758 P.2d 219 | Kan. | 1988
Lead Opinion
The opinion of the court was delivered by
This is an appeal of a personal injury action wherein a summary judgment was entered in favor of the Catholic Diocese of Wichita. The district court ruled the negligence of Father Steven Scheier, pastor of a Catholic parish, could not be imputed to the diocese.
Appellants were injured when their pickup was struck by a car driven by Father Scheier, pastor of Sacred Heart Parish in Fredonia. The parish is now part of the Catholic Diocese of Wichita, a not-for-profit organization incorporated in the State of Kansas, although it existed well before the corporation’s formation. Father Scheier owned and insured the car. He had no subsequent recollection of the accident, or the events preceding it. He did recall going to Wichita to visit a friend, Father Ken Melaragno, to discuss problems he was having with his parish’s Altar Society. He had no subsequent recollection of the visit.
Appellants filed suit against Father Scheier and against the diocese under the doctrine of respondeat superior. They claimed Scheier was an employee of the diocese who was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident. On June 12, 1987, the district court heard arguments on motions by both the diocese and appellants for summary judgment and granted
The Roman Catholic Church is hierarchical in nature, extending from the parish to the diocese and ultimately to the Pope. Each diocese is headed by a bishop and contains a number of parishes, each headed by a pastor. The pastor is required to conduct his parish according to church canons and diocesan statutes. A pastor may be removed from office, but only for serious cause and then under specific procedures requiring the bishop to confer with others and allowing the pastor to appeal the decision. Diocesan law sets the amount of each pastor’s salary. Under Canon Law, if a pastor’s compensation exceeds his needs, he is obligated to return the excess to the diocese. Wichita Diocesan statutes prescribe a salary of $400 a month and a car allowance of $300 a month. The Wichita Diocese now follows the majority of diocese in issuing a W-2 form to each priest. This policy was instituted after a tax dispute over whether priests were considered to be self-employed. The pastor is required by diocesan statute to report to the bishop annually on the financial and spiritual status of the parish.
The bishop is clearly the pastor’s superior under ecclesiastical law. The evidence shows, however, that a pastor’s day-to-day activities are within his own discretion and control. He is authorized under Canon Law to do whatever he feels is necessary to carry out his duties. He sets his own hours and vacation. He makes out his own paycheck, and hires or fires any non-priest/non-deacon employee, such as secretaries and janitors. Such salaries, including his own, come from parish receipts. The pastor has complete discretion in purchasing church supplies and paying the bills from parish • funds. The details of daily bookkeeping and accounting of sums received and spent by the parish are not reviewed by. the diocese.
Appellants do not dispute the facts in the case. They argue only that the facts create a question for the jury whether an employer-employee relationship existed between the diocese and Father Scheier. The diocese asserts Father Scheier’s legal
Resolution of conflicting evidence which might establish the existence of an agency is for the finder of fact. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Hepler State Bank, 6 Kan. App. 2d 543, 548, 630 P.2d 721 (1981). What constitutes an agency, however, is a question of law. Fredricks v. Foltz, 225 Kan. 663, 670, 594 P.2d 665 (1979).
Thus, the sole issue before this court is whether it may be found, as a matter of law from the uncontroverted facts, that the diocese may not be held liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior, or whether it is for the jury to weigh the facts and decide whether Father Scheier was an employee under established agency law. The specific question to be answered is whether a pastor’s negligence while engaged in activity beneficial to his diocese (viewing the evidence most favorably to the appellant), but within his own discretion and control, may be imputed to his diocese.
The phrase “imputed negligence” refers to the doctrine which places upon one individual responsibility for the negligence of another. Schmidt v. Martin, 212 Kan. 373, 375, 510 P.2d 1244 (1973). The doctrine of imputed negligence, or respondeat superior, has its origin in public policy. It is elemental that every person conduct his business so as not to cause injury to others, and if he conducts business through others, he is bound to manage them so third persons are not injured by the others while they are doing the principal’s business within the scope of their authority. The doctrine is a “fiction of the law,” not favored in this state, which is limited to master/servant (employer/employee) and joint enterprise relationships. Schmidt, 212 Kan. at 376. See Lightner v. Frank, 240 Kan. 21, 26, 727 P.2d 430 (1986). These are relationships in which the potential respondents have sufficient control and responsibility for the actions of others to justify holding them liable for their actions.
