| Superior Court of New Hampshire | Jul 15, 1834
delivered the opinion of the court.
It may be assumed, that the labor performed by the plaintiff, and for which he seeks to recover a compensation in this action, was commenced under a special contract to labor for the defendant the term of one year/for the sum of one hundred and twenty dollars, and that the
It is clear, then, that he is not entitled to recover upon the contract itself, because the service, which was to entitle him to the sum agreed upon, has never been performed.
But. the question arises, can the plaintiff, under these circumstances, recover a reasonable sum lor the service he has actually performed, under the count m quantum meruit.
Upon this, and questions of a similar nature, the decisions to be found in the books are not easily reconciled.
It has been held, upon contracts of this kind for labor to be performed ai a specified price, that the party who voluntarily fails to fulfil the contract by performing the whole labor contracted for, is not entitled to recover any thing for the labor actually performed, however much he may have done towards the performance, and this has been considered the settled rule of law upon this subject.
2 Pick. 267, Stark v. Parker; 2 Mass. 147, Faxon v. Mansfield; 12 Johns. 165, McMillen v. Vanderlip; 13 Johns. 94" court="N.Y. Sup. Ct." date_filed="1816-01-15" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/jennings-v-camp-5473644?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="5473644">13 Johns. 94, Jennings v. Camp; 19 Johns, 337, Reab v. Moor; 8 Cowen, 63, Lantry v. Parks; 9 Barn, & Cres. 92, Sinclair v. Bowles; 2 Stark. Rep. 256, Spain v. Arnott.
That such rule in its operation may be very unequal, not to say unjust, is apparent.
A party who contracts to perform certain specified labor, and who breaks his contract in the first instance, without any attempt to perform it, can only be made liable to pay the damages which the other party has sustained by reaso# of such non performance, which in many instances may be trifling — whereas a party who in good faith has entered upon the performance of his contract, and nearly completed it, and then abandoned the further performance — although the other party has had the full benefit of all that has been done, and has pur-haps sustained no actual damage — is in fact subjected to
By the operation of this rule, then, the party who attempts performance muy be placed in a much worse situation than he who wholly disregards his contract, and the other party may receive much more, by the breach of the contract, than the injury which he has sustained by such breach, and more than he could be entitled to were he seeking to recover damages by an action.
The case before os presents an illustration. Had the plaintiff in this case never entered upon the performance of his contract, the damage could not probably have been greater than some small expense and trouble incurred in procuring another to do the labor which he had contracted to perform. Rut having entered upon the performance, and labored nine and a half months, the value of which labor to the defendant as found by the jury is ⅜95, if the defendant can succeed in this defence,he in fact receives nearly five sixths of the value of a whole year’s labor, by reason of the breach of contract by the plaintiff a sum not only utterly disproportionate to any probable, not to say possible damage which could have resulted from the neglect of the plaintiff to continue the remaining two and an half months, but altogether beyond any damage which could have been recovered by the defendant, liad the plaintiff done nothing towards the fulfilment of his contract.
Another illustration is furnished in Lantry v. Parks, 8 Cowen, 83. There the defendant hired the plaintiff fora year, at ten dollars per month. The plaintiff worked ten and an half months, and then left saying he would work no more for him. This was on Saturday — on Monday the plaintiff returned, and offered to resume his work, but the defendant said he would employ him no longer.
There are other cases, however, in which principles have been adopted leading to a different result.
It is said, that where a party contracts to perform certain work, and to furnish materials, as, for instance, to build a house, and the work is done, but with some variations from the mode prescribed by the contract, yet if the other party has the benefit of the labor and materials he should be bound to pay so much as they are reasonably worth. 2 Stark. Ev. 97, 98; 7 Pick. 181, Hayward v. Leonard; 8 Pick. 178, Smith v. First Cong. Meeting House in Lowell; 4 Cowen, 564, Jewell v. Schroeppel; 7 Green. 78, Hayden v. Madison; Bull. N. P. 139; 4 Bos. & Pul. 355; 10 Johns. 36; 13 Johns. 97; 7 East, 479.
A different doctrine seems to have been holden in Ellis v. Hamlen, 3 Taunt. 52, and it is apparent, in such cases, that if the house has not been built in the manner specified in the contract, the work has not been done. The party has no more performed what he contracted to perform, than he who has contracted to labor for a certain period, and failed to complete the time.
It is in truth virtually conceded in such cases that the work has not been done, for if it had been, the party performing it would be entitled to recover upon the contract itself, which it is held he cannot do.
