Following a jury trial, Daniel Britton, Jr. was convicted of the offenses of trafficking in cocaine, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. He appeals.
The еvidence at trial showed that on January 30, 1995, a detective with the Liberty County Sheriff’s Department assigned to the Multi-Agency Craсk Enforcement Drug Task Force received a telephone call from an anonymous caller. The callеr stated that he knew Britton from some business dealings. He said that Britton would be driving a new blue pickup truck with gold rims in Liberty County and would be carrying cash and drugs under a false bottom in the truck’s console. As a result, a lookout was posted for a vehicle matching the description. Police located the truck and stopped it. The officers told Britton that they had received information that he had a large sum of cash and drugs in his truck, and they asked for permission to search the truck. Britton told thе officers that there was no cocaine in the truck and gave his consent to search. One of the agents pullеd out the center console and found cocaine, $12,000 in U. S. currency, and a loaded gun in a space beneаth the console. Officers testified at trial that police had previously searched vehicles belonging to Britton, but fоund no drugs.
In response to police questioning, Britton stated that he did not know anything about the gun or the drugs, but said that he had won the mоney car racing in Florida. Upon further questioning, however, he admitted that he had seen the gun when someone had shown it tо him the previous Saturday and that he may have touched it. He continued to deny any knowledge of the cocainе found with the gun and the money.
The sole witness for the defense testified that Britton and his *442 business partner had had a dispute and terminаted their business relationship. The witness stated that this former business partner had access to Britton’s truck.
1. Britton contends that thе trial court erred at his trial in admitting the hearsay evidence regarding the information provided by the anonymous callеr. We agree and reverse.
The testimony regarding the anonymous informant was admitted under the exception to the hearsay rule to explain the police conduct in stopping Britton’s car. But in
Teague v. State,
At heart, a criminal prosecution is designed to find the truth of what a defendant did, and, on occasion, of why he did it. It is most unusual that a prosecution will рroperly concern itself with why an investigating officer did something. If the hearsay rule is to remain a part of our law, then OCGA § 24-3-2 . . . must be contained within its proper limit. Otherwise, the repetition of the rote words “to explain conduct” can becоme imprimatur for the admission of rumor, gossip, and speculation.
Id. at 536 (1).
Hearsay evidence is inadmissible to explain police conduct even “where an appellate court suggests that the jury may find police behavior so inexplicable as to cast doubt on the prosecution, or where a confidential informant has provided information which initiates an investigation.” (Citation omitted.)
Weems v. State,
Accordingly, we find that it was error in this case to admit evidence of the anonymous caller’s information in order to explain the officers’ actions in stopping and apprehending Britton. We must determine, therefore, whether this error necessitates a reversal.
The police officer who spoke with the anonymous informant testified that in addition to the information that Britton had drugs and money in his truck, the caller indicated that he knew the police had
*443
been looking for Britton “for some time” and also stated that Britton was involved in narcotics trafficking. We cannot say that this evidence was harmless under the circumstances of this case, especially in light of Britton’s defense that a disgruntled business partner had planted the drugs in his truck. The hearsay evidеnce, which implicated him in narcotics trafficking, only served to bolster the State’s contention that the drugs were his. Other thаn the presence of the drugs in the truck, there was no other evidence linking Britton to the contraband. Compare
Carlisle v. State,
Therefore, we сonclude that the trial court committed reversible error in admitting this evidence. See
Render v. State,
2. Britton also asserts that the trial cоurt erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence seized by police when they stopped his truck. But that ruling was the subject of a prior appeal to this Court, in which we found that the evidence was admissible and affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress.
Britton v. State,
Judgment reversed.
Notes
The
Brown
court, however, stopped short of determining whether this constituted reversible error under the circumstances, because the case had already been reversed on other grounds.