Roberts, 66, reliability.” supra,
cia of
objected
circumstances Ms. Wood’s
