Case Information
*1 Before S YKES , H AMILTON , and S CUDDER , Circuit Judges . H AMILTON , Circuit Judge
. Plainti Brigid Ford worked as a deputy in the Marion County Sheri ce until her hand was seriously injured in a car accident while on duty. After assigning Ford to light duty for about a year, the Sheri ’s Of- ce told Ford that she must either transfer to a permanent po- sition with a cut in pay or be terminated. After some back and forth, Ford accepted a civilian job as a jail visitation clerk. In the following years, Ford alleges, she su ered disability- based harassment by co-workers, refusals to accommodate her scheduling needs, and several discriminatory promotion denials. Ford sued the Sheri ff ’s O ffi ce for discriminatory em- ployment practices in violation of the Americans with Disa- bilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq .
The district court granted summary judgment on most of Ford’s claims. Two claims were tried to a jury, which rendered a verdict for the defense. Ford has appealed and raised a host of issues. We a ffi rm. The district court correctly granted sum- mary judgment on numerous claims and commi ed no re- versible error in the trial.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Ford had worked at the Sheri ff ’s O ffi ce for almost a dozen years when, in April 2012, another driver ran a red light and crashed into her patrol vehicle. Since 2008, Ford had worked as a sworn deputy sheri in the warrants unit, locating and arresting people with outstanding warrants. The crash se- verely injured Ford’s dominant right hand. Despite extensive treatment, she has not recovered full use of her hand. She suf- fers ongoing and sometimes debilitating pain in her lower arm.
In the wake of the accident, the Sheri ’s O ce placed Ford on various light duty tasks for about a year while she pursued treatment. It became clear that Ford physically could not re- sume her work as a deputy sheri , in the warrants unit or oth- erwise.
A. Demotion to Visitation Clerk In June 2013, Angela Grider, the Sheri ce’s director of human resources, and Eva Talley-Sanders, the chief deputy, held a meeting with Ford that she calls the “three choices” meeting. Ford’s claims based on the ensuing events were re- solved on summary judgment, so we recount the facts in the light most favorable to her. See Brown v. Milwaukee Board of School Directors , 855 F.3d 818, 820 (7th Cir. 2017). Grider and Talley-Sanders told Ford that she could either (a) accept a ci- vilian clerk position in the Main Control o ce with a cut in pay, (b) resign, or (c) be red.
The day after the meeting, Ford sent Grider an email re- questing accommodation under the ADA. Ford said that she wanted to work and believed she could do so with reasonable accommodations for her complex regional pain syndrome. She asked for the “ADA form” for her doctor to ll out. Over the following weeks, Ford and Grider emailed back and forth concerning Ford’s request for accommodation and whether the clerk position would suit her needs and abilities.
In a July 12 le er, Ford described accommodations that she believed might enable her to perform the main control clerk job. She requested a hands-free telephone, voice-acti- vated software for her computer, an ergonomic work station, the ability to take breaks when needed to alleviate her pain, and training for her supervisors. Two months later, Grider re- sponded in a le er granting each of these requests except the voice-activated software.
The nal exchanges concerning Ford’s ultimate placement occurred in late September. Ford sent an email to Grider on September 20, 2013 asking if the Main Control clerk was the only open civilian position. Grider responded that it was the “only position where we are able to meet the limitations of your request.” Ford persisted, asking if Grider could provide her with a list of open civilian positions. Grider did not re- spond to this request. Three days later, Ford emailed again to accept the position as a Main Control clerk. Only then did Grider respond. She described Ford’s pending requests about other possible assignments as “now a moot issue.” Ford then shadowed other workers in various clerk roles, including “basement control,” “book-out,” and jail visitation. She ulti- mately accepted a position in the Visitation O ffi ce starting on October 3, 2013.
B. Con fl ict with Co-Workers in the Visitation O ffi ce Ford alleges that in her work in the Visitation O ffi ce, she su ered almost three years of disability harassment. She clashed repeatedly with her co-workers, rst Carol Ladd and Eva Wa s, who worked in the Visitation O ffi ce from October 2013 to December 2014, and later with Vashni Hendricks, who worked there from January 2015 to July 2016. Ford contends that these con fl icted relationships and the Sheri ’s O ffi ce’s failure to address them created a hostile work environment based on her disability.
Before turning to the facts of the alleged disability harass- ment, we note the split procedural posture of this claim. On summary judgment, the district court found that no reasona- ble jury could impose liability on the Sheri ’s O ce based on the evidence of harassment by Hendricks from January 2015 to July 2016, primarily because Ford did not alert supervisors that the friction stemmed from Hendricks’s hostility to her disability. The court denied summary judgment, however, based on the evidence of the earlier harassment by Ladd and Wa s. The jury ruled for the Sheri ce. Section II of this opinion addresses the propriety of dividing Ford’s hostile work environment claim. For now, we summarize both the facts that were before the jury and Ford’s account of Hen- dricks’s conduct.
Ford and Ladd had disputes from the start. On October 3, 2013, Ford’s fi rst day in the Visitation O ffi ce, Ford went to Grider and “broke down in tears” describing Ladd’s alleged bullying, unhelpfulness, and insensitivity to Ford’s disability. At trial, Grider testi fi ed that she discounted this allegation be- cause Ladd did not “even know about [Ford’s] disability at that moment.” Ladd testi fi ed and denied that she had made any disparaging remarks to Ford on that date. Over the next four months, Ford did not make any wri tt en complaints, but she testi fi ed at trial that Ladd was harassing her constantly during that time. Ford testi fi ed that Ladd mocked Ford’s workstation accommodations, adjusted Ford’s chair into un- comfortable positions, and disrupted work with loud speak- erphone conversations.