Professors Prosser and Keeton explain the “multitude of very ingenious reasons” offered to justify the doctrine in the master/servant relationship:
“[The employer] has a more or less fictitious ‘control’ over the behavior of the servant; he has ‘set the whole thing in motion,’ and is therefore responsible for what has happened; he has selected the servant and trusted him, and so should suffer for his wrongs, rather than an innocent stranger who has had no opportu*594 nity to protect himself; it is a great concession that any man should be permitted to employ another at all, and there should be a corresponding responsibility as the price to be paid for it — or, more frankly and cynically, ‘In hard fact, the reason for the employers’ liability is the damages are taken from a deep pocket.’ None of these reasons is so self-sufficient as to carry conviction, although they are all in accord with the general common law notion that one who is in a position to exercise some general control over the situation must exercise it or bear the loss. . . .
“What has emerged as the modern justification for vicarious liability is a rule of policy, a deliberate allocation of a risk. The losses caused by the torts of employees, which as a practical matter are sure to occur in the conduct of the employer’s enterprise, are placed upon that enterprise itself, as a required cost of doing business. They are placed upon the employer because, having engaged in an enterprise, which will on the basis of all past experience involve harm to others through the torts of employees, and sought to profit by it, it is just that he, rather than the innocent injured plaintiff, should bear them; and because he is better able to absorb them, and to distribute them, through prices, rates or liability insurance, to the public, and so to shift them to society, to the community at large. Added to this is the makeweight argument that an employer who is held strictly liable is under the greatest incentive to be careful in selection, instruction and supervision of his servants, and to take every precaution to see that the enterprise is conducted safely.” Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 69 (5th ed. 1984).
In contrast to an “employee” under the respondeat superior doctrine, an “independent contractor” is one who contracts to do certain work according to his own methods, without being subject to the control of his employer, except as to the result of his work. An independent contractor therefore represents the will of his employer only in the result, and not as to the means in which it is accomplished. Snedden v. Nichols, 181 Kan. 1052, 1055, 317 P.2d 448 (1957). Thus, one who hires such an individual is not liable for that party’s negligence. See Wallis v. Secretary of Kans. Dept. of Human Resources, 236 Kan. 97, 689 P.2d 787 (1984).
The primary test to determine whether one is an employee or an independent contractor is the “right to control” test. The employer need not actually control the work of the employee; he need only have the right to control the work. Danes v. St. David’s Episcopal Church, 242 Kan. 822, Syl. ¶ 3, 752 P.2d 653 (1988). Other tests include the authority to discharge the employee before work is completed, Schroeder v. American Nat’l Bank, 154 Kan. 721, 724, 121 P.2d 186 (1942), and control over payment of wages and the amount paid, Davis v. Julian, 152 Kan. 749, 756, 107 P.2d 745 (1940).
Whether ecclesiastical superiority, which clearly exists herein
An opposite result was reached in Roman Catholic Archbishop v. Industrial Acc. Com., 194 Cal. 660, 230 Pac. 1 (1924), a workers’ compensation case in which a carpenter was injured while reshingling a roof of a Roman Catholic Church. The court noted, however, that had it been alleged and proved that it was not a part of the bishop’s duties to have the roof repaired, but rather the duty of the parish pastor, the result might have been different.
Facts similar to the instant case are found in Ambrosio v. Price, 495 F. Supp. 381 (D. Neb. 1979), in which a parish priest was involved in a car accident on his way to visit friends. Suit was brought against the parish as well as the priest and the Archbishop. All parties moved for summary judgment. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the parish and the Archbishop on the basis of scope of employment, but implied in dicta that imputed negligence could have been found had the priest acted upon the orders of the church for its benefit. 495 F. Supp. at 385.
A final case relied upon by appellants, Stevens v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Fresno, 49 Cal. App. 3d 877, 123 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1975), is inapplicable because the alleged negligence was that of a missionary priest who did not hold the office of pastor and the appellate court based its decision on Canon Law, a position contrary to Kansas case law. See generally Gospel Tabernacle Body of Christ Church v. Peace Publishers & Co., 211 Kan. 420, 506 P.2d 1135, reh. denied 211 Kan. 927, 508 P.2d 842 (1973).
Two Kansas automobile cases are pertinent on the doctrine of respondeat superior in this state. In Houdek v. Gloyd, 152 Kan. 789, 107 P.2d 751 (1940), defendant Gloyd, acting as a salesman for Oehlert Tractor & Equipment Company, was alleged to have
Similarly, in Hurla v. Capper Publications, Inc., 149 Kan. 369, 87 P.2d 552 (1939), the court held as a matter of law that a newspaper deliveryman who used his own car was not an employee for purposes of imputing negligence because the evidence demonstrated the employer did not have the right to control the physical conduct of the carrier in the performance of his duties.
Applying the “right to control” test to the case herein, we see the diocese has no control over the day-to-day activities of a parish pastor. Although a diocese sets a pastor’s salary and has the power to eventually remove him from office, the pastor retains significant control even in these areas. Moreover, the pastor is clearly in control of his parish. He performs his duties as he sees fit, and is required only to make annual reports of status and planning to the diocese.
In the present case, if the negligence of the pastor may be imputed to the diocese, it logically may be extended to the Pope, as all control over the pastor’s employment ultimately stems from Roman Catholic ecclesiastical law, in which the Pope is the highest authority.
Father Scheier was driving his own self-insured automobile on the day of the accident, a factor which has repeatedly been held significant in determining agency. He had purchased personal insurance to cover liability arising out of his use of the automobile. The diocese did not request Father Scheier to visit his friend; he chose to go on his own accord. He neither advised nor sought permission of the diocese, as was in keeping with his autonomous position as pastor.
In a typical respondeat superior situation, the employee would not be expected to procure insurance to protect against liability for his actions at work. His potential negligence is viewed by his employer as “a required cost of doing business” which may be shifted to society at large. See Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 69. In such a situation, an innocent victim would often not be able to recover damages for negligence unless the employee’s negligence was imputed to the employer. The doctrine of respondeat superior allows the victim to reach the “deep pocket” which benefits from the risk undertaken, and thus encourages an employer to supervise his employees to prevent injuries to others caused by the employees’ negligence. The case at bar is not a typical respondeat superior situation where public policy dictates imputed liability.
We have carefully examined the record before us and conclude that under these facts and circumstances the legal relationship of Father Scheier to his diocese was that of an independent contractor, as the district court correctly determined. There are no genuine issues of material fact and the diocese is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 60-256(c).
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting: I disagree with the majority’s holding as a matter of law that the relationship of Father Scheier, pastor of a Catholic parish, to his diocese is that of an independent contractor. I believe the motion for summary judgment and the supporting affidavits raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding the status of the pastor as an employee and whether he was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident. Therefore, I must dissent.
I agree with the majority’s recitation of the general rule that an independent contractor is one who contracts to do a piece of work according to his own methods without being subject to the control of his employer, except as to the result of his work, and one who represents the will of his employer only in the result of his work and not as to the means by which it is accomplished. Snedden v. Nichols, 181 Kan. 1052, 1055, 317 P.2d 448 (1957). As the majority opinion states, the primary test to determine whether one is an employee or an independent contractor is the so-called “right to control” test. Under this test, if the alleged employer has the right of control and supervision over the work of the alleged employee and the right to direct the manner in which the work is to be performed as well as the result which is to be accomplished, an employer/employee relationship exists. See Wallis v. Secretary of Kans. Dept. of Human Resources, 236 Kan. 97, Syl. ¶ 5, 689 P.2d 787 (1984).
Applying the “right to control” test to the facts of this case, it is clear that the Catholic Diocese of Wichita retains a significant right of control over its pastors. Although this court has recognized a distinction between civil and ecclesiastical law, internal regulations of religious organizations have been determined to be relevant to the existence of agency relationships between church bodies and religious workers. See Stevens v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Fresno, 49 Cal. App. 3d 877, 123 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1975).
