Broadnax Mills, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of VirginiaBroadnax Mills, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Virginia
MEMORANDUM
This mаtter is before the Court on the plaintiffs motion to remand, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e). For the reasons set forth below, the Court will deny the motion.
I.
In 1978, the plaintiff established a fully insured health benefit plan for its employees. Because the plaintiff was unfamiliar with administering such a plan, it sought advice regarding plan administration and “the availability of, and the need for, insurance to provide ... reasonable protection from liability under the [plan].” Motion for Judgment ¶4. Since adopting the plan, the plaintiff has relied on the defendant for such advice.
The plan was, until August 1, 1989, fully insured by the defendant. On that date, the plan was converted to a self-insured plan. The plaintiff and the defendant concomitantly entered into an administration services only agreement (“ASO Agreement”). Pursuant to this agreement, the plaintiff agreed to pay premiums into an operating account managed by the defendant in exchange for the provision of various claims services. The monthly payments made by the plaintiff consisted of funds contributed by both the plaintiff and the plaintiff’s employees. Receipts and charges were recorded by the defendant in the operating account. If, at the termination of the contract, the sum of claims paid plus administrative and other fees exceeded the amount of premiums paid, the plaintiff
The ASO Agreement was renewed in subsequent years. In connection with the 1991-92 ASO Agreement, the plaintiff procured from the defendant an excess risk insurance policy with specific stop loss insurance. This policy limited the plaintiffs liability for claims paid in excess of $60,000.00 per year per participant as the plaintiff was reimbursed for claims exceeding such amount. The policy did not, however, provide any limit on the plaintiffs overall liability for operating account deficits. Motion for Judgment ¶22. The plaintiff contends that the defendant “did not inform Broadnax ... about the existence of, or the need for, any additional insuranсe to protect Broadnax against liability for a large deficit in the operating account.” Id. at ¶23.
The ASO Agreement was renewed for the 1992-93 contract year after the defendant’s review of the plaintiffs historical and projected claims levels. 1 Once again, the agreement did not provide for aggregate stop loss insurance for 1992-93. During that year, an unusually large number of claims were submitted by plan participants. As a result, the operating account showed a deficit of $240,-000.00 at the end of the contract year. According to thе plaintiff, the account would have shown a surplus of approximately $52,-347 if the defendants had recommended and provided aggregate stop loss insurance.
The plaintiff also alleges that the defendants failed to explain a provider payment differential provision that was contained in the ASO Agreement. Specifically, the plaintiff claims that the defendant obtained discounts from various health care providers and that the 1992-93 deficit, as reported in the оperating account, fails to account for these discounts which allegedly amounted to $48,952.27. The plaintiff states that this amount represents “undisclosed fees ... that were improperly and unfairly imposed” owing to the defendant’s failure to explain the meaning of the ASO Agreement’s provider payment differential provision. Motion for Judgment ¶¶ 44^45.
Finally, the plaintiff charges that the defendant failed to explain that, under the ASO Agreement, the plaintiff was liable “for all claims incurred but not reported prior to the termination of the ASO Agreement,” and that terminal liability limit insurance was available to protect the plaintiff against potential “excessive terminal liability.” Motion for Judgment ¶¶ 49-50. Because it was unaware that such insurance was available, the plaintiff alleges that it is now liable for an undetermined amount of claims submitted after the ASO Agreement expired on July 31, 1994.
On these allegations, the plaintiff filed a six count motion for judgment in the Circuit Court of Mecklenberg County on August 1, 1994. The motion for judgment contains state law causes of action including breach of contract, negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, promissory estoppel, negligent misrepresentation and constructive fraud. The motion for judgment nowhere mentions the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. Nevertheless, the defendants filed a notice of removal on August 18, 1994, basing removal on federal question jurisdiction assertedly created by ERISA. The plaintiffs moved to remand the matter to state court on September 19, 1994.
II.
In order for removal jurisdiction to exist, a federal court must have “original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Original jurisdiction exists where the plaintiffs cause of action arises under the Constitution or federal law.
See
28 U.S.C. § 1331. Whether or not an action “arises under” federal law is generally determined by the “well pleaded complaint” rule.
Franchise Tax Bd. of State of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vac. Trust for S. Cal.,
whether a case is one arising under the Constitution or a law or treaty of the United States ... must be determined from what necessarily appears in the plaintiffs statement of his own claim in the bill or declaration, unaided by anything alleged in anticipation of avoidance of defenses which it is thought the defendant may interpose.
