The defendant-appellant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff-appellee’s complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction was denied. This court granted the application for interlocutory appeal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Certain facts are not in dispute. Defendant is a Pennsylvania corporation manufacturing athletic shoes. Defendant has never established warehouses, offices, facilities or other places of business in Georgia, and at the time of suit was not authorized to do or transact business in this state. Plaintiff is a Georgia resident and was defendant’s exclusive sales representative in the Southeast from mid 1973 to late 1975. Plaintiff solicited orders in Georgia subject to approval in Pennsylvania. Defendant’s shipments were made F. O. B. Pennsylvania. Payments were made directly to Pennsylvania. On occasion, at defendant’s request, plaintiff collected defendant’s accounts receivable in Georgia. In 1973,1974 and 1975, defendant’s executive officers attended trade shows in Atlanta in order to assist plaintiff in the solicitation of potential customers.
The complaint in this action was brought in three counts. Count 1 alleges that defendant breached its contract by terminating plaintiffs employment without complying with contractual notice requirements and by failing to remit commissions allegedly owing. Count 2 sounds in tort and is predicated on defendant’s alleged unreasonable and unlawful interference with plaintiffs business (soliciting orders) without legal excuse or justification. Count 3 sounds in tort and complains of *432 defendant’s unauthorized use and conversion of customer and account lists compiled by plaintiff while soliciting pursuant to the contract.
The issue before us is whether our Long Arm Statute (Code Ann. § 24-113.1), confers in personam jurisdiction under the facts of this case.
1. " '[T]he Long Arm Statute contemplates that jurisdiction shall be exercised over non-resident parties to the maximum extent permitted by procedural due process. [Cit.] ’ ”
Cox v. Long,
2. There is no case in Georgia involving this precise fact situation. We hold that under the totality of the circumstances there were sufficient contacts to confer personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant under § 24-113.1 (a). A Millner Co. v. Noudar, LDA
Our decision in Storey
v. Seffelaar & Looyen, Inc.,
3. The participation of defendant’s representatives and officers in the local trade shows during 1973, 1974 and 1975 was intended to encourage the development of defendant’s market in Georgia and to reap economic benefit therefrom. See generally
Palm Beach Invest. Properties v. Dingman,
4. The Long Arm Statute is sui generis in that venue depends in part on a demonstration that there is a valid claim for which relief may be granted.
Lincoln Land Co. v. Palfrey,
5. Our holding that personal jurisdiction exists under Code Ann. § 24-113.1(a) makes it unnecessary to consider the other reasons advanced (i.e., Code Ann. § 24-113.1 (b) and (c)) by plaintiff for validating the service. *434 See generally Cox v. Long, supra, Division (3).
6. Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss Count 2 (tortious interference with business activity) and Count 3 (unauthorized use of customer lists) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
We granted this petition for interlocutory review solely to determine the issue of whether jurisdiction was alleged under our Long Arm Statute. Having determined that jurisdiction does exist, it is beyond the scope of this interlocutory review to address these enumerations.
Judgment affirmed.