120 N.Y. 427 | NY | 1890
The action was brought to recover for an alleged assault upon and forcible eviction of the plaintiff from a house in which he was residing, and for the alleged conversion of certain of his personal property then in the house at Spring Valley in the county of Rockland. The plaintiff was a member of the Newark Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church, by which he was stationed as a preacher in March, 1885, at Spring Valley, and continued to preach in the church at that place until the 15th of January, 1886, when he was suspended from all ministerial services and church privileges. This was done in accordance with the rules and discipline of the Methodist Church, and was effectual as a suspension until the then next annual conference in March following. From the time he went to that place to preach, the plaintiff, with his family, resided in a house which had, for several years, been occupied by the Methodist ministers as a parsonage. On March 17, 1886, the defendants forcibly ejected the plaintiff from the house. It is of that act, and the alleged conversion of his goods then in the parsonage, that the plaintiff complains. The trial court held, as matter of law, and instructed the jury, that the eviction of the plaintiff was illegal; and that, upon that branch of the case, the question was one of damages only, for them to determine. And upon the exception to that instruction and exception to the refusal of the court to charge and submit to the jury, as requested by the defendant's counsel, certain propositions bearing upon *430 that subject, arise the main questions presented for consideration. They pertained, not only to the relation of the plaintiff to the premises, but to the persons assuming to act as trustees of the church, and to the right of the trustees to assume any control of the parsonage.
Although it was not directly proved that the Spring Valley church was a corporation, it may, from what did appear, be inferred and assumed that it was such, as no question was raised to the contrary. The temporalities belonging to the church were under the control of the trustees. (Laws of 1813, chap. 60, § 4.) The parsonage was owned by the Mutual Life Insurance Company, and was held for a parsonage under a demise from that company, and, whether it was rented to the trustees or to a society known as the Ladies' Guild, was one of the questions upon which evidence was given. While the defendants contended that the church or the trustees of it, as such, were the tenants of the insurance company, it was claimed on the part of the plaintiff that such society rented the premises, and, that it was not within the control of the trustees. If this society could be treated as an independent one, outside of the authority of the church, and the fact as to where the tenancy from the insurance company was located became material, there would, upon the evidence, have been a question for the jury. It is, at least, very questionable whether that society could be treated otherwise than as an instrumentality within the church organization to aid in the accomplishment of its legitimate objects, and for that purpose a mere agency of the religious corporation. In the view taken of the case, the determination of that question does not, nor does the official character of those defendants, who assumed to act as trustees in what they did, seem to be essential here for consideration.
It sufficiently appears by the record before us to indicate that an unfortunate controversy arose in the church and congregation, and that there was a want of that generous christian spirit which should characterize the action of religious societies. But it is not the province of the court to deal with *431 those considerations. It is the legal aspect only of the situation which can have treatment here.
When the plaintiff went to Spring Valley pursuant to the direction of the conference to perform the services as minister of the church there, the house was furnished to him as a place of residence. He lawfully went into occupancy of the parsonage. If that occupancy was the actual possession of it by him, at the time of his eviction, the defendants were chargeable with liability for assaulting and forcibly expelling him from the house. And this was so, irrespective of the mere right to the possession, as in that case there was no justification for the application of such force to eject the plaintiff, although the defendants, as trustees, may have had the right to reduce the premises to possession by means of legal process and proceedings. (Parsons v. Brown, 15 Barb. 590; Bliss v. Johnson,
There appears to have been nothing, so far as appears in the circumstances under which he went into the house or in *433 his relation to the church or its trustees, which so qualified his occupancy as to render it otherwise than possession by him. This is presumptively the relation assumed to premises by a party who lawfully enters upon them as a place of abode and occupies them as such; and any less right than that which possession furnishes is dependent upon some understanding, express or implied, denying such relation. None appears in this case so qualifying the character of the occupancy of the plaintiff. And he had the right to protection against eviction by violence without the aid of legal process. It is unnecessary to consider the question whether he was a tenant at will and entitled to a month's notice, or whether legal proceedings may have been effectually taken with a shorter or without any notice for his removal.
In view of the fact that the plaintiff was in actual possession of the house at the time in question, the use of the force used by the defendants to expel him from the house was without justification.
Whether the plaintiff had established his alleged claim for the conversion of the property, was treated as a question of fact, which was submitted to the jury. We do not understand that any question of law was raised by any exception bearing specially upon this branch of the case. Nor is it seen that there was any error in leaving that question to the jury.
No other exceptions seem to require consideration.
The judgment should be affirmed.
All concur, except FOLLETT, Ch. J., dissenting.
Judgment affirmed.