At the start of February 2014, Ford sent the rst of many wri tt en complaints to one of her supervisors, Lieutenant James Walterman, regarding Ladd’s behavior. Wa s began working with Ford and Ladd in the Visitation O ffi ce soon af- ter that, and Ford testi ed that Wa s began harassing her as well. Ford relied on a tally of her emails and memos to Wal- terman as proof of the disability harassment and the failure of the Sheri ’s O ce to address it. Lieutenant Walterman acknowledged at trial that he received three memos from Ford reporting, among other things, that Ford used more pain medicine because of Ladd’s animosity, that Ford overheard Ladd disparaging her disability, and that Ladd pushed Ford physically with her chair. Ford o ered as evidence a total of fteen memos and emails to Lieutenant Walterman during this time with similar allegations.
The Sheri ’s O ce argued at trial that these memos re- ported only ordinary disputes about how to do the work of a visitation clerk rather than complaints of disability harass- ment. Walterman testi ed that he believed Ford took issue with how Ladd did her work. Two other co-workers—not otherwise involved in the suit—testi ed that Ford, Ladd, and Wa tt s argued a lot about how to do the work correctly. Wal- terman also testi ed that he believed any bumps between co- workers in the cramped Visitation O ffi ce were inadvertent.
Ford’s memos themselves lent some support to the Sher- i ff ’s O ffi ce defense. Ford complained that Ladd was too per- missive with inmates’ visitors, that she made personal calls at work, that she criticized Ford’s leaving callers on hold, and that she did not say good morning. Ford complained that Wa tt s left early and took work documents home, and that she told Ladd to ignore Ford.
The Sheri ’s O ffi ce ultimately decided to transfer Ladd and Wa tt s out of the Visitation O ffi ce e ective December 27, 2014 and January 3, 2015, respectively. At trial, Ford said that Ladd and Wa tt s’s departure “remedied” their con fl ict.
The jury concluded in a special verdict that Ford was “sub- jected to negative comments and behavior by Ladd and Wa s,” and that “this conduct by Ladd and Wa tt s was unwel- come.” But the jury then found that Ford had failed to prove that the unwelcome conduct “occurred because of the Plain- ti ’s disability,” thus ruling for the Sheri ce on Ford’s claim of a hostile work environment. Neither party objected to the use of the special verdict form.
After Ladd and Wa s left the Visitation O ce, Vashni Hendricks began working there with Ford. Ford alleges that Hendricks immediately began harassing her because of her disability. As noted, the district court granted summary 7 judgment on this portion of her claim, primarily on the ground that Ford did not alert supervisors that friction with Hendricks had anything to do with Ford’s disability. Ford sent two complaints to Lieutenant Walterman, on January 20 and February 13, 2015, shortly after Hendricks arrived. Nei- ther memo mentioned Ford’s disability or asserted that Hen- dricks subjected her to disability harassment. Then, sometime in March 2015, Lieutenant Walterman was replaced by Lieu- tenant Teri Nesbi tt .
Ford cites a few later incidents that also have no apparent link to her disability. On June 19, 2015, Ford wrote an email describing disagreements with Hendricks on visitation poli- cies and asserting that Hendricks’s hand lotion made her sick. That same day, Ford told her sergeant, Marvin Johnson, that Hendricks had made a comment “about ge tt ing a gun and blowing [Ford]’s brains out.” The Sheri ce investigated this claim. Hendricks’s wri en response explained that she was describing a mass shooting in the news, not talking about Ford. After reviewing this incident, along with the ongoing animosity between Ford and Hendricks, the Sheri ’s O ce issued wri en discipline to both employees. [1] Months later, in February 2016, Hendricks stated that “it’s a good thing I don’t have a gun,” but Ford does not describe much else about this comment.
Ford’s disability surfaced during a January 2016 disagree- ment about whether visitors to the Marion County Jail may use passports as a form of identi cation. Ford thought not; Sergeant Johnson disagreed. Our accounts of the confronta- tion come from Ford’s complaint to Lieutenant Tia Shanklin, [2] Hendricks’s memo to Major Tanesha Crear, and the trial tes- timony of Crear. Crediting Ford’s account, as we must, Ford refused to let a visitor use a passport as identi cation, but Johnson overruled her. After the visitor had left, Ford began expressing her disagreement to Johnson. At this point Hen- dricks arrived and berated Ford for “yelling” at her supervi- sor in front of visitors. In none of the accounts did Hendricks mention Ford’s disability. But Ford’s disability became an is- sue when Major Crear intervened in the dispute, saying to Ford that “anyone who was supposedly in as much pain as [Ford] was claiming to be in would not have the energy to be up in front of the Supervisor’s desk, waving [her] arms around.” Crear reproached Ford for her behavior.
Ford has o ered evidence of two instances of alleged har- assment where Hendricks mentioned Ford’s disability. Both apparently stemmed from Hendricks’s resentment that she had to work shifts in both the Visitation O ce and the Main Control O ce; Ford’s disability excused her from the Main Control shifts. First, Ford testi ed that, in September 2015, Hendricks told her that she should have to prove she was dis- abled to avoid Main Control duty. Shanklin witnessed this event but told Ford that Hendricks was “just kidding” or “just joking.” Second, on June 22, 2016, Hendricks told Ford that she needed to go to Main Control to see just how hard it was. Hendricks also joked that she “caught” carpal tunnel syndrome from working over there. Ford described the la tt er incident in a complaint to Lieutenant Shanklin. The next month, the Sheri ff ’s O ffi ce transferred Hendricks out of the Visitation O ffi ce as a result of the ongoing con fl ict between Ford and Hendricks.