Franchise Tax Bd.,
The plaintiff asserts that the absence of a federal law on the face of the complaint is alone sufficient to remand the action to state court. The Court does not agree as it is well settled that removal jurisdiction may nevertheless be established under the “complete preemption” doctrine. Pursuant to this doctrine, a federal court will have jurisdiction, regardless of the complaint’s contents, where Congress has “so completely preempted] a particular area that any civil complaint raising this select group of claims is necessarily federal in character.”
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor,
III.
The “touchstone of the federal district court’s removal jurisdiction is ... the intent of Congress.”
Taylor,
The ERISA statutory scheme relies heavily on the civil enforcement and preemption provisions to attain Congress’ underlying objectives. ERISA’s preemption provision reads, in pertinent part: “[T]he provisions of this subchaptеr ... shall supersede any and
was intended to ensure that plans and sponsors would be subject to a uniform body of benefits law; the goal was to minimize the administrative and financial burden of complying with conflicting directives among States or between states and the Federal Government. Otherwise, the inefficiencies could work to the detriment of plan benefiсiaries.
Ingersoll-Rand v. McClendon,
The civil remedies provision creates several discrete causes of action and identifies the parties who have standing to bring an action under that section.
4
This section reflects a “careful balancing of the need for prompt and fair claims settlement procedures against the public interest in encouraging the formation of employee benefit plans.”
Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux,
IV.
Under the preemption provision, the critical inquiry is whether or not the state cause of action “relates to” the plaintiffs health benefits plan. In order to achieve the policies underlying ERISA, the preemption clause is generally read expansively and a state cause of action will be found to “relate to” an ERISA plan “if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan.”
Dist. of Columbia v. Greater Washington Bd. of Trade,
— U.S. -,
The provision, however, is not free of limitations. “Some state actions mаy affect employee benefit plans in too tenuous, remote or peripheral a manner to warrant a finding that the law ‘relates to’ the plan.”
Shaw,
First, state laws involving the exercise of traditional state authority are less likely to be preempted than state laws regulating areas not traditionally left to the state. Second, a state law is more likely to relatе to a benefit plan, and thus be preempted, if it affects relations among principal ERISA entities (the employer, the plan, the plan fiduciaries, and the beneficiaries). When it affects relations among principal ERISA entities and an outside party, or between two outside parties, a state law is less likely to be preempted. Third, preemption is less likely to occur where the effect of a state law of general application on an ERISA-covered plan is merely incidental. 5
Id. at 457-58 (citations omitted).
The plaintiff asserts that the suit does not “relate to” ERISA. In support of this contention, the plaintiff states that the subject matter of the suit, stop-loss insurance, is not
This argument fails to account for several critical facts. To begin, the defendant was not merely a third party insurer.
6
To the contrаry, the ASO agreement makes clear that the defendant was the administrator and servicer, as well as the insurer, of the plaintiffs plan.
See
Answer, Exhibit 1, ASO Agreement (“The Company agrees to administer the benefits afforded Participants as set forth herein_”). In this capacity, the defendant, among other responsibilities, determined the extent to which participants and beneficiaries were covered and, in this regard, applied plan assets to pay for services rendered by health care providers. This involvement in plan operations elevates the-defendant’s status above that of mere insurer. Indeed, as set forth below, the defendant, like the plaintiff, was a plan fiduciary. Where a dispute involves “principal ERISA entities,” it is more likely to “relate to” the plan and be preempted.
Richmond,
Moreover, the plaintiffs claims implicate the primary administrative functions of the plan.
See Martori Bros. Dists. v. James-Massengale,
Finally, the facts set forth аbove make it clear that any resolution of the. plaintiffs claims cannot occur without reference to the plan and its governing documents, including the ASO Agreement.
8
“The existence of [the plaintiffs] plan is a critical factor in establishing liability....”
Ingersoll-Rand,
On this record, the Court concludes that the plaintiffs causes of action “relate to” the health benefit plan. This does not end the inquiry, however. To determine whether or not the plaintiffs claim is completely preempted under the facts presented, the Court must turn its attention to the preemptive effect of ERISA’s civil remedies provisions.
Taylor,
V.
The ERISA civil enforcement provision provides several causes action.
See
29 U.S.C. 1132,
supra
n. 4. The relevant cause of action in the instant matter reads as follоws: “A civil suit may be brought by the Secretary, or by a participant, beneficiary or fiduciary for appropriate relief under section 409 [breach of fiduciary duty].” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2). In order to fall within § 1132(a)(2), both the plaintiff and the defendant in the instant matter must be fiduciaries.
See Great Coastal Express, Inc. v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Virginia,
Pursuant to ERISA,
[A] person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent (i) hе exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management of such plan or exercises any authority or control respecting management or disposition of its assets ... or (iii) he has any discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration of such plan.
