Charles F. BROCK, Claimant-Appellant, v. CITY OF BOISE, Employer, and State Insurance Fund, Surety, Defendant-Respondent.
No. 11231.
Supreme Court of Idaho.
Oct. 18, 1973.
Rehearing Denied Dec. 7, 1973.
516 P.2d 189
Judgment affirmed. Costs to respondent.
DONALDSON, C. J., and SHEPARD, McQUADE and McFADDEN, JJ., concur.
Glenn A. Coughlan, Coughlan, Imhoff, Christensen & Lynch, Boise, for claimant-appellant.
Paul S. Boyd, Boise, for defendant-respondent.
McQUADE, Justice.
Claimant-appellant Charles F. Brock was employed as a fireman by Boise City from October 14, 1945, to May 1, 1972. On September 17, 1971, appellant was injured while engaged in his duties as a fireman. As a result of these injuries a claim was filed for workmen‘s compensation benefits, and total temporary compensation benefits at the rate of $67.00 per week were instituted. Appellant was also afforded medical treatment benefits. A total of $727.40 in temporary compensation benefits was paid, but since appellant continued to receive his regular salary during this period, he endorsed his compensation checks to Boise City.
Appellant then worked from December 13, 1971, until May 1, 1972, when he voluntarily retired pursuant to
On June 27, 1972, the physician treating appellant rated his permanent partial disability due to the accident as 35% as compared to the loss of the leg at the hip. Pursuant to this rating, a workmen‘s compensation agreement between appellant, City of Boise, and the State Insurance Fund was approved by the Industrial Commission on July 12, 1972. The 35% permanent partial disability rating entitled appellant to 63 weeks at the rate of $43.00 per week amounting to $2,709.00. The State Insurance Fund paid $1,600.57 of this sum to appellant on July 14, 1972, the remain-
At the end of August, 1972, appellant filed a Petition for Hearing with the Industrial Commission, alleging that he was entitled to full payment under both agreements. Findings and Conclusions were entered on November 22, 1972, and additional conclusions were made on November 27. The Commission ordered that respondents were entitled to deduct the workmen‘s compensation payments from the firemen‘s retirement benefits. This appeal is from the Findings, Conclusions and Order of the Industrial Commission.
Appellant makes five assignments of error, the first being that the Findings, Conclusions and Order were not based on substantial and competent evidence. The second assignment alleges that
As authority for their actions, respondents rely on
“Workmen‘s Compensation credit.-Any fireman, widow, child or children of a fireman entitled to compensation under the Workmen‘s Compensation Law, shall draw benefits under this act only to the
extent that the benefits under this act exceed those to which he shall be entitled under the Workmen‘s Compensation Law of Idaho.”
Appellant argues that this statute is unconstitutional in that it is arbitrary and capricious, and discriminates between firemen in a class.1 The constitutionality of a provision connected with the Workmen‘s Compensation Act may properly be raised for the first time on appeal.2
The U.S. Supreme Court has held the following in the case of Reed v. Reed;3
“The Equal Protection Clause of that Amendment [the Fourteenth Amendment] does, however, deny to States the power to legislate that different treatment be accorded to persons placed by a statute into different classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of that statute. A classification ‘must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.’ Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415, 40 S. Ct. 560, 561, 64 L.Ed. 989 (1920).”4
The Firemen‘s Retirement Fund is a part of Title 72 of the Idaho Code which governs workmen‘s compensation and related laws. It is the major purpose of the Workmen‘s Compensation Law to provide compensation to make good the loss or impairment of earning power which otherwise might fall on the worker or his family.5
A leading treatise points out that:
“Once it is recognized that workmen‘s compensation is one unit in an overall system of wage-loss protection, rather than something resembling a recovery in tort or on a private accident policy, the conclusion follows that duplication of benefits from different parts of the system should not ordinarily be allowed.”6
The treatise goes on to state:
“Wage-loss legislation is designed to restore to the worker a portion, such as one-half to two-thirds, of wages lost due to the three major causes of wage-loss: physical disability, economic unemployment, and old age. The crucial operative fact is that of wage loss; the cause of the wage-loss merely dictates the category of legislation applicable. Now if a workman undergoes a period of wage loss due to all three conditions, it does not follow that he should receive three sets of benefits simultaneously and thereby recover more than his actual wage. He is experiencing only one wage loss and, in any logical system, should receive only one wage-loss benefit. This conclusion is inevitable, once it is recognized that workmen‘s compensation, unemployment compensation, non-occupational sickness and disability insurance, and old age and survivor‘s insurance are all parts of a system based upon a common principle.”7
Appellant argues that respondents waived application of
The record and evidence have been reviewed by this Court and no error has been found. In appeals to this Court in cases involving workmen‘s compensation statutes, review is limited to questions of law.10 Here there is ample evidence to support the Commission‘s decision.
The order of the Industrial Commission is affirmed.
Costs to respondents.
SHEPARD and McFADDEN, JJ., concur.
DONALDSON, Chief Justice (dissenting).
I dissent. In my opinion,
Lump sum payments of workmen‘s compensation benefits are, and were at the time of the appellant‘s injury, authorized under the Idaho Code.
The major purpose of the Workmen‘s Compensation Law may in fact be, as the majority says, “to provide compensation to make good the loss or impairment of earning power which otherwise might fall on the worker or his family.” But the obvious purpose of
In failing to require an offset against retirement benefits for lump sum payments previously received, while requiring such an offset for weekly benefits concurrently received,
“We direct our attention to the above classifications * * * and consider their rationality, reasonableness and relevance to the purposes of the employment security act attempted to be accomplished by this legislation, to determine whether the distinctions are based on substantial differences and justifiable foundations which operate uniformly on all of the persons naturally in the various classes.
“We ask ourselves this question: Is there a justifiable, reasonable and substantial difference between these participants in workmen‘s compensation benefits who did not qualify for unemployment compensation benefits because they were drawing weekly benefits under the workmen‘s compensation act and those with the same disability, suffering injury at the same time, who received their workmen‘s compensation benefits in one lump sum * * * ?
“There is no substantial, rational or justifiable difference between the classes established by this amendment pertaining to the lump sum payment exception. The injury is the same; the disability is the same; the length of the incapacity is the same; and even the benefits to which the two classes are entitled are the same. Plaintiff, who falls into the classification of one receiving weekly benefits rather than having taken a lump sum settlement prior to filing for unemployment compensation benefits, is deprived of the constitutional right of equal protection of the laws since all, including this plaintiff, have not been treated alike in determining their eligibility * * * .”
See also State ex rel. Morgan v. White, 136 Mont. 470, 348 P.2d 991 (1960).
BEEBE, D. J., concurs in the dissent.