77 Mo. 134 | Mo. | 1882
The petition in this case states, in substance, that on October 15th, 1870, Jane Briscoe conveyed by deed of trust to A. F. Alexander, as trustee, lots 5 and 6 in block 15, in the city of Lexington, to secure the payment of a note for $500, made by Briscoe Gaines to Susan M. Alexander, who was named as the beneficiary in said deed. On March 28th, 1871, Jane Briscoe conveyed to Theresa Callahan, wife of Dennis Callahan, for her sole and separate use, lot 5 above described, for the sum of $2,000, $1,000 of which was paid in cash, $500 was secured by a note of Theresa and Dennis Callahan at twelve months and a deed of trust on lot 5 aforesaid to William C. Chiles, as trustee, and in satisfaction of the remainder of said
The plaintiff claims that Susan M. Alexander holds said lot 5 so purchased by her under the deed of trust given to the plaintiff, subject to a vendor’s lien in favor of said plaintiff for the $500 which Theresa and Dennis Callahan promised to pay to extinguish the debt due from Briscoe Gaines to Susan M. Alexander; or, if not, then that the purchase by said Susan of said lot 5, under the trust deed of Theresa and Dennis Callahan, was an acceptance of the promise of said Theresa and Dennis to pay the debt due her from Briscoe Gaines, and that such acceptance operated to extinguish the mortgage of the plaintiff to Alexander to secure said debt.
The circuit court sustained a demurrer to this petition and final judgment was entered thereon in favor of the defendants.
It is the doctrine of this court that when a mortgage or deed of trust is taken, on the land conveyed, for a part of the unpaid purchase money, the vendor’s lien for the remainder of such unpaid purchase money, is thereby-waived, unless it is expressly stated in such mortgage or deed of trust, that such lien is not waived. Emison v. Whit
As to the second claim set up in the petition, it is only necessary to say that we know of no authority which holds that the simple acceptance by suit or otherwise, by a third person of a promise made to pay a debt due such third person from another, will operate to release such other person from all liability to such third person on account of such debt. To extinguish the obligation of the original debtor, it must appear that the subsequent obligation was accepted in lieu thereof, otherwise the second obligation will be regarded only as collateral and additional to the first.
"We are an of opinion that the demurrer to the petition was properly sustained, and the judgment of the circuit court will be affirmed.