29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A). Moreover, “to state a cause of action under section 502(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2), it is not sufficient for [the defendant] to generally be a fiduciary, it must have had fiduciary respоnsibilities with regard to the specific issues in the suit.”
Great Coastal,
In the instant matter, both the plaintiff and the defendant fall within ERISA’s definition of “fiduciary.” This conclusion is inescapable upon a reading of the ASO
The plaintiff, too, is a fiduciary. 12 Indeed, it was the plaintiffs responsibility to establish and maintain the plan. The plaintiff was also entrusted with employee funds for remittance to the defendant, along with any employer contributions, in the form of monthly payments to the operating account. Moreover, the plaintiff exercised its discretion in hiring the defendant as insurer and co-fiduciary of the plan. Finally, the plaintiff had the authority to determine participant eligibility, Answer, Exh. 1, ASO Agreement § II.A at 12, and terminate the plan upon thirty days notice. Id. § X.D at 39.
From the foregoing, it is clear that both parties are fiduciaries and that the plaintiff is asserting a cause of action under the civil enforcement provisions of ERISA. In such cases, “the federal courts will have exclusive jurisdiction over the plaintiffs claims.”
Great Coastal,
VI.
The record before the Court establishes that the plaintiffs claims are preempted by ERISA and fall within ERISA’s civil enforcement provisions. On this basis, the Court concludes that the plaintiffs state law claims are completely preempted by ERISA. Accordingly, the plaintiffs motion to remand this matter to state court will be denied.
Notes
. This review is allegedly designed to ascertain projected insurance needs and recommend the insurance necessary to protect against “commer-daily unreasonable risks" arising under the plan. Motion for Judgment ¶ 26.
. In certain situations, a court examining a remand motion may conclude that a claim is preempted based on § 1144 alone. For example, in
Richmond,
it was not possible for the plaintiffs' claims to fall within the ERISA civil enforcement provisions because the plaintiffs, minority shareholders of the defendant corporation, did not have standing under those provisions. Thus, in considering whether to exercise its discretionary remand powers, the court concluded that preemption would have to come from ERISA's preemption provision, if anywhere. In this vein, the court concluded that the claims did not sufficiently “relate to” ERISA to be preempted under § 1144.
. It is uncontested that the plaintiff's plan is covered by ERISA. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1).
. 29 U.S.C. § 1132 provides, in pertinent part: A civil action may be brought — •
(1) by a participant or beneficiary—
(A) for the relief provided for in subsection (c) of this section [concerning requests to the administrator], or
(B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan;
(2) by the Secretary, or by a participant, beneficiаry, or fiduciary for appropriate relief under section 1109 of this title [breach of fiduciary duty];
(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the plan.
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a).
. These principles served as the basis for the recent holding that certain provisions of Virginia worker’s compensation law do not "relate to” ERISA plan.
See Employers Resource Management Co., Inc. v. James,
. The plaintiff proposes that any claims involving self-funded plans and stop loss insurance do not "relate to” ERISA as such claims involve only concurrent third party contracts. To support this proposition, they rely on
Consumer Benefit Ass’n of the United States v. Lexington Ins. Co.,
. The fact that employee contributions, in part, funded the plaintiff’s policy also distinguishes the instant matter from the narrow factual scenario addressed in the Department of Labor Advisory Opinion cited by the plaintiff as support for the proposition that stop-loss policies covering the employer are not plan assets. See DOL Advisory Opinion 92-02A (January 17, 1992) (employer represented that employee contributions were not required by the medical benefit plan).
. There is no doubt that the ASO agreement is one of the fundamental documents governing the operational aspects of the plaintiffs health bеnefits plan. Indeed, the extent to which the plaintiff's employees could receive benefits was determined solely by the defendant under the terms and conditions of the ASO Agreement. See Answer, Exh. 1, ASO Agreement X.B at 39.
. The parties must both be fiduciaries because (1) only defendant fiduciaries may be sued under this provision; and (2) the plaintiff is neither a participant nor a beneficiary of the health benefit plan, and will thus have standing only if it is a fiduciary. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2).
. For example, the defendant had the sole discretion to determinе the extent to which a participant was entitled to benefits. Answer, Exh. 1, ASO Agreement § X.B at 39. It also had the discretion to amend or terminate the ASO Agreement. Id. at § X.D.
. Moreover, as indicated by the defendant, several courts have held that insurance brokers are fiduciaries under ERISA.
See Brink v. DaLesio,
[I]t is apparent that responsibility for important decisions pertaining to the scope of insurance coverage and the selection of carriers were delegated to [the broker]. In order to afford plan participants and beneficiaries the protection that Congress intended, insurance consultants such as [the broker] must be held to fiduciary standards.
.Nowhere does the plaintiff deny that it is a fiduciary, as defined at 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A).