C. Change to a Rotating Schedule The second claim at trial arose from the Sheri ff ’s O ffi ce’s refusal to adjust Ford’s schedule as a reasonable accommoda- tion under the ADA. On January 3, 2015—the same day that Hendricks replaced Ladd and Wa tt s—the Sheri ’s O ffi ce switched Ford from a fi xed to a rotating schedule. Ford re- quested later that month to be returned to a xed schedule, saying that the rotating schedule exacerbated her complex re- gional pain syndrome. Ford a ached a physician’s note from her doctor to that e ect. Grider replied in an email two weeks later denying Ford’s request because “it [was] not a reason- able accommodation.”
The district court denied the Sheri ffi ce’s motion for summary judgment on this claim, nding that the O ce had not shown an undue hardship as a ma er of law under 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). Ford’s arguments on appeal do not dwell on the details of the schedule issue, and we need not do so either. Su ce it to say that the evidence about the positive and negative e ects of the schedule change was in con fl ict, and the jury found for the defense on the ground that Ford had failed to prove that she needed the accommodation of the xed schedule. The jury did not reach the undue hardship question.
D. Ford’s Applications for Promotions A nal set of claims arose from Ford’s four unsuccessful applications to be transferred or promoted within the Sheri ff ’s O ffi ce between March 2016 and February 2017. Ford argues that all these rejections were illegally based on her disability and/or amounted to retaliation for her earlier protected activ- ity under the ADA. The district judge granted summary judg- ment for the Sheri ’s O ce on the failure-to-promote claims, nding that Ford had simply not supported these claims with evidence that would support a reasonable inference of unlaw- ful motive. In August 2017, Ford secured a transfer to the sex- and violent-o ender registry unit, where she continued to work for the Sheri ce at the time of trial.
II. The District Court’s Use of Partial Summary Judgment
Ford’s principal argument on appeal is that the district court improperly divided the issues presented in her case. She argues the court erred by granting partial summary judgment on an indivisible claim for a hostile work environment. The Supreme Court’s ruling in National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan , 536 U.S. 101 (2002), instructs courts to evaluate each unlawful employment practice as a distinct but indivisible claim, but it did not prohibit the district court’s actions in this case. The district court had sound reasons, permi tt ed under Morgan , to treat di erently the alleged disability harassment by Wa s and Ladd, on one hand, and Hendricks, on the other.
A. Principles Governing Partial Summary Judgment As a general ma er, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 has long authorized partial grants of summary judgment. See, e.g., American Nurses’ Ass’n v. State of Ill ., 783 F.2d 716, 729 (7th Cir. 1986) (“[M]otions for partial summary judgment are 11 permi ed.”). The 2010 revisions to Rule 56 make this unmis- takably clear. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), cmt. 2010 Amendment (“The rst sentence is added to make clear at the beginning that summary judgment may be requested not only as to an entire case but also as to a claim, defense, or part of a claim or defense.”). A district court also may enter an order stating any material fact that is not genuinely in dispute for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(g). In short, “[r]equests for (and grants of) partial summary judgment, including summary judgment as to fewer than all parties and claims, are nothing new.” Hotel 71 Mezz Lender LLC v. National Retirement Fund , 778 F.3d 593, 606 (7th Cir. 2015).
In the employment discrimination context, however, the enforcement provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, have been construed to impose lim- its on the use of partial summary judgment. [3] Title VII author- izes suit based speci cally on an “unlawful employment prac- tice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). In Morgan , the Supreme Court considered whether events that took place outside the rele- vant statute of limitations period could support a plainti ’s claim of discrimination. 536 U.S. at 108–09. Morgan held that courts must consider all events that belong to a “single un- lawful employment practice,” no more and no less, regardless of whether they fell within the statutory time period. Id . at 117–18.
In our cases applying Morgan , we have ruled that district courts may not splinter a single employment practice even if claims based on some of the underlying conduct would no longer be timely on their own. In Isaacs v. Hill’s Pet Nutrition, Inc ., 485 F.3d 383 (7th Cir. 2007), we reversed a grant of sum- mary judgment on plainti ff ’s hostile environment claim un- der Title VII. The plainti ff o ff ered evidence that she had been sexually harassed while on two di erent teams in the factory where she worked. The district court had divided the claim in two based on the identities of the harassers, nding that claims based on the conduct of the rst team were time-barred and that the conduct of the second team was not severe enough to amount to unlawful harassment. We rejected the division, noting that Title VII makes the employer liable for complying with the law, and the evidence showed that the plainti had su ered a continuous course of harassment co- ordinated between the two teams of co-workers. 485 F.3d at 385–86. We emphasized that all of the conduct occurred under the same management, that the plainti had complained re- peatedly about harassment by both teams, and that manage- ment had failed to respond. Id.
We followed up on that point in Bright v. Hill’s Pet Nutri- tion, Inc ., 510 F.3d 766 (7th Cir. 2007), which involved the same factory as Isaacs . We ordered a new trial in Bright because the district judge had unduly restricted the evidence of earlier sexual harassment that occurred outside the limitations pe- riod and before the employer took disciplinary action against one form of sexual harassment. We explained: “Employers may not turn a practice that Morgan deems unitary into two or more distinct practices by calling each subdivision of the workplace a separate ‘team.’” Id . at 768.
It would be odd if this principle restricted a district court’s power to grant partial summary judgment against untimely 13 claims but allowed a district court to slice apart timely claims. [4] Whether or not timeliness is at issue, courts may grant partial summary judgment as to di ff erent unlawful employment practices in one lawsuit, but not as to part of a single unlawful employment practice. See Morgan , 536 U.S. at 118 (“The stat- ute does not separate individual acts that are part of the hos- tile environment claim from the whole for the purposes of timely ling and liability.”).
That principle is easier to state than to apply. How should a district court tell the di ff erence, and was the court’s partial grant of summary judgment lawful in this case? We rst con- sider Ford’s argument that the court improperly separated di erent types of ADA claims, and then her argument that the court improperly divided her evidence about Hendricks’s harassment from that of Ladd and Wa s.