Those cases are not to be distinguished, in principle, from the present, unless it be in the circumstance, that where the party has contracted to furnish materials, and do certain labor, as to build a house in a specified manner, if it is not done according to the contract, the party for whom it is built may refuse to receive it — elect to take no benefit from what has been performed — and therefore if he does receive, he shall be bound to pay the value— whereas in a contract for labor, merely, from day to day, the party is continually receiving the benefit of the con
Rut we think this difference in the nature of the contracts docs not justify the application of a different rule in relation to them.
The party who contracts for labor merely, for a certain period, does so with full knowledge that he must, from the nature of the case, be accepting part performance from day to day, if the other party commences the performance, and with knowledge also that the other may eventually fail of completing the entire term.
If under such circumstances he actually receives a benefit from the labor performed, over and above the damage occasioned by the failure to complete, there is as much reason why he should pay the reasonable worth of what has thus been done for his benefit, as there is when he enters and occupies the house which has been built for him, but not according to the stipulations of the contract, and which lie perhaps enters, not because he is satisfied with what has been done, but because circumstances compel him to accept it such as it is, that lie should pay for the value of the house.
Where goods are sold upon a special contract as to their nature, quality, and price, and have been used before their inferiority has been discovered, or other circumstances have occurred which have rendered it impracticable or inconvenient for the vendee to rescind the contract in toto, it seems to have been the practice formerly to allow the vendor to recover the stipulated price, and the vendee recovered by a cross action damages for the breach of the contract. “ But according to the later and more convenient practice, the vendee in such case is allowed, in an action for the price, to give evidence of the inferiority of the goods in reduction of damages, and the plaintiff who has broken his contract is not entitled
So where a person contracts for the purchase of a quantity of merchandize, at a certain price, and receives a delivery of part only, and he keeps that part, without any offer of a return, it has been held that he must pay the value of it. 5 Barn. & Cres. Shipton v. Casson; Com. Dig. Action F. Baker v. Sutton; 1 Camp. 55, note.
A different opinion seems to have been entertained, 5 Bos. & Pul. 61, Waddington v. Oliver, and a different decision was had, 2 Stark. Rep. 281, Walker v. Dixon.
There is a close analogy between all these classes of cases, in which such diverse decisions have been made.
If the party who has contracted to receive merchandize, takes a part and uses it, in expectation that the whole will be delivered, which is never done, there seems to be no greater reason that he should pay for what he has received, than there is that the party who has received labor in part, under similar circumstances, should pay the value of what has been done for his benefit.
It is said, that in those cases where the plaintiff has-been permitted to recover there was an acceptance of what had been done. The answer is, that where the contract is to labor from day to day, for a certain period, the party for whom the labor is done in truth stipulates to receive it from day to day, as it is performed, and although the other may not eventually do all he has contracted to do, there has been, necessarily, an acceptance of what has been done in pursuance of the contract, and the party must have understood when he made the contract that there was to he such acceptance.
If then the party stipulates in the outset to receive part performance from time to time, with a knowledge that the whole may not be completed, we see no reason
In neither case has the contract been performed. In neither can an action be sustained on the original contract.
In both the party has assented to receive what is done. The only difference is, that in the one case the assent is prior, with a knowledge that all may not be performed, in the other it is subsequent, with a knowledge that the whole has not been accomplished.
We have no hesitation in holding that the same rule should be applied to both classes of cases, especially, as the operation of the rule will be to make the party who has failed to fulfil his contract, liable to such amount of damages as the other party has sustained, instead of subjecting him to an entire loss for a partial failure, and thus making the amount received in many cases wholly disproportionate to the injury. 1 Saund. 320, c; 2 Stark. Evid. 643.
It is as “ hard upon the plaintiff to preclude him from recovering at all, because he has failed as to part of his entire undertaking,” vvhere his contract is to labor for a certain period, as it can be in any other description of contract, provided the defendant has received a benefit and value from the labor actually performed.
We hold then, that where a party undertakes to pay upon a special contract for the performance of labor, or the furnishing of materials, he is not to be charged upon such special agreement until the money is earned according to the terms of it, and where the parties have made, an express contract the law will not imply and raise a contract different from that which the parties have entered into, except upon some farther transaction between the parties.
But if, where a contract is made of such a character, a party actually receives labor, or materials, and thereby derives a benefit and advantage, over and above the damage which has resulted from the breach of the contract by the other party, the labor actually done, and the value received, furnish a new consideration, and the law thereupon raises a promise to pay to the extent of the reasonable worth of such excess. This may be considered as making a new case, one not within the original agreement, and the party is entitled to “ recover on his new case, for the work done, not as agreed, but yet accepted by the defendant.” 1 Dane’s Abr. 224.
