23 Kan. 334 | Kan. | 1880
The opinion of the court was delivered by
The briefs in this case are of little value, as they assume § 135, ch. 34, Laws 1876, to be-in force, whereas that section was repealed by Laws of 1879, ch. 43, §4, which took effect March 15,1879. Sec. 127 of ch. 34, Laws 1876, as amended by § 1, ch. 41, Laws 1879, however, provides that any owner may at any time before the execution of a tax deed redeem any land by paying to the treasurer of the county where such land is sold, for the use of the purchaser, the amount for which the land was sold, and all subsequent taxes and charges thereon, with interest at the rate of twenty-four per,cent, per annum, on the amount of the purchase-money from the date of sale, and the same rate on all subsequent taxes paid thereon. Under this provision of the statute, the ■court rendered the right judgment, but erroneously decided that plaintiff was compelled to pay fifty per cent, interest per annum, in order to redeem his land. At the time the tender was made, the rate of interest was only twenty-four per ■cent, per annum. Notwithstanding the sale of the premises for taxes occurred in 1876, prior to the amendment of 1879, the county can only collect the interest prescribed by the act of 1879, as the county has no such vested right by buying the land at tax sale, as denies to the legislature the power to change the rate of interest or costs of redemption. Counsel contend that §127 is only applicable to purchasers of tax titles, and that a county is not a purchaser within the law, and refers to Guittard Tp. v. Comm’rs Marshall Co., 4 Kas. 388, as decisive. While there is a marked distinction in the tax laws as to the rights and duties of individuals purchasing lands at tax sales, and those of counties, under the same circumstances, yet in a general sense the law recognizes
The judgment of the district court will therefore be affirmed.