135 Pa. 110 | Pa. | 1890
Opinion,
When Bristor v. Tasker was called for argument on April 9, 1890, an examination of the docket entries as printed in appellant’s paper-book disclosed this statement: “ Bill dismissed, in order that the Supreme Court might decide the case.” Supposing this statement to be correct, we quashed the appeal, in order that the case might he sent back to the court below for a decision upon the merits, under a practice of long standing in this court not to hear appeals in equity from decrees which are merely pro forma: See Dyer’s App., 107 Pa. 446. Subsequently we ascertained that no such entry appeared upon the record of the case. The order was merely “ bill dismissed,” and, as now appears, after a full consideration of the case by the court below. We were thus misled by the printed copy of the docket entries, and were induced to quash an appeal which would not have been quashed but for this misstatement. Under these circumstances, we felt it our duty to enter the above rule.
The rules of court require a copy of the docket entries to be printed in the paper-book for obvious reasons. We have a right to expect counsel to print them correctly, as upon them serious results sometimes depend. It is too much to expect the members of this court to verify them by the record in every instance, which we would be obliged to do if we are not safe in relying upon the care and integrity of counsel. The docket entries must be a literal copy as they stand upon the records of the court below. To present them to us in an altered or
We have no desire to deal harshly with the respondent, and are willing to accept a plea of inexperience, when we would not do so from an older practitioner. Under all the circumstances, we have come to the conclusion that the respondent has been sufficiently punished for his indiscretion b}^ the notice we have taken of this matter, and the rule upon him is
Discharged.
Opinion,
The bill in this case is filed by the cestui que trust against her trustee, and also against the guardian of her children. The trustee filed an answer admitting all the facts set forth in the bill, and the guardian, a corporation, stating that it had no knowledge of the facts, said that it had inquired as to their truth, and from information received knew of no reason for doubting their truth. The more correct practice would have been to refer the case to a master, and have him to take testimony and make a report upon the facts alleged in the bill. Then any decree which the court might have made would have been founded upon facts established by proof, and not upon the mere allegations of the bill admitted by the answer. A case might easily arise upon the latter mode of proceeding which could not command the confidence of a court, and which, if permitted to prevail, might work great injustice to persons ultimately interested. It is not necessary, however, for us to hesitate in proceeding upon the facts set out in the bill, and admitted in the answer, since it does not appear that any persons are interested in the trust except the cestui que trust and her trustee.
By the terms of the deed the grantor’s property was all conveyed by the cestui que trust to the trustee in trust to receive the rents, issues, and profits of the real estate, and the interest, income, and dividend of the personal estate, and pay it all over to the grantor as received, or to let her receive it directly, during the whole term of her life, and after her death in trust for the use of such persons as she might appoint, and, on failure of appointment, in trust for her right.heirs. In such a case as
There are, however, ample reasons found in the facts set out in the bill, and admitted in the answer, for granting the relief prayed for. The bill explicitly states that, at the time of the execution of the deed of trust, the plaintiff was a single woman, without any contemplation of marriage, and had no motive or reason for making a trust which would deprive her of an absolute ownership of her property. She also alleges that she was indixced to make the deed by her mother and grandfather, in order to induce her sister, who was married to a spendthrift husband, to execute a similar deed of trust for her property; and, further, that she was informed by her mother and grandfather at the time, that, as she was a single woman, not contemplating marriage, her case was different from that of her sister, and that she could at any time thereafter, if dissatisfied with the trust, revoke the same ; that she afterwards, and at the request of her grandfather and mother, called upon the gentleman who was the counsel for them, and informed him of her desire and its purpose, and that the counsel thereupon pre
The facts of this case are much stronger in favor of the relief sought than in the cases heretofore considered by this court. The motive of the conveyance was entirely foreign to any purpose or desire to strip the plaintiff of the control of her property. It was entirely for the sake of a sister, who, being married to a spendthrift, had an urgent reason for. protection by an irrevocable deed of trust, but whose action it was represented to the plaintiff would be promoted by a similar deed on her part. Then too, it was her mother and her grandfather who asked and urged her to. make the deed. To an appeal coming from such a so urce she would be peculiarly sensitive, and very properly so. To every statement made by them to her she naturally gave the most implicit confidence, as she was justified in doing. When they told her she could at any time revoke the deed, she had a right to believe them, and to act upon the faith of their statement. It was a mistake for them to tell her this, but it was an innocent mistake on their part. It not only misinformed her, but would operate to prevent her from employing independent counsel for herself, and would naturally lead her to resort to their counsel for the preparation of the necessary deed. And here, again, she became the victim of
The subject of granting such relief is not at all new, either in England or in this commonwealth. This court has administered such relief in several cases, and after the most mature deliberation. In Russell’s App., 75 Pa. 269, which is a noted and a leading case, the whole subject was so exhaustively discussed by the learned master in the court below, and by this court, that it is no longer necessary to review the authorities or investigate the doctrine. It is the accepted and well-settled law in this commonwealth, illustrated and enforced in a number of important causes. We there held that the absence of a power of revocation in such a deed is a circumstance to be taken into account, and entitled to more or less weight, according to the other circumstances of the case in granting the relief sought. Mr. Chief Justice Agnew, in delivering the opinion of the court, said: “ It may be admitted, also, that the mere omission of counsel to advise the insertion of a power to revoke will not alone be a ground in equity to sot aside a voluntary conveyance. But the absence of such a power, and the failure of counsel to advise upon it, are circumstances of weight, when joined to other circumstances tending to show that the act was not done with a deliberate will. Therefore, when the facts show that the instrument was executed without advice or reflection, and without an in
In Miskey’s App., 107 Pa. 611, we applied this doctrine in a different state of circumstances, and set aside a voluntary deed, partly because of the absence of a power of revocation and of the absence of proof of a distinct intention to make the gift irrevocable. The exertion of parental influence, and the fact that the grantor had no independent counsel, were circumstances which we regarded as of weight in determining to set aside the deed. In Rick’s App., 105 Pa. 528, we set aside a voluntary, deed because of the absence of a power of revocation, because it appeared that the grantor had no intention to deprive herself of all control of her property, because she had been misled by her brother on the subject of revocation, and because the deed was improvident. The present Chief Justice said in the opinion : “ If Mrs. Peiffer signed the deed under the representation that it could be revoked, then a fraud was practiced upon her; if, under the advice that she could not insert' a power of revocation, she was wrongly advised; she acted under a mistake partly. of law and partly of fact; she was misled by those whose duty it was to inform her, and upon whom she had a right to rely with confidence.....
Further discussion seems quite unnecessary. Other instances in which we have administered this kind of relief will be found in the opinions in the cases wo have cited. We think the relief prayed for here should be granted, because there was no intention to make an irrevocable gift; because the whole purpose of the deed was accomplished when the plaintiff’s married sister executed the deed for her property,—after that, there was no motive or reason for continuing the present deed; because the deed contained no power of revocation ; because the plaintiff was misled by her mother and grandfather telling her she could at any time revoke the deed; becaxxse she had no independent advice; because counsel who prepared the deed did not inform her of the necessity of a power of revocation, axxd of the effect of its absence; and becaxise the deed is improvident and unreasonable, axid was not made in contemplation of marriage.
The decree of the court below is reversed, at the cost of the appellee; the bill of the plaintiff is reinstated, and the record is remitted, with instructions to the court below to enter a decree granting the relief prayed for, in accordance with this opinion.