Broad River Power Co. v. South Carolina Ex Rel. Daniel
282 U.S. 187
SCOTUS
1930
Check Treatment

BROAD RIVER POWER COMPANY ET AL. v. SOUTH CAROLINA EX REL. DANIEL, ATTORNEY GENERAL.

No. 528 (1929 Term)

Supreme Court of the United States

December 15, 1930

Argued on Rehearing, December 3, 4, 1930

282 U.S. 187

See 281 U. S. 537.

gravity had been exemplified in various methods for centuries, and that long prior to the patent there in suit the principle had been applied to various substances such as grain, coal, crushed stone, sand, and iron ore, and said [p. 184]:

“The observations of common experience in the mechanical arts would lead one to expect that once the feasibility of using ‘wet’ concrete in building operations was established, the mechanical skill of those familiar with engineering and building problems would seek to make use of known methods and appliances for the convenient handling of this new building material.”

Here it appears that the use of compressed air for conveyance of granular and plastic materials had long been known and practised; so that the cited case is clear authority against invention in the instant cases.

The decree in No. 3 is reversed and the cause remanded with instructions to dismiss the bill of complaint. The decree in No. 4 is affirmed.

No. 3, reversed.

No. 4, affirmed.

Mr. George M. LePine, with whom Messrs. C. Edward Paxson, W. C. McLain and Wm. Marshall Bullitt were on the supplemental brief, for petitioners.

Mr. Irvine F. Belser, with whom Messrs. John M. Daniel, Attorney General of South Carolina, Cordie Page, Assistant Attorney General, Joseph L. Nettles, City Attorney of Columbia, S. C., H. N. Edmunds, and C. T. Graydon were on the supplemental brief, for respondents.

PER CURIAM.

At the last term the writ of certiorari in this cause was dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

. A rehearing afterwards was ordered by the Court and the rehearing recently has been had. Upon this further consideration the Court adheres to the view that the writ of certiorari should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction, but the members of the Court differ in the reasons which lead to that decision:

MR. JUSTICE VAN DEVANTER, MR. JUSTICE MCREYNOLDS, MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND and MR. JUSTICE BUTLER concur in this disposition of the case, upon the rehearing, for the following reasons: The state court found that the petitioners here “did not make a bona fide effort to make the street railway business a success,” but planned to discontinue it and pursued a course tending to depress the business and make it unremunerative; that “if the street car system had been properly maintained, as it could and should have been, the same would have been patronized by the public generally“; and that the “street railway system can be made to yield a fair return if properly managed and properly maintained.” These findings, although opposed to part of the evidence, have such support in other parts that they should be accepted here. In the presence of such findings, so supported, it is apparent that on the present record petitioners are not in a position to maintain that enforced operation of the street railway system will be in contravention of rights secured by the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. An essential basis in matter of fact for the right sought to be asserted under that constitutional provision is wanting; and as this is true regardless of whether the electric street railway franchise be independent or so unified with other franchises as to be interdependent, there is no present need to consider or determine its status in that regard.

The CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE HOLMES, MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS and MR. JUSTICE STONE adhere to the views expressed in the opinion heretofore delivered.

.

MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS, considering himself disqualified, took no part in the decision of this case.