If on such failure to perform the whole, the nature of the contract be such that the employer can reject what has been done, and refuse to receive any benefit from the part performance, he is entitled so to do, and in such case is not liable to be charged, unless he has before assented to and accepted of what has been done, however much the other party may have done towards the performance. He has in such case received nothing, and having contracted to receive nothing but the entire mat. ter contracted for, he is not bound to pay, because his express promise was only to pay on receiving the whole, and having actually received nothing the law cannot and ought not to raise an implied promise to pay. But where the party receives value — takes and uses the materials, or has advantage from the labor, he is liabe to pay the reasonable worth of what he has received. 1 Camp. 38, Farnsworth v. Garrard. And the rule is the same wheth'
In fact we think the technical reasoning, that the performance of the whole labor is a condition precedent, and the right to recover any thing dependent upon it — that the contract being entire there can be no apportionment —and that there being an express contract no other can be implied, even upon the subsequent performance of service — is not properly applicable to this species of contract, where a beneficial service has been actually performed ; for we have abundant reason to believe, that the general understanding of the community is, that the the hired laborer shall be entitled to compensation for the service actually performed, though he do not continue the entire term contracted for, and such contracts must be presumed to be made with reference to that understanding, unless an express stipulation shows the contrary.
Where a beneficial service has been performed and received, therefore, under contracts of this kind, the mutual agreements cannot be considered as going to the whole of the consideration, so as to make them mutual conditions, the one precedent to the other, without a specific proviso to that effect. 1 H. Black. 213, note, Boone v Eyre; 6 D. & E. 570, Campbell v. Jones; 10 East, 295, Ritchie v. Atkinson; 4 Taunt. 745, Burn v. Miller.
It is easy, if parties so choose, to provide by an ex-prés agreement that nothing shall be earned, if the laborer leaves his employer without having performed the whole service contemplated, and then there can be in
The amount, however, for which the employer ought to be charged, where the laborer abandons Ins contract, is only the reasonable worth, or the amount of advantage lie receives upon the whole transaction, (ante 15, Wad-leigh v. Sutton,) and, in estimating the value of the labor, the contract price for the service cannot be exceeded. 7 Green. 78; 4 Wend., 285" court="N.Y. Sup. Ct." date_filed="1830-05-15" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/dubois-v-delaware--hudson-canal-co-5513352?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="5513352">4 Wendell, 285, Dubois v. Delaware & Hudson Canal Company; 7 Wend. 121, Koon v. Greenman.
If a person makes a contract fairly he is entitled to have it fully performed, and if this is not done he is entitled to damages. He ¡nay maintain a suit to recover the amount of damage sustained by the non performance.
The benefit and advantage which the party takes by the labor, therefore, is the amount of value which lie receives, if any, after deducting the amount of damage ; and if he elects to put this in defence he is entitled so to do, and the implied promise which the law will raise, in such case, is to pay such amount of the stipulated price for the whole labor, as remains after deducting what it would cost to procure a completion of the residue of the service, and also any damage which has been sustained by reason of the non fulfilment of the contract.
If in such case it be found that the damages are equal to, or greater than the amount of the labor performed, so that the employer, having a right to the full performance of the contract, has not upon the whole case received a beneficial service, the plaintiff cannot recover.
This rule, by binding the employer to pay the value of the service he actually receives, and the laborer to answer in damages where he does not complete the entire contract, will leave no temptation to the former to drive the laborer from his service, near the close of his term, by ill treatment, in order to escape from payment ; nor to the latter to desert his service before the stipulated time, without a sufficient reason ; and it will in most in
There may be instances, however, where the damage occasioned is much greater than the value of the labor performed, and if the party elects to permit himself to be charged for the value of the labor, without interposing the damages in defence, he is entitled to do so, and may have an action to recover his damages for the non-perlormanee, whatever, they may be. 1 Mason’s Rep. Crowninshield v. Robinson.
And he nuiy commence such action at any time after the contract is broken, notwithstanding no suit has been instituted against him ; but if he elects to have the damages considered in the action against him, he must be understood as conceding that they are not to be extended beyond the amount of what he has received, and he cannot afterwards sustain an action for farther damages.
Applying the principles thus laid down, to this case, the plaintiff is entitled to judgment on the verdict.
The defendant sets up a mere breach of the contract in defence of the action, but this cannot avail him. He does not appear to have offered evidence to show that he was damnified by such breach, or to have asked that a deduction should be made upon that account. The direction to the jury was therefore correct, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover as much as the labor performed was reasonably worth, and the jury appear to have allowed a pro rata compensation, for the time which the plaintiff labored in the defendant’s service.
As the defendant has not claimed or had any adjustment of damages, for the breach of the contract, in this action, if he has actually sustained damage he is still entitled to a suit to recover the amount.
Whether it is not necessary, in cases of this kind, that notice should be given to the employer that the contract is abandoned, with an offer of adjustment and demand of payment ; and whether the laborer must not wait until
Judgment on the verdict.