delivered the opinion of the Court.
*37 This is a suit brought in a magistrate’s court for conversion of a radio. Plaintiff sold the property to one Herman Turner, retaining title to secure the purchase money. Defendant Bates purchased the radio from Turner, and resold it in ignorance of the fact that the title was in plaintiff. The magistrate gave judgment for plaintiff, hut the circuit judge reversed and gave judgmеnt for the defendant.
The case was tried in the circuit court on the fоllowing stipulation of facts:
“That on April 5, 1933, Herman Turner purchased a Philсo Jr., Radio, Number K4523 from the Broadway Furniture Co., of Nashville, Tennessee. Sаid purchase was made under Retained Title or Conditional Sales contract in which title was retained by the Broadway Furniture Co., to securе the payment of the purchase price. That the said Herman Turnеr defaulted in payment and owed $23.25; that the said Herman Turner sold to the defendant, Emit Bates, the above described radio without the knowledge оr consent of the Broadway Furniture Co. That subsequently the said Emit Bates sold the radio to some other party. That at the time he purchased and at the time he sold the radio it was worth $20.00. That Emit Bates had no knowledge оr notice of the retained title contract held by the Broadway Furniturе Co. That Herman Turner has left the state and his present address is unknown to аny of the parties.”
The general rule is thus stated in 55 C. J., 1311: “A subsequent purchaser from a buyer may be sued for conversion of the property, although he has resold it and is no longer in possession of it.” The two cases cited to support this text are
Elder
v.
Woodruff Hardware & Mfg.
Co.,
“Such a defense is not sufficient. It ignores the rule caveat emptor. It is clear that Barnes had no title to sell, and hence neither Nichols nor Ballou acquired any by their purchases. The law, as statеd in Cooley, Torts, section 451, which is well supported by authority, is as follows: ‘ One who buys property must, at his peril, ascertain the ownership, and, if he buys оf one who has no authority to sell, his taking possession, in denial of the owner’s right, is a conversion. . . . So, it is no protection, to one who has received property and disposed of it in the usual course of trаde, that he did so in good faith, and in the belief that the person from whom he took it was the owner, if in fact the possession of the latter was tortious.’
“The mere possession by Barnes under the agreement was not tortious, but possession with an intention to sell, contrary to the agreement, was tortious. Under the agreement, he had no right to sell. The law in England and in this country is in harmony on the question before us. In Hollins v. Fowler, L. R., 7, H. L., 757, the subject was most exhaustively considered, and it may be taken as a definitive statement of the law in Englаnd. The case holds that any person who, however innocently, obtаins possession of the goods of a person who has been fraudulently deprived of them, and disposes of them, *39 whether for his own benefit or thаt of any other person, is guilty of a conversion.”
The principle involved is the same applied by this court in cases of stolen or wrongfully converted property.
McDaniel
v.
Adams,
Beversed, and judgment lien for plaintiff.