54 Miss. 353 | Miss. | 1877
delivered the opinion of the court.
Lucy H. Brooks filed her bill against her husband and sundry of his judgment creditors, for the purpose of enjoining a sale of his property under their judgments, and of establishing her own right to the property levied on.
It appears from the evidence in the case that in every instance the real estate, which is the property here involved, was bought either wholly or partially on a credit; the notes of the husband having been given and subsequently liquidated with the wife’s means. It is, therefore, insisted on behalf of the creditors, that inasmuch as it is essential to the creation of
The wise framers of this statute perceived that this unlimited though beneficent right conferred upon the wife might work grievous injustice to those who had traded with the husband upon the faith of his apparent ownership of the property standing in his name, and they therefore qualified the section above quoted by adding to it the words, “ but such trust shall be void as against creditors of the husband who contracted or gave credit in consequence of the possession of such property, without notice of the trust.” What is the meaning of this limitation upon the rights of the wife ?
As reluctant as we are to disturb adjudications involving rights so important, we cannot adhere to this construction of the statute in question. It seems to us wholly unwarranted, either by the evil to be guarded against, or by the language of the statute. We believe that the inception of the error fallen into by the court in that decision will be found in the assumption that the statutory trust conferred upon the wife was a mere recognition of her right to enforce, like other persons, a resulting trust, where she could show that her means had been invested in property the title to which had been placed in the husband. The learned judge who delivered the opinion, adverting to the fact that a resulting trust will not ordinarily be defeated, because the apparent owner has contracted general debts while clothed with the legal title to the property, remarks that this statute is “ exceptional, and almost penal, as to
If the assumption was correct, the argument might be sound; but, as we have stated above, the statutory trust here established in favor of the wife is wholly distinct from the ordinary resulting trust, and is freed from the technicalities by which that trust is surrounded. It enables the wife at any time to assert her equitable rights against the husband, regardless of the mode or manner, in which he has transformed her money into his property. Wisely, therefore, it is enacted that this right shall not be asserted against those who have trusted the husband on the faith of the property. A new right being conferred upon the wife, it is accompanied by a new limitation in favor of third persons. To require the creditor to show that in each case the extension of credit by agreement between himself and the husband was based upon some specific .piece of property, is either to nullify the statute, or to demand that in each case there must be a mortgage executed. If the latter had been intended, we think the law-giver would have said so.
Cases may arise where it may be difficult to determine whether the credit was extended in consequence of property really owned by the husband, or upon the faith of that which equitably belonged to the wife; and such, perhaps, was the case of Butterfield v. Stanton, ubi supra. Whether in such cases it must be held that the creditor is always to be presumed to have contracted in consequence of all the property of which the husband was the apparent owner, or whether it may be shown that, in point of fact, the credit was extended upon some other basis, it is unnecessary now to consider. George W. Brooks owned no property save that of which he was equitably the trustee of the wife ; and yet, with not a dollar that properly belonged to him (as shown by his wife’s bill and his own testimony), he held high position, socially and otherwise, planted exteiisivety, merchandised on a considerable scale, bought various pieces of property in his own name,