41 Ind. App. 102 | Ind. Ct. App. | 1908
This is a suit brought by appellant to enjoin appellee from collecting certain city taxes assessed against the property of appellant’s ward, Mary A. Brook-over, in the city of Huntington. The grounds upon which said writ of injunction was sought were that appellant’s ward did not reside in said city during the years for which said assessments were made; that said property had been listed and assessed and the taxes paid thereon in Warren township, the township where it is claimed said ward resided. Trial was had, and upon request a special finding of facts was made by the court, and a conclusion of law stated that the law was with appellee, and decree accordingly entered thereon. Exception was taken to the conclusion of law, and the ruling of the court on such ’ conclusion of law is assigned here as error, and is the only error presented.
The facts as stated in the finding are, in substance, that Mary A. Brookover is a person of unsound mind, fifty-eight years of age, and at no time in life has been capable of transacting business or caring for her property; that she resided in Warren township, Huntington county, Indiana, for many years prior to December, 1884, with her mother;
Findings four, five and nine are as follows:
“ (4) That said ward continued to reside and have- her home with her said mother on said farm until the spring of 1886, when said Eliza J. Brookover moved to the city of Huntington, in said county, and by and with the consent of said guardian said ward went with her said mother to reside.in said city of Huntington, and did so reside and make her home until the fall of 1892, when said Eliza J. Brookover moved to said Warren township, with said ward, with the consent of said guardian, and under said arrangement, and they remained until the latter part of 1893, when said Eliza J. Brookover returned to said city of Huntington to live, and by and with the .consent of said guardian said ward moved with her said mother, and since which time said ward has lived and made her home with her mother within the corporation limits of said city of Huntington, by and with the agreement of said Eliza J. Brookover and said guardian that said Eliza J. Brookover should keep and furnish a home for said ward without any agreement or understanding of the length of time said ward was so to live or remain with her said mother.
(5) That when said ward moved with her said mother to said city of Huntington the second time there was no definite agreement between said guardian and said Éliza J. Brookover as to how long said ward should make her home*105 with her said mother, hut she has so resided with her said mother with the agreement of said guardian to pay, and who' has paid, said mother for the support, board and care of said ward out of said ward’s estate.”
“ (9) That during the years set out in finding eight, said Mary Ann Brookover resided within the corporate limits of the city of Huntington, and her said property, set out in finding eight, was subject to taxation during said years by said city of Huntington.”
Other findings are to the effect that appellant listed said property and the same was assessed in Warren township, and the state, county and township taxes paid thereon by virtue of said assessment; that appellant resided in said Warren township, ¿nd that appellee was threatening to collect the taxes, of which complaint was made.
It is contended by appellant that findings four and five show that appellant’s ward did not reside, in the city of Huntington, but that her residence was in Warren township.
The right of a guardian to change the residence of his ward seems never to have been decided in this State, but both reason and authority of other states clearly sustain this right. Kirkland v. Inhabitants of Whately (1862), 86 Mass. 462; Anderson v. Estate of Anderson (1869), 42 Vt.
Kirkland v. Inhabitants of Whately, supra, is in many respects similar to the case before us. In that case the domicil of origin of the ward was in Northampton, that being also the domicil of the guardian. With consent and under arrangement of the guardian the ward was sent to Whately to the home of his grandfather, who kept him and cared for him, and was paid therefor by the guardian. The ward had real estate in Northampton, and occasionally visited there, but had no home or habitation there. This continued for a period of two years. There was no definite understanding between the guardian and the grandfather as to how long the ward should remain with him. The question, as here, was whether the ward should be taxed on his personal estate in Northampton or Whately, this question to be determined by the ward’s residence. The court say: “It is admitted that for two consecutive years the minor with the consent of his guardian had lived exclusively in that town. All the outward indicia by which the residence of a person is determined pointed solely to Whately as the place where he resided and had his home. This, then, is one essential element of domicil. The other is the intent with which he there lived; for the fact and intent must concur, in order to establish a legal domicil. In .this case, as the domicil of a minor under guardianship is at issue, the intent of the guardian is to be regarded. So far as the facts agreed indicate any intent on his part having reference to the domicil of origin of his ward at Northampton, it appears that, when he went to Whately and ever since, the guardian has had no definite intention to cause him to return to Northampton to reside. It appears, then, that the ward had for two years ceased in fact to reside at Northampton, and that when he-
In the case of Anderson v. Estate of Anderson, supra, it appears that appellee’s decedent resided with his wife and family in Woodstock. He became insane and was taken to Brattleboro for treatment, and a guardian for his person and estate was appointed. The guardian disposed of his ward’s property and removed his family to Montpelier, where they made their home. They left no interests in Woodstock. The ward died in Brattleboro, never having regained his reason. The question arose whether his residence was in Woodstock, where it was when he lost his reason, or Montpelier, where his wife and family, under the guardian’s direction, had subsequently removed. The court held his residence to be
Judgment affirmed.