B. Separating Di erent Types of ADA Claims For purposes of summary judgment, a district court may properly separate from each other claims based on speci c adverse employment actions, retaliation, denial of reasonable accommodation, and hostile work environment. These claims require proof of di erent factual circumstances under di er- ent legal tests. A summary of the relevant law demonstrates why courts must treat them as distinct “unlawful employ- ment practices.”
The ADA prohibits employment discrimination on the ba- sis of disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Like other employment discrimination statutes, the ADA also prohibits retaliating against employees for asserting their rights. See § 12203(a); see also § 2000e-3(a) (Title VII). The duty to accommodate an employee’s disability is speci c to the ADA. See § 12112(b)(5). A plainti must rst show that the requested accommodation is reasonable on its face. That shifts the burden to the em- ployer to prove that the accommodation would impose on the employer an undue hardship as de ned by the ADA. See Ma- jors v. General Electric Co ., 714 F.3d 527, 535 (7th Cir. 2013); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)–(10).
In Morgan , the Supreme Court drew a sharp line between claims for “discrete” acts of discrimination and hostile work environment claims. See 536 U.S. at 115. A hostile work envi- ronment “occurs over a series of days or perhaps years and, in direct contrast to discrete acts, a single act of harassment may not be actionable on its own.” Id. Hostile work environ- ment claims have their legal basis in the phrase “terms, con- ditions, and privileges of employment” present in the ADA and other employment discrimination statutes. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a); see Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc ., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). A hostile work environment exists “[w]hen the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and in- sult that is su ciently severe or pervasive to alter the condi- tions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive work- ing environment.” Id. (citations omi ed). “A hostile work en- vironment claim is composed of a series of separate acts that collectively constitute one ‘unlawful employment practice.’” Morgan , 536 U.S. at 117.
Thus, certain facts may support one type of claim but not another. Our decisions have distinguished among the forego- ing categories of claims. See, e.g., Passananti v. Cook Cnty ., 689 F.3d 655, 659 (7th Cir. 2012) (reinstating jury verdict for 15 plainti on hostile work environment but not discriminatory termination); Fine v. Ryan Int’l Airlines , 305 F.3d 746, 751–52 (7th Cir. 2002) (upholding summary judgment as to discrimi- nation accompanied by plainti ’s verdict on retaliation); Rehling v. City of Chicago , 207 F.3d 1009, 1013–14 (7th Cir. 2000) (a rming summary judgment as to reasonable accommoda- tion but not as to discrimination). Distinct legal theories de- note independent unlawful employment practices that may be addressed separately. [5]
C. Dividing the Hostile Work Environment Allegations A more di cult question is whether and when a plainti ’s hostile work environment claim comprises more than one un- lawful employment practice under the rule in Morgan . If the alleged disability harassment by Ladd and Wa s, as well as that by Hendricks, all belonged to the same employment practice, then it would have been improper for the district court to grant partial summary judgment as to only Hen- dricks’s conduct. We conclude, however, that Ford’s suit pre- sented not one but two disability harassment employment practices, and that Bright and Isaacs are distinguishable in this regard.
As a threshold ma tt er, we hold that hostile work environ- ment claims are cognizable under the ADA. The district court followed the decisions of this court that have assumed they are. See, e.g., Lloyd v. Swifty Transp., Inc ., 552 F.3d 594, 603 (7th Cir. 2009); Mannie v. Po er , 394 F.3d 977, 982 (7th Cir. 2005). At some point, however, extended hypothetical analysis should end. Every other circuit to decide the question has held that it is possible to bring an ADA claim for a hostile en- vironment.
We agree with our colleagues in other circuits that a plain- ti may assert a claim for an illegal hostile work environment on the basis of disability under 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). The claim’s legal basis is simple: Congress wrote the ADA using the language of Title VII, and Title VII recognizes hostile work environment claims. See, e.g., Fox v. Costco Wholesale Corp ., 918 F.3d 65, 74 (2d Cir. 2019) (detailing this argument). Five circuits have held that such claims are permi ed under the ADA. See id.; Fox v. General Motors Corp ., 247 F.3d 169, 175–76 (4th Cir. 2001); Flowers v. Southern Regional Physician Services Inc ., 247 F.3d 229, 233 (5th Cir. 2001); Shaver v. Indep. Stave Co ., 350 F.3d 716, 719–20 (8th Cir. 2003); Lanman v. Johnson Cty ., 393 F.3d 1151, 1155–56 (10th Cir. 2004). No circuit has held to the contrary. We adopt the position of our colleagues who have recognized hostile-environment claims under the ADA. [6] We turn to whether the district court improperly divided a single unlawful employment practice in this case. Morgan taught that, in general, “the entire hostile work environment encompasses a single unlawful employment practice,” but cautioned that acts bearing “no relation” to one another would belong to separate employment practices. 536 U.S. at 117–18. Morgan also said that “certain intervening action by the employer” could sever a hostile work environment claim. Id. at 118. It also quoted favorably the Ninth Circuit’s reasons to nd a single practice in Morgan itself: “the pre- and post- limitations period incidents involve[d] the same type of em- ployment actions, occurred relatively frequently, and were perpetrated by the same managers.” Id. at 120, quoting Mor- gan v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp ., 232 F.3d 1008, 1017 (9th Cir. 2000) (alteration in original). Morgan thus signaled that hostile work environments can sometimes be broken apart for legal analysis but did not specify when.
