49 F. 669 | E.D.N.Y | 1892
On the 11th of December, 1890, tbelibelant was employed as a longshoreman in loading and discharging the steamship Persian Monarch in this port. A derrick was rigged upon the mizzen-mast, the boom of which was held up some 12 feet above the deck by a chain running from the end of it to the mast aloft, and kept in position over the keel by a guy or vang of wire rope running from the end of the boom on each side to a block fastened to the deck near the rail. The libelant’s duty was to tend the fall-rope. For the purpose of hauling along-side the ship a scow loaded with a cargo of flour, the book of the tail-rope was carried outside of the ship on the starboard side and fastened upon the further side of the scow. The winch was then set in motion; but the scow being heavy, and the ebb-tide beneath the pier offering additional resistance, the strain became so great upon the guy on the port side, that it parted. Thereupon the boom swung suddenly to starboard, carrying the starboard guy and tackle along with it, and caught the libelant, who was standing by the starboard rail, and pressed him severely against the rail, causing him great injuries, for which the above libel was filed.
Several witnesses on behalf of the claimant testify, and I have no doubt that such is the fact, that a derrick rigged upon the mast is not designed for such lateral strains,,or to be used in hauling barges by a longitudinal strain; and that the proper way to use the winch for that purpose is to detach the fall-rope from the block of the boom, or else to use a different hawser, and carry it through the chock on the side of the ship to the barge outside. The stevedore also testifies that the use of the fall from the boom was improper, and was only used when the offi*
Taking all the circumstances into account, I am of the opinion that the libelant’s theory is most compatible with the evidence, and with the reasonable presumptions of the case; that the purpose for which the derrick was supplied was much extended beyond'its original design, and included, by the long and well-known practice of the ship, the hauling in of barges that might need small changes in position for the quick dispatch of the ship’s business; and that the guys should, therefore, have been sufficient for hauling in such barges as cante there in the ordinary course of business. This must include also hauling at the usual different stages of the tide, and under all other ordinary circumstances, unless some notice in the way of exception was given. None such was given.
j Had the break arisen from a manifest gross misuse of the machine, as in attempting to raise ten tons where it was known to be designed only ¡for one ton, or for five, I think such a palpable misuse would be negligence of fellow-workmen which would cast no responsibility upon the ¡owners. But since the hauling of barges must, as the evidence stands, ¡be included among the purposes for which this derrick was supplied, I cannot say that this barge and the circumstances of the attempt to moor it along-side, were so peculiar dr extraordinary as to distinguish this case from that of other barges often moored in a similar manner.
There is great difficulty and uncertainty in determining what amount can be properly given as damáges. The libelant is now, as is conceded, wholly disabled from severe work, through the enlargement and dangerous condition of the heart. He can only do light work, earning about one-third his former average wages. He is 42 years old. He testifies that before this accident he was strong and rugged, and never sick. I am satisfied that the other supposed troubles do not exist to any material degree. His ribs were not broken as supposed. His own physician believes the condition of his heart to have been produced by this accident. Dr. Flint, on the contrary, an expert of wide experience and high reputation, though admitting that to be barely possible, conceives
Under such circumstances I must regard the libelant’s contention that his present condition has been wholly produced by this accident, as not sufficiently made out, but consider the case as one of previous heart disorder aggravated and accelerated in its development by this accident. Upon such a finding of the facts, there is no satisfactory standard for ascertaining the damages to be awarded. I can only do as a jury would, under similar circumstances, ho obliged to do, viz., give such damages as on the whole commends itself to their judgment. I award the libelant $2,000, and costs.