BEFORE: ALITO, ROTH and STAPLETON, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed June 25, 2003 ) *3 OPINION OF THE COURT STAPLETON, Circuit Judge:
Appellants Blandina Briones, Jesse M anios, Elia Serrano, Donna Viscardi, Fred Meyer, Joyce Graham, Essie Dallas, Dora Buther, Valentino Chiavello, Gabriel DeJesus, Miguel Miranda, Ella Parchuf, Elias Ramos, Efrain Rivera, Hector Valentin, and Sylvia Vance (collectively, “Appellants”) brought suit in a New Jersey state court agаinst their former employers, Bon Secours Health System, Inc., Bon Secours New Jersey Health System, Inc., St. Francis Hospital, Bon Secours & Canterbury Partnership for Care, Inc., and certain other unnamed defendants (collectively, “Appellees”). Appellees removed the case to federal court. Apрellants moved to remand, asserting that they had raised no federal question in their complaint and that there was no other basis for federal jurisdiction. The District Court denied the motion to remand and, later, entered an order dismissing their claims because they were preempted by federal law. Appellants now аppeal, challenging both the denial of their motion to remand and the dismissal of their claims as preempted.
As we will explain hereafter, it is clear that the District Court properly dismissed the complaint on preemption grounds. The only debatable issue is whether the District Court, without proceeding further, should havе remanded to the state court for it *4 to address Appellees’ federal preemption defenses and any remaining issues. We conclude that its retention of jurisdiction was appropriate.
I.
In early 2001, Appellees transformed St. Francis Hospital, an acute care facility, into a rehabilitation facility, resulting in layoffs. Appellees and the employees of St. Francis, including Appellants, had negotiated, some years before, a Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) that determined the terms and conditions of the employment relationship, and remained in force in early 2001. This CBA also provided procedurеs to be followed in the event of layoffs, including a process by which employees, who had lost their positions in one hospital, would be able to “slot” themselves into positions at another hospital based on seniority and other factors. When the transformation from acute care to rehabilitation wаs announced, Appellees and union representatives discussed the layoffs that would necessarily result and worked out a plan for their execution. Several appellants were laid off as a result of this process; others declined to participate in the slotting process and lost their jobs as a result.
Thereafter, the union filed two unfair labor practice charges against Appellees with the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”). The union alleged that the decision to transform St. Francis, as opposed to another, non-union hospital under Appellees’ control, was the result of anti-union biаs and that Appellees had unlawfully withdrawn recognition of the union as the representative for the employees of St. Francis *5 hospital. The NLRB assumed jurisdiction over the complaints, stating that they alleged violations of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq . However, the NLRB found no merit to either claim and dismissed thеm.
Appellants’ original state court complaint contained two counts. Count One
alleged a violation of Article I of the New Jersey Constitution which,
inter alia
,
guarantees the right of employees to organize and bargain collectively and “prohibits
dismissal of an employee because of his or her union aсtivities.”
Comite Organizador de
Trabajadores Agricolas (COTA) v. Molivelli
,
Appellees removed the case to federal court, arguing that since appellants’ claims required the interpretation of the CBA, § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 144, et seq. , completely preempted their claims and jurisdiction in the federal courts was proper. Appellants moved to remand the *6 proceedings to state court, asserting that their complaint did not rely on or mention any federal statute. The District Court denied their motion to remand, noting that Appellants based their claim in part оn their loss of rights under the CBA and that their claim could not be adjudicated without a determination of the contours of those rights under that agreement.
After the briefing on Appellees’ motion to remand but nine days before that motion was denied by the court, Appellants amended their complaint to delete the reference to the rights secured by the CBA.
Thereafter, Appellees moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that §§ 7 and 8 of the NLRA and the jurisdiction of the NLRB preempted Appellants’ claims. [1] *7 This motion was granted, and this appeal followed.
II.
labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it: Provided, That subject to rules and regulations made and рublished by the Board pursuant to section 6 [29 USCS § 156], an employer shall not be prohibited from permitting employees to confer with him during working hours without loss of time or pay;
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization: Provided, That nothing in this Act, or in any other statute of the United States, shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor organization (not established, maintained, or assisted by an action defined in section 8(a) of this Act [this subsection] as an unfair labor practice) to require as а condition of employment membership therein on or after the thirtieth day following the beginning of such employment or the effective date of such agreement, whichever is the later, (I) if such labor organization is the representative of the employees as provided in section 9(a) [29 USCS § 159(a)], in the appropriate collective- bargaining unit covered by such agreement when made, and (ii) unless following an election held as provided in section 9(e) [9 USCS § 159(e)] within one year preceding the effective date of such agreement, the Board shall have certified that at least a majority of the employeеs eligible to vote in such election have voted to rescind the authority of such labor organization to make such an agreement: Provided further, That no employer shall justify any discrimination against an employee for nonmembership in a labor organization (A) if he has reasonable grounds for believing that such membership was not available to the employee on the same terms and conditions generally applicable to other members, or (B) if he has reasonable grounds for believing that membership was denied or terminated for reasons other than the failure of the employee to tender the periоdic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership;
(4) to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because he
has filed charges or given testimony under this Act;
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his
employees, subjеct to the provisions of section 9(a) [29 USCS § 159(a)].
*8
Since “[r]emoval jurisdiction under section 1441 is . . . wholly derived from
original federal jurisdiction,”
Roxbury Condo. Assoc., Inc. v. Anthony S. Cupo Agency
,
In general, under the “well-pleaded complaint” rule, a court looks to the
face of a complaint to determine whether a federal claim has been raised, because the
plaintiff is “master of the claim.”
Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams
,
Because of the general rule that the plaintiff is master of his claim, where a
well-pleaded state complaint contains only claims based on state law that are not
“completely preempted,” a federal court to which the case has been removed must remand
to the state court for a determination of the issues presented.
Lingle v. Norge Div. of
Magic Chef, Inc.
,
Section 301 comрletely preempts claims if they “substantially depend upon
analysis of the terms of an agreement made between parties in a labor contract.”
Angst v.
Mack Trucks, Inc.
,
of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.” 28 U.S.C. § 185(a).
By contrast, §§ 7 and 8 of the NLRA, the other provisions of fеderal law
relied upon by Appellees in support of their preemption argument, do not “completely
preempt” state law and thus provide no basis for removal jurisdiction.
Ethridge v. Harbor
House Restaurant
,
Though Appellants, after removal, amended their complaint, “the nature of
plaintiff’s claim must be evaluated, and the propriety of remand decided, on the basis of
the record as it stands at the time the petition for removal is filed.”
Westmoreland Hosp.
Ass’n. v. Blue Cross
,
In their state court complaint, Appellants based their claims in part on their
loss of rights under the CBA. As a result, those claims could not be adjudicated without
interpreting the CBA and comparing the rights, benefits and entitlements there guaranteed
with Appellants’ positions after the allegedly discriminatory decision to transform St.
Francis. That fact alone is sufficient to implicate § 301 of the LMRA and to completely
preempt Appellants’ claims.
Berda
,
III.
Having determined that the District Court properly exercised jurisdiction, we now turn to its disposition of Appellants’ claims.
“When an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the [NLRA], the
States as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competencе of the National
Labor Relations Board if the danger of state interference with national policy is to be
averted.”
San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon
,
The claims brought by Appellants are preempted by sections 7 & 8 of the
NLRA. First of all, “[i]f the [NLRB] decides, subject to appropriate federal judicial
review, that conduct is protected by § 7, or prohibited by § 8, then the matter is at an end,
and the States are ousted of all jurisdiction.”
Garmon
,
Moreover, even if the NLRB had not exercised jurisdiction over the same
subject matter, it is clear that both Counts One and Two of Appellants’ complaint, at the
very least, “arguably implicate” the NLRA. Section 8(a)(3) prohibits discrimination
having the effect of encouraging or discouraging union membership or participation in
union activities. That is precisely the gravamen of Appellants’ claims. This is not a case
in which the behavior is of “peripheral concern” to the federal law.
Voilas
,
IV.
We will affirm the order of the district court dismissing the complaint. *13 TO THE CLERK:
Please file the foregoing Not Precedential Opinion.
/s/ Walter K. Stapleton Circuit Judge
Notes
[1] Section 7 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 157, provides, in relevant part: [e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as а condition of employment as authorized in section 8(a)(3) [29 USCS § 158(a)(3)]. Section 8, 29 U.S.C. § 158, provides, in relevant part: (a) Unfair labor practices by employer. It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-- (1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7 [29 USCS § 157]; (2) to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any
[2] Section 301 provides that “[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this Act, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court