Based on the Court’s guidance, our cases interpreting Mor- gan , and cases from other circuits, we can identify “various factors that should guide the Morgan ‘relatedness’ inquiry.” McGullam v. Cedar Graphics, Inc ., 609 F.3d 70, 81 (2d Cir. 2010) (Calabresi, J., concurring). The simplest factor is time: A sig- ni cant gap between alleged incidents of discriminatory har- assment can sever the hostile work environment claim. See Milligan-Grimstad v. Stanley , 877 F.3d 705, 713 (7th Cir. 2017) ( nding separate employment practices where spans “as large as two or three years” separated the incidents); Lucas v. 679 F. App’x 851, 852–53 (11th Cir. 2017); Hill v. Assocs. for Renewal in Educ., Inc ., 897 F.3d 232, 236 (D.C. Cir. 2018). The Sixth Circuit has recognized the claim, but in a non-precedential decision, Trepka v. Bd. of Educ ., 28 F. App’x 455, 461 (6th Cir. 2002).
Chicago Transit Auth ., 367 F.3d 714, 727 (7th Cir. 2004) (more than three years). There is no magic number; the question is whether “the series of allegations describe continuous con- duct rather than isolated incidents.” Milligan-Grimstad , 877 F.3d at 713. In this case, a gap of eighteen months sepa- rated Ladd and Wa tt s’s departure and the date in June 2016 when Ford put the Sheri ce on notice of disability har- assment by Hendricks. In saying this, we must acknowledge that, according to Ford’s testimony, she was subjected to a continuous pa ern of harassment, rst by Ladd and Wa tt s and then by Hendricks. But from the perspective of the em- ployer that she seeks to hold liable, there was a signi cant gap. Ford complained about con fl ict with Hendricks, but it was not until June 2016, eighteen months after Hendricks joined the Visitation O ce, that Ford complained to her su- pervisors that Hendricks was harassing her because of her disa- bility . That fact distinguishes this case from Bright and Isaacs , where the sexual harassment and the plainti s’ complaints about sexual harassment were essentially continuous. [7]
On the other hand, our cases make clear that “the har- assers’ identities, whether they acted in concert or isolation, and whether they harassed in distinct or similar fashions” do not bear on the inquiry. Milligan-Grimstad , 877 F.3d at 712. Isaacs and Bright emphasized this point. Both cases involved alleged harassment by multiple groups of the plainti s’ male co-workers. We explained that which co-workers were in- volved and how they harassed did not ma er because the em- ployer, not the co-workers, is the party that is legally obliged to comply with Title VII. Isaacs , 485 F.3d at 386; Bright , 510 F.3d at 769–70.
A change in managers can a ect whether incidents are re- lated. Unlike the actions of co-workers, the actions of super- visors impart vicarious liability to the employer for discrimi- natory harassment. See Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth , 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998). As a result, we observed in Isaacs : “An employee moved from one plant to another, where a di erent set of managers made decisions about working conditions, might well experience di erent hostile environments for the purpose of Morgan .” 485 F.3d at 386; see Morgan , 536 U.S. at 120 (citing “perpetrat[ion] by the same managers” as a reason to nd a single employment practice). That said, “routine per- sonnel actions” not taken to alleviate the harassment are less signi cant. See Vickers v. Powell , 493 F.3d 186, 199 (D.C. Cir. 2007). Here, Ford’s supervisor changed in between the two periods of harassment. Lieutenant Walterman left his post not long after Ladd and Wa s’s departures. Lieutenant Nesbi and later Lieutenant Shanklin had direct control over the Sheri ce’s response to possible disability harassment of Ford from March 2015 forward, during the alleged harass- ment by Hendricks.
Finally, as noted, “certain intervening action by the em- ployer” can interrupt a hostile work environment claim. Mor- gan , 536 U.S. at 118. Although the Supreme Court did not say which intervening actions qualify, we have held that “prompt and appropriate corrective action reasonably likely to prevent the harassment from recurring” defeats employer liability for co-worker harassment. Porter v. Erie Foods Int’l, Inc ., 576 F.3d 629, 636 (7th Cir. 2009). The same standard can determine whether an action su ces to sever a hostile work environment claim. Bright held that a two-week suspension of the harassers, with no evident e ff ect on their sexist behavior, did not alter the duration of the unlawful employment prac- tice. 510 F.3d at 769–70. A case from the Fifth Circuit, by com- parison, found that a transfer made to separate the plainti and the harasser did sever the hostile work environment claim. See Stewart v. Mississippi Transp. Comm’n , 586 F.3d 321, 329 (5th Cir. 2009).
We agree that removing alleged harassers permanently, as the Sheri ce did with Ladd and Wa s, can bring an end to the unlawful employment practice at issue. Cf. Saxton v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co ., 10 F.3d 526, 535 (7th Cir. 1993) ( nding that transfer of the harasser was “a su cient safeguard against any recurrence of the harassment” to defeat employer liabil- ity). As explained above, however, an incidental rotation of co-workers not calculated to address the harassment does not necessarily a ect a hostile work environment claim against the employer. See Isaacs , 485 F.3d at 385–86. Only a transfer that amounts to “intervening action by the employer” can close out a distinct unlawful employment practice. Morgan , 536 U.S. at 118.
We are not suggesting there is a hard and fast rule to apply here. At least for now, we are applying a standard implied in Morgan to determine when di erent episodes of unlawful harassment, whether based on disability, race, sex, or any other protected category, may be treated separately by a dis- trict court. The following factors—all present in Ford’s case— support a nding that alleged incidents of harassment have “no relation” to each other under Morgan : a substantial pas- sage of time without incident known to the employer, a change in the employee’s supervisors, and an intervening remedial action by the employer. The district court here incor- rectly divided the harassment claim based on the identities of the harassers rather than the “intervening action” of the Sher- i ’s O ce, but the court reached the right result. We a ffi rm based on the eighteen-month gap, the departure of Lieutenant Walterman, and the transfer of Ladd and Wa s calculated to end their alleged harassment. On the facts of Ford’s case, the court did not err in independently evaluating two distinct claims for a hostile work environment.
