PER CURIAM.

While William Worrels was serving a third term of federal supervised release, the district court¹ revoked supervised release and sentenced him to serve 6 months in prison and 29 additional months of supervised release. Worrels appeals, and we affirm.

For reversal, Worrels first argues that the district court erred procedurally by failing to calculate the revocation range in the guidelines. Because no objection was raised below, we review for plain error, see United States v. Miller, 557 F.3d 910, 916 (8th Cir. 2009), and we find none, see United States v. Winston, 850 F.3d 377, 380 (8th Cir. 2017) (plain error standard). The record reflects that the district court considered the chapter 7 policy statements in the guidelines, which include the revocation ranges, before it imposed the sentence it determined was warranted. See United States v. Fleetwood, 794 F.3d 1004, 1005 (8th Cir. 2015) (sentencing error is prejudicial only if defendant proves reasonable probability that he would have received lighter sentence but for error); United States v. Hawkins, 375 F.3d 750, 751-52 (8th Cir. 2004) (district courts must consider advisory chapter 7 policy statements when sentencing a defendant whose supervised release has been revoked).

Worrels next argues that the supervised release portion of the revocation sentence is substantively unreasonable because the violations resulted from his struggles with drug addiction. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing an additional 29 months of supervised release because the court considered valid sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (history and characteristics of defendant), (a)(2)(B) (need for sentence to deter criminal conduct); United States v. Merrival, 521 F.3d 889, 890 (8th Cir. 2008) (abuse of discretion review); United States v. Zoran, 682 F.3d 1060, 1064-65 (8th Cir. 2012) (where district court emphasized defendant’s repeated violation of conditions of supervision, court acted well within its discretion by imposing maximum term of supervised release); United States v. Bridges, 569 F.3d 374, 379 (8th Cir. 2009) (district court has wide latitude to assign some § 3553(a) factors greater weight than others in determining appropriate sentence).

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment, and we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.

BRITTANY O., as Parent and Next Friend of L. Plaintiff-Appellant v. BENTONVILLE SCHOOL DISTRICT; Michael Poore, Individually, and in His Official Capacity as Superintendent; Brad Reed, Individually, and in His Official Capacity as Director of Student Services; Amy Simpson, Individually, and in Her Official Capacity as 504 Designee as Thomas Jefferson Elementary; Tanya Sharp, Individually, and in Her Official Capacity as Director of Special Education Defendants-Appellees; Vista Health; Allen Morrison; Veronica Odum Defendants; Arkansas Department of Education Defendant-Appellee; Tom Kimbrell; New Boston Enterprises, Inc.; Tony Wood Defendants; Johnny Key Defendant-Appellee

No. 16-1976

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: April 1, 2017; Filed: April 27, 2017

557

Before RILEY, ARNOLD, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

Theresa L. Caldwell, Caldwell Law Office, Maumelle, AR, for Plaintiff-Appellant; Angela C. Artherton, Marshall S. Ney, Friday & Eldredge, Rogers, AR, for Defendants-Appellees Bentonville School District, Michael Poore, Brad Reed, Amy Simpson, Tanya Sharp; Christine Ann Cryer, Assistant Attorney General, Attorney General’s Office, Little Rock, AR, for Defendants-Appellees Arkansas Department of Education, Johnny Key

PER CURIAM.

Brittany O. (Parent), as parent and next friend of L. (Student), appeals following the entry of final judgment in her action asserting, as relevant, (1) a claim for attorneys’ fees under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA); and (2) substantive claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act. We reverse the dismissal of the IDEA claim for attorneys’ fees, and we otherwise affirm.

Parent sought attorneys’ fees from the Bentonville School District (District) as a prevailing party in a state IDEA administrative proceeding. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I) (in any IDEA action or proceeding, court may award reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of costs to prevailing party who is parent of disabled child). The IDEA itself contains no limitations period for this type of claim, so the district court found that the most analogous state statute of limitations was an Arkansas statute providing that any party aggrieved by the findings and final decision of an officer in an administrative hearing shall have 90 days from the date of the hearing officer’s decision to bring a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction pursuant to the IDEA. See Ark. Code Ann. § 6-41-216(g); Birmingham v. Omaha Sch. Dist., 220 F.3d 850, 854 (8th Cir. 2000) (when federal statute does not provide limitations period, courts may borrow most closely analogous state statute of limitations unless doing so would frustrate policy embodied by federal law). Because the hearing officer’s decision was dated November 25, 2013, and Parent filed her complaint on March 5, 2014, the district court dismissed the claim as untimely.

We review de novo the district court’s decision to borrow a particular state statute of limitations. See id. We have not previously determined what state statute is most analogous in this situation, and we need not decide now, because we find persuasive the approach taken in D.G. ex rel. LaNisha T. v. New Caney Indep. Sch. Dist., 806 F.3d 310 (5th Cir. 2015), and McCartney C. ex rel. Sara S. v. Herrin Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 4, 21 F.3d 173 (7th Cir. 1994). Like the Fifth and Seventh Circuits, we conclude that whatever limitations period applies to a prevailing party’s court action to recover IDEA attorneys’ fees, it did not begin to run until the 90-day period had expired for an aggrieved party to challenge the IDEA administrative decision by filing a complaint in court. Upon expiration of this period, an administrative decision becomes final, and the parties know who is the prevailing party. Thereafter, the parties have an opportunity to agree on the matter of attorneys’ fees, and if no agreement is reached, the prevailing party may bring an action in court, within the applicable limitations period, seeking attorneys’ fees under the IDEA. See LaNisha T., 806 F.3d at 319-21; Sara S., 21 F.3d at 174-76. Here, the 90-day period for the aggrieved party—the District—to challenge the November 25 hearing officer’s decision ended on Sunday, February 23, 2014; therefore Parent’s March 5, 2014 IDEA attorneys’-fees complaint was timely filed, even if the applicable limitations period was 90 days.

As to the remaining substantive claims, which all arose from Student’s transfer during his kindergarten school year from a District school to a day-treatment facility, we conclude that the district court did not err in determining that Parent lacked standing to seek prospective injunctive relief against the Commissioner of the Arkansas Department of Education, see Hughes v. City of Cedar Rapids, 840 F.3d 987, 991-92 (8th Cir. 2016) (de novo review); or in determining that summary judgment was warranted on the section 1983, Rehabilitation Act, and Americans with Disabilities Act claims, see Malone v. Hinman, 847 F.3d 949, 952 (8th Cir. 2017) (de novo review).¹

Accordingly, we reverse the dismissal of Parent’s IDEA claim for attorneys’ fees, we affirm in all other respects, and we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Notes

The Honorable John A. Jarvey, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa. The district court, within its discretion, also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim Parent had asserted. See (per curiam).

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