In his deposition, Father Ronald Gilmore, Chancellor of the Diocese of Wichita, stated that in the Roman Catholic Church, the bishop is the priest of the diocese and all other priests are his assistants. The bishop selects his priests after a training process, ordains them, and gives them jurisdiction to function within a given parish. A priest is not free to go from diocese to diocese.
The “right to control” test, however, is not an exclusive one. Other commonly recognized indicia of the status of an independent contractor include the existence of a contract for the performance of work at a fixed price, the independent nature of the business, the right to employ assistants with the right to supervise their activities, the right to control the progress of the work except as to final results, the time for which the worker is employed, the method of payment, and whether the work is part of the regular business of the employer. See 41 Am. Jur. 2d, Independent Contractors § 5, pp. 744-45.
Additional factors which should be considered include whether the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or business; the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is usually done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist without supervision; the skill required in a particular occupation; whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person doing the work; the length of time for which the person is employed; and whether the parties believe they are creating the relationship of master and servant. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220 (1957). No one particular factor is controlling, but each case must be judged on its particular facts.
The majority states that the priest should be classified as an independent contractor due to the “enormous discretion” which the priest exercises in the daily operation of the parish, citing, as examples of this discretion, that the priest makes out his own
There are also other factors which weigh against the classification of the priest as an independent contractor: (1) At the end of the tax year, the diocese issues a W-2 or W-4 form to each individual priest. (2) A priest is considered to be on call 24 hours a day; vacation policy is set by the diocese. (3) The priest’s term of employment is indefinite. (4) The priest’s work clearly furthers the regular business of the diocese. (5) The priest is not engaged in an independent occupation in the sense that he contracts with different churches to perform pastoral services on a job-by-job basis: rather, he is engaged solely in his parish and can accept no other assignments without the consent of the bishop.
Finally, it is important to consider that the doctrine of respondeat superior has its origin in public policy. The maxim of respondeat superior is grounded on the principle that he who expects to derive advantage from an act which is done by another for him must answer for any injury which a third person may sustain from it. 53 Am. Jur. 2d, Master and Servant § 417. As the majority states, the employer/employee relationship is one in which the potential respondents “have sufficient control and responsibility for the actions of others to justify holding them liable for their actions.” It is those parties who control the enterprise who are the proper parties to be charged with the responsibility for preventing, administering, and distributing the risk of loss. Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 71, p. 509 (5th ed. 1984).
Public policy was a significant consideration in Malloy v. Fong, 37 Cal. 2d 356, 232 P.2d 241 (1951), where plaintiff brought suit against, among others, a Presbyterian pastor and the Presbytery of San Francisco, to recover for injuries sustained in
“A property owner, for example, may be unable to understand the intricacies of erecting a building upon his land — the most that he can ordinarily be expected to do is to use care in the selection of a construction contractor. The Presbytery contends that the services here involved were ‘professional,’ like those rendered by a physician or attorney, and that as a matter of law a minister should be regarded as an independent contractor. [However], the skills possessed by [the pastor] were also possessed by the Presbytery; it was the Presbytery in fact that determined that he was qualified for this position, whereas medical, legal, or construction experts are examined and licensed by state authority. None of the duties performed by [the pastor] were too complicated for efficient supervision by the Presbytery.” 37 Cal. 2d at 371.
For the Malloy court, the fact that the Presbytery possessed the requisite skill to ordain and supervise the pastor was an important factor in allocating the risk of the pastor’s negligence to the Presbytery, as long as the negligent acts occurred within the scope of the pastor’s employment. Similarly, the priest’s vow of obedience and poverty, and the conduct of his parish according to church canons and statutes, should also be considered in an allocation of risk analysis. Generally, a person may be said to be an employee rather than an independent contractor when, in the eyes of the community, he would be regarded as a part of the employer’s own working staff and not otherwise. Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 70, p. 501. Here, the pleadings and affidavits raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the priest was a part of the working staff of the diocese for the purposes of imputing negligence. I would reverse the grant of summary judgment and remand the matter to the district court for further proceedings.