III. Ford’s Substantive Arguments for Reversal
Turning to the merits of Ford’s claims, she challenges on appeal the partial grant of summary judgment on some claims. She also argues that several evidentiary rulings and a jury instruction require a new trial on the claims that were tried. We consider these arguments in turn.
A. Summary Judgment Ruling
Ford appeals the grant of summary judgment on: (1) her claim that the demotion to visitation clerk was not a reason- able accommodation, but in fact was discriminatory and re- taliatory; (2) the part of her hostile work environment claim based on Hendricks’s actions from January 2015 forward, as discussed above; and (3) her discrimination and retaliation claims stemming from the four decisions not to promote her after March 2016. We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment. Brown , 855 F.3d at 820.
1. Demotion to Visitation Clerk Ford argues that, although the Sheri ce found a new position for her after the accident, the visitation clerk job was not a reasonable accommodation because be er vacancies were available at the time. The ADA required the Sheri ’s O ce to canvass available positions and, if a vacant job ex- isted that Ford was quali fi ed to perform with or without rea- sonable accommodations, to o er it to her. See Hendricks-Rob- inson v. Excel Corp ., 154 F.3d 685, 694–95 (7th Cir. 1998). Ford’s simple statement that she “want[ed] to work” was enough to trigger this duty to accommodate. Id. at 694 . The Sheri ’s Of- fi ce asserts that it satis fi ed its duty by reassigning Ford to the visitation clerk position, which it admits was a demotion from her prior post as a warrants deputy.
A demotion can be a reasonable accommodation when the employer cannot accommodate the disabled employee in her current or prior jobs or an equivalent position. See Gile v. United Airlines, Inc ., 213 F.3d 365, 374 (7th Cir. 2000); Hen- dricks-Robinson , 154 F.3d at 694–95. But if Ford could show that she quali ed for a vacant position that more closely matched her previous job, the ADA would have obliged the Sheri ce to o er it to her. The EEOC’s interpretive guid- ance on this point states: “An employer may reassign an indi- vidual to a lower graded position if … there are no vacant equivalent positions for which the individual is quali ed with or without reasonable accommodation.” 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. § 1630.2( o ) (emphasis added). The Tenth Circuit has ex- amined this issue, along with the EEOC’s guidance, and con- cluded that an employer “should rst consider lateral moves to positions that are regarded as equivalent.” Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc. , 180 F.3d 1154, 1177 (10th Cir. 1999). We agree. [8] To take advantage of this principle, however, Ford needed to come forward with evidence that a more equivalent posi- tion for which she was quali ed was vacant at the relevant time. See Dunderdale v. United Airlines, Inc ., 807 F.3d 849, 856 (7th Cir. 2015). Ford’s complaints about terse, unhelpful re- sponses from Grider, the director of human resources, do not control this question. We have repeatedly explained that a problem in the “interactive process” to reach an accommoda- tion is not itself actionable; the ADA looks to ends, not means. See, e.g., Bunn v. Khoury Enterprises, Inc ., 753 F.3d 676, 683 (7th Cir. 2014); Rehling v. City of Chicago , 207 F.3d 1009, 1015–16 (7th Cir. 2000). “It is well-established that an employer is ob- ligated to provide a quali ed individual with a reasonable ac- commodation, not the accommodation he would prefer.” Id. at 1014.
To survive summary judgment, Ford needed to present evidence that some vacant position existed closer to her orig- inal job, rendering the visitation clerk demotion unreason- able. She failed to do so. The relevant time period for possible vacancies began in June 2013, when Ford requested accom- modation under the ADA. See EEOC, Enforcement Guidance: Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the Americans With Disabilities Act (2002), reprinted in 2 EEO Compl. Man. (BNA) at 902:151 (“’Vacant’ means that the po- sition is available when the employee asks for reasonable accommo- dation , or that the employer knows that it will become availa- ble within a reasonable amount of time.” (emphasis added)). Until Ford requested accommodation, the Sheri ce was Auth ., 926 F.3d 881, 889 (7th Cir. 2019), citing Federal Express Corp. v. Holowecki , 552 U.S. 389, 399 (2008).
not on notice of the need to consider her for potential reas- signment to vacancies that arose.
Ford identi ed only two possible vacancies. First, she pro- vided some evidence that civilian vacancies opened in the warrants division between February and May 2013. The dis- trict court correctly found that any such vacancies fell outside the relevant period. Second, Ford argued that dispatcher po- sitions were available “constantly” but that she was never given an opportunity to train for one. Yet the record also con- tains uncontradicted evidence that dispatcher positions in- volved duties that Ford could not perform even with accom- modation. In short, Ford failed to introduce evidence suggest- ing that the visitation clerk reassignment was not a reasonable accommodation.
