Aftеr a bench trial, appellant was found guilty of speeding. He appeals from the judgment of conviction and sentenсe entered by the trial court on its finding of guilt.
1. Over objection, the trial court admitted evidence of speed obtained by usе of a radar speed detection device operated by a Cobb County law enforcement officer. Appellant enumerates this ruling as error, contending that the State failed to lay a proper foundation for admission of the evidence in accordance with the requirements of OCGA § 40-14-1 et seq.
County, municipal, and campus law enforcement officers “may use speed detection devices only if the governing authorities of [their respective jurisdictions] . . . shall aрply to the Department of Public Safety [(DPS)] for a permit to use such devices in accordance with [OCGA § 40-14-1 et seq.].” OCGA § 40-14-2 (a). In the instant case, the State submitted copies of DPS permits issued to the Cobb County Board of Commissioners “for the use of a speеd detection device at [certain specifically] authorized location(s). . . .” These permits, to which no objeсtion was raised, were signed by the Commissioner of DPS. The Commissioner of DPS is a public officer and is “presumed to discharge [his] duties properly, and [his signature] speak [s] with verity as to the same. [Cit.] Thus, the [DPS permits] are presumed to speak with verity. [Cit.]” Oller v. State,
According to thе DPS permits, the Cobb County Board of Commissioners had “submitted an application in proper form for a permit for the use of a speed detection device at [certain specified] location^). . . .” Thus, the DPS permits constitute presumptivе evidence of compliance with OCGA § 40-14-3 (a), which provides: “The gov
The DPS permits also provide that the Cobb County Board of Commissioners had shown “compliаnce with all applicable laws, rules and regulations. ...” Thus, the DPS permits would likewise constitute presumptive evidence оf compliance with that portion of OCGA § 40-14-4 which provides that “[n]o . . . county . . . law enforcement agency may use speed detection devices unless the agency possesses a license in compliance with Federal Communicatiоns Commission [(FCC)] rules. . . .” Appellant’s reliance upon Wiggins v. State,
OCGA § 40-14-4 also requires that “each device, before being placed in service and annually after being placed in service, [be] certified for compliance by a technician possessing a certification as required by [DPS].” As in Wiggins, evidencе of the manufacturer’s certification for accuracy was introduced in the instant case. Accordingly, here, as in Wiggins, supra at 306 (2c), the manufacturer’s certification serves “as a memorandum of the accuracy of the equipment ‘before being placed in service,’ a part of [the] requirement [of OCGA § 40-14-4]. [Cits.]” The “other part” of the requirement of OCGA § 40-14-4 regarding annual certification is inapplicable
Moreover, the only issue in Wiggins was the admissibility of certain evidence to establish the foundation. Wiggins does not purport to establish the manner in which the foundation must be proved. Nothing in Wiggins suggests that compliance with the certification requirements of OCGA § 40-14-4 cannot be proved by reliance upon the evidentiary presumption “ ‘ “that a public officer has done his duty, and his official duties will be presumed to have been donе rightly until the contrary is shown. (Cit.)” (Cit.) Accordingly, there [would appear to be] a presumption in this and in all other cases arising under (the relevant Code sections) that the [appropriate public official] has caused the instrument used to [detect speed by radar] to be checked ... for calibration.’ [Cits.]” Calloway v. State,
Appellant raises no other challenge to the sufficiency of the foundation laid for admission of the evidence. It follows that the trial court correctly overruled apрellant’s objection to the introduction of evidence of speed obtained by use of a radar speed detеction device.
2. A rational trior of fact could reasonably have found from the evidence adduced below proof of appellant’s guilt of exceeding the posted speed limit beyond a reasonable doubt. Brown v. State,
Judgment affirmed.