The plaintiff struck from paragraph 3 the reference to giant oak trees in the center of the street. The rest of the paragraph, taken in connection with other allegations of the petition, is not subject to the ground of demurrer that the allegations are not such as to show liability on the part of the defendant for damaging private property for public purposes. The court properly overruled this ground. The reference in paragraph 4 to oak trees in the center of the street is conceded by defendant in error to have been improperly mаde. The allegation that the occupants
*313
of houses along the street enjoyed, before the construction of the overpass, “a freedom of vision as to all traffic going to and fro on said street” suggests at most only a present inconvenience in not having the same view. Such incоnvenience to the plaintiff is not a basis for recovery in an action for damage to property, as provided against by article 1, section 3, paragraph 1, of the State constitution.
Southern Railway Co.
v. Leonard,
58 Ga. App.
574, 581 (
The allegations of paragraph 6 are not subject to the fourth special ground of demurrer that they are mere conclusions of the pleader without supporting facts. • The pleader is not obliged to set out the evidential facts as tо value, before and after the construction of the overpass, but may allege generally the values, not as conclusive, but subject to being proved on the trial of the ease. The allegation that “said storehouse and filling-station had a rental value of $40 per month,” and “said store and filling-station has been completely destroyed as business property,” is not subject to the objection urged in the fourth special ground of demurrer that the allegation does hot show any liability on the defendant. It shows rental value from which the market Value of the property before the ■ changе in the street was made could be determined, which market value the plaintiff alleged to have been $4000, but which, after the construction of the overpass, had depreciated to *314 $100. The allegation is pertinent, not as a basis for recovery of rental value, but as a basis for computing thе market value of the storehouse and filling-station as a part of the realty.
The allegations of paragraph 7, with respect to damaging plaintiff’s property, are not subject to the objections urged in the fifth special ground of demurrer, that they are mere conclusions of thq pleаder without allegations of supporting facts. It is not necessary that the supporting facts be alleged in the same paragraph, and the conclusions are supported by sufficient allegations elsewhere in the petition as to the change of grade and construction of the ovеrpass having damaged the property of plaintiff, although it is not shown that any property was “appropriated” or taken. In the latter respect the word “appropriated” is subject to the objection made, and direction is given that it be stricken, as the action is obviously one to recover for damage to property.
With the elimination of the language above referred to and ordered to be stricken, the petition as amended nevertheless sets forth a cause of action for damage to the realty of the plaintiff, and is maintainable under the constitutional provision that “Privatе property shall not be taken, or damaged, for public purposes, without just and adequate compensation being first paid.” Code, § 2-301. It is shown that the plaintiff’s property was located on a highway which was part of the State-aid road system; that in 1938 the State Highway Department changed the grаde of the street and constructed an overpass over the A. C. L. Railroad tracks crossing the street, approximately thirty feet high, in such a way that it left on each side of the northern approach a ground-level alley about fifteen feet wide, which runs 750 feet to a deep, opеn ditch immediately north of the railroad tracks, where a cul-de-sac was formed, whereas previously the street was 135 feet wide and traffic from Quitman, Georgia, to Greenville, Florida, proceeded along the street in front of plaintiff’s propertjq on which was located a two-story dwelling-hоuse and combination storehouse and filling-station, and that because of such construction work plaintiff’s property has been damaged in the sum of $7900, in that it formerly had a market value of $9000 and its present market value is only $1100. It is not alleged that the construction work was done by the county, but that it was donе by the State Highway Department after the highway had been designated as a part of the system of
*315
State-aid roads; but it was clearly established in
Taylor
v.
Richmond County,
185
Ga.
610 (
It is argued that the suit as originally brought did not set forth a cause of action, for the reason that it did not plead the- constitutional provision or any statute authorizing a suit against the county; and it is insisted that the petition was thus so defective that there was nothing to аmend by, and therefore should have
*316
been dismissed on the original demurrer. Authorities are cited to the effect that a suit against a county can not be maintained unless authorized by statute. These decisions are recognized as sound, but not as authority for the position taken by counsel for plaintiff in еrror that the constitutional provision relied on by the plaintiff in the trial court should have been so pleaded as to make the petition impervious to attack by general demurrer. The decisions holding that a county, being a political subdivision of the sovereign State, is not liable to a suit for аny cause of action unless made so by statute (Code, § 23-1502) have no application here. The right to sue a county for damages for the taking or damaging of private property under the circumstances alleged is not dependent on any statute, but arises out of the constitutional provision which applies to counties as well as to individuals. In
Smith
v.
Floyd County,
85
Ga.
420 (
After the defendant had filed its general and special demurrers, the plaintiff filed an amеndment striking paragraph 8 and substituting therefor the allegations that the suit was brought to recover _ damages to his property, based on article 1, section 3, paragraph Í, of the constitution, and Code, § 95-1710, act of 1919, p. 249, creating the State Highway Department, and the amendatory act oif 1922, p. 176, dеfining its powers, duties, and liabilities, in so far ,as applicable to the facts set out in plaintiff’s amended petition. This amendment was allowed subject to further demurrer. The defendant afterward demurred to the amended paragraph 8 on the ground that it alleged a new and distinct cause of action; and it is contended that the court erred in overruling this ground, and in not dismissing the action. It is urged that under the original petition the plaintiff’s suit was based on sections 828 et seq. of Michie’s Code, which, it is averred, dealt only generally with the reorganization of the State Highway Department, duties of the State Highway Board, the State highway engineer, and the department’s responsibility with reference to constructing roads and maintaining a highway system. This contention is also without merit. Paragraph 7 alleges, that, “in thus changing the grade and constructing said approach and overpass, defendant has damaged and thus apрropriated for public use the property of petitioner without any condemnation thereof, or payment therefor, and without the consent of petitioner,” and thereby sufficiently shows an intention to base the action on the constitutional provision. While it is also stated in paragrаph 8 that the suit is brought in accordance with the Michie Code, sections 828 et seq., it is further stated that plaintiff prays that said defendant vouch the State Highway Department into court to defend the suit; and the only significance of the reference to sections 828 et seq. of the Michie Code is to *318 pеrfect the suit against the county in respect to vouching the State Highway Department into court. The subject-matter of these sections of Michie’s Code, an unofficial publication, is taken from the act of 1919, p. 24=2, and certain amendatory acts relating to the reorganization of the Stаte Highway Department, its duties, etc., and in section 2 of the act of 1919 provision is made for vouching the State Highway Department into court when a county is sued under the circumstances named in the act. The amendment merely makes more definite and pleads more accurately the reliance on the constitutional provision against taking or damaging private property without just and adequate compensation being .first paid, and cites and quotes the present official Code of 1933, § 95-1710, which codifies in part the act of 1919, pp. 242, 249, as amended by the act of 1922, p. 176, as to suits agаinst counties and the vouching into court of the Highway Department, and specifically cites the acts above mentioned as a basis for the suit in so far as applicable to the facts set out in the petition. The allegations of the amendment to paragraph 8 do not have the effect of introducing a new and distinct cause of action, and the demurrer thereto is without merit.
From what is said above it follows that the court did not err in overruling the general demurrers and special demurrers, except in respect to certain language of the petition which we have directed be stricken.
Judgment affirmed, with direction.