Ford also argues that the demotion to visitation clerk was an adverse action that can support additional claims for disa- bility discrimination and retaliation. We do not see how the reassignment could be simultaneously a reasonable accom- modation and an adverse employment action. Where both sides agreed that Ford could no longer serve as a sheri ’s dep- uty, reasonable accommodation standards provide the be er framework. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (de ning “reasonable accommodation” to include “reassignment to a vacant posi- tion”). We have trouble imagining how a demotion that qual- i es as a reasonable accommodation required by the ADA can, at the same time, constitute disability discrimination or retal- iation prohibited by the ADA. The district court properly granted summary judgment on the claims arising from Ford’s transfer to the Visitation O ce. 25
2. Hostile Work Environment After January 2015 As explained, the district court properly considered two separate periods of alleged hostile work environment based on disability harassment. The district court correctly awarded summary judgment for the later period from January 2015 to July 2016, involving Hendricks. The same standard governs hostile work environment claims under the ADA as under other employment discrimination laws. [9] To survive summary judgment, plainti s must present evidence that: “(1) they were subject to unwelcome harassment; (2) the harassment was based on their [disability]; (3) the harassment was so se- vere or pervasive as to alter the conditions of employment and create a hostile or abusive working environment; and (4) there is a basis for employer liability.” Johnson v. Advocate Health & Hosps. Corp ., 892 F.3d 887, 900 (7th Cir. 2018) (racially hostile environment claim). On the nal prong, employers are strictly liable for harassment commi ed by supervisors, but liable for harassment by co-workers only if the employer was “negli- gent either in discovering or remedying the harassment.” Nis- chan v. Stratosphere Quality, LLC , 865 F.3d 922, 930 (7th Cir. 2017). [10]
The district court correctly held that Ford failed to show a genuine issue of material fact under this standard. She o ered evidence of three incidents involving Hendricks where the employer arguably should have known they related to Ford’s disability. In September 2015, Hendricks told Ford that she should be required to prove her disability in order to avoid shifts in the Main Control O ffi ce, and Lieutenant Shanklin overheard this comment. The second comment was from Ma- jor Crear, who questioned during the January 2016 passport incident whether Ford was really “in as much pain as [she] was claiming to be.” Finally, in June 2016, Hendricks insinu- ated that Ford was faking her disability to avoid the di ffi cult work in the Main Control O ffi ce. Ford reported this fi nal com- ment in a wri tt en complaint to Shanklin. This was her fth wri tt en complaint regarding Hendricks, but the rst to men- tion Ford’s disability.
As a ma er of law, the rst two incidents simply do not show conduct “su ffi ciently severe or pervasive to have altered the conditions of her employment such that it created an abu- sive working environment.” Passananti v. Cook Cty ., 689 F.3d 655, 667 (7th Cir. 2012). At worst they amount to “[o] ffh and comments, isolated incidents, and simple teasing.” Id. Re- garding the employer liability prong, the overheard remark in September 2015 was not “su ffi ciently obvious” harassment to give the Sheri ffi ce constructive notice of disability har- assment. Hrobowski v. Worthington Steel Co ., 358 F.3d 473, 478 (7th Cir. 2004). Not until the wri en complaint in June 2016 was the Sheri ’s O ffi ce on notice that Ford believed Hen- dricks was harassing her based on her disability. The O ffi ce then took prompt action, transferring Hendricks out of the Visitation O ce the next month. This transfer defeats any claim that the O ce was negligent in addressing any known disability harassment by Hendricks . See Muhammad v. Cater- pillar, Inc ., 767 F.3d 694, 698 (7th Cir. 2014) (“Title VII requires 27 only that employers take action reasonably calculated to stop unlawful harassment … .”); Saxton , 10 F.3d at 535–36 (holding that transfer of the harasser is such an action). The district court did not err by granting summary judgment on the claim that the Sheri ce should be held liable for a hostile work environment created by Hendricks on the basis of disability.
3. Failures to Promote The nal category of claims resolved at summary judg- ment arose from four applications for promotion between March 2016 and February 2017. The district court assumed that the four positions would have been promotions for Ford, and we assume so as well. [11]
A failure to promote is a discrete act under employment discrimination laws, so each denied promotion can amount to a “separate actionable ‘unlawful employment practice.’” Mor- gan , 536 U.S. at 114. One way to prove a claim for a discrimi- natory failure to promote is for the plainti to show: (1) she belongs to a protected class, (2) she applied for and was qual- i ed for the position sought, (3) she was rejected for that po- sition, and (4) the employer granted the promotion to some- one outside of the protected group who was not be tt er quali- ed than the plainti . E.g., Grayson v. City of Chicago , 317 F.3d 745, 748 (7th Cir. 2003). Ford a tt empted this approach to proof, but that required her to compare herself to the success- ful applicant for each job. Only then would the burden of pro- duction shift to the Sheri ’s O ce to give non-discriminatory reasons for the promotion decisions, which Ford could rebut with evidence of pretext. See id .; McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792, 802–03 (1973); see generally St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks , 509 U.S. 502, 507–08 (1993) (describing the mechanics of burden-shifting in discrimination law).
Nearly all of Ford’s purported evidence of discrimination is irrelevant under these standards. Ford argues that the Sher- i ce treated Ladd, Wa s, Hendricks, and Johnson be er etc., … a plaintiff who alleges retaliation for having filed a charge with the EEOC need not file a second EEOC charge to sue for that retaliation”); see also Haugerud v. Amery School Dist ., 259 F.3d 678, 690 (7th Cir. 2001) (con- sidering merits of claims stemming from months after EEOC charge where “one would reasonably expect [the incidents] to be discovered dur- ing the course of an EEOC investigation into the allegations in the charge”). In this case, an investigation of the first denied promotion could reasonably be expected to have delved into the later denials that occurred in the next few months. There was no need for Ford to have filed a third EEOC charge alleging the later denials were also retaliatory.
than it treated her in various ways. But none of these individ- uals competed for the speci fi c promotions that Ford sought. Ford also discusses at length de fi ciencies she identi fi ed in the O ce’s ADA policies. An employer’s “general policy and practice with respect to minority employment” can be rele- vant evidence of pretext or discrimination, see McDonnell Douglas , 411 U.S. at 804–05; McCluney v. Joseph Schli tz Brewing Co ., 728 F.2d 924, 928 (7th Cir. 1984), and the same is true for disability discrimination. Yet such evidence must undercut the speci fi c justi fi cations given by the employer. General alle- gations of an “ongoing history of discrimination” are not enough to impugn a particular employment decision. Suble tt v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc ., 463 F.3d 731, 739 (7th Cir. 2006).
Ford identi fi ed four speci fi c rejections. In March 2016, she applied to become a clerk for the sex- and violent-o ender registry. Grider told Ford she was not selected because the di- vision commander wanted someone without disciplinary his- tory within the past year, which meant that Ford’s August 2015 reprimand disquali fi ed her. In the summer of 2016, Ford applied for an “HR Generalist” position. She received an in- terview but was denied the position. In October 2016, she ap- plied for an intelligence analyst position; she was denied an interview because of her “a tt endance history and/or disci- pline history.” In February 2017, Ford interviewed for two open analyst positions but was not hired.
The district court correctly found no material disputes of fact as to any of the promotion decisions. The record discloses li le about any of the people who were named to the jobs. Ford identi es no speci c person who fi lled the March 2016 opening. Ford identi ed the people chosen for the three later jobs but presented li le evidence about them beyond their names. All that we know comes from a single page of Ford’s declaration in opposition to summary judgment, which con- tains conclusory statements regarding the other applicants’ lack of merit. We agree with the district court that Ford did not present enough evidence about the jobs or how she com- pared to the other candidates to support an inference of dis- crimination.
The Sheri ’s O ffi ce also presented unrebu tt ed, non-dis- criminatory reasons for each decision. Ford’s disciplinary his- tory precluded her consideration for the March 2016 and Oc- tober 2016 positions, per Sheri ’s O ffi ce policy. Ford argues that this policy did not disqualify her, but she provided no evidence to substantiate the point. Cf. Hill v. Po tt er , 625 F.3d 998, 1004 (7th Cir. 2010) (explaining that a plainti “must do more than simply deny that the [neutral] Policy exists”). The HR Generalist position went to a candidate with superior Mi- crosoft O ce and Excel skills, a justi fi cation that Ford has not contested. Finally, the February 2017 analyst position simply went to a be er quali ed candidate, again according to unre- bu ed testimony from the Sheri ce. None of the alleged pretext evidence that Ford identi ed bore upon these speci c hiring decisions.
Ford argues that the promotion denials were also unlaw- ful retaliation, which as explained above is a separate theory for relief. Yet Ford has not shown, in the district court or on appeal, how her retaliation claims stand apart from her dis- crimination claims. She relies on the same evidence to support both. The district court treated the retaliation and discrimina- tion claims as co-extensive. It did not err by granting sum- mary judgment on each of the promotion claims.
B. Alleged Errors at Trial
Ford argues that we must remand for a new trial on her remaining claims because of evidentiary rulings by the dis- trict judge and an unnecessary jury instruction. Neither argu- ment is persuasive.
1. Excluded Background Evidence Ford argues that the district court denied her a fair trial on the two claims that went to trial—the alleged hostile environ- ment created by Ladd and Wa s, and the scheduling accom- modation she sought—by refusing to admit more back- ground evidence about her disability-related disputes with the Sheri ’s O ffi ce. We review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. E.g., Thompson v. City of Chicago , 722 F.3d 963, 971 (7th Cir. 2013). Even if we found such an abuse of discretion, we would order a new trial only if there were a signi cant chance that the ruling a ected the outcome of the trial. E.g., Smith v. Hunt , 707 F.3d 803, 808 (7th Cir. 2013).
Ford identi es four categories of excluded evidence that she argues amount to reversible error: (1) the “three choices” meeting in June 2013; (2) the details of the interactive process to identify an accommodation for her disability between June and September 2013; (3) the Sheri ’s O ce’s “general ani- mus” against the ADA during the interactive process; and (4) the O ce’s broken promise to train Ford’s supervisors.
The rst three categories underlie Ford’s claim that the vis- itation clerk job was not a reasonable accommodation. To the extent that Ford is just reiterating her objections to the grant of summary judgment on that claim, we have already ad- dressed her objections. Ford also argues, however, that these categories of evidence would have provided the jury context or background for her disability harassment and scheduling accommodation claims that did go to trial.
The Sheri ffi ce replies that Ford waived this argument when she herself moved in limine to prohibit the O ce from “entering evidence relating to claims … on which the Court granted summary judgment.” But the court’s order on the motions in limine was “not a fi nal ruling regarding the admis- sibility of the evidence at issue” and, by its own terms, left parties free to “request a sidebar conference during the appro- priate point in the trial.” Ford did not waive the issue; she did raise her objections at trial.
Ford has not shown an abuse of discretion, however. The district court evenhandedly enforced a rule that only conduct after October 2013, when Ford began working with Ladd and Wa s in the Visitation O ce, was relevant to the harassment claim at trial. That was a reasonable way to keep the trial fo- cused on the disputes the jury would actually need to decide. We doubt that evidence from before the alleged disability har- assment began could fairly sway the outcome of a hostile work environment claim. In addition, Ford herself took ad- vantage of the district court’s time limit. Before trial, she ob- jected to exhibits concerning her disciplinary history and t- ness for duty from outside this time period, and the court sus- tained those objections. Ford referred at trial to the “relevant time period” and asked for evidence of earlier events to be excluded. The rst three categories of evidence that Ford ar- gues should have been admi ed re fl ect the application of this neutral time limit to her, and we nd no abuse of discretion. [12] Ford’s fourth category fares no be er for a more basic rea- son. Ford states that the district court excluded evidence that the Sheri ’s O ce “failed to abide by its own agreement to provide ‘training to [Ford’s] supervisors regarding [Ford’s] condition.’” But the district court admi ed the evidence on this subject. During Ford’s direct examination of Lieutenant Wal- terman, the district court initially paused this line of question- ing, but later allowed it to go forward—over the objection of the Sheri ce. Another of Ford’s supervisors also testi- ed that he lacked much training on the ADA.
This case illustrates the challenges of managing a trial after a partial grant of summary judgment. In a typical example from employment discrimination law, a trial on a retaliation claim might follow a grant of summary judgment on a distinct claim for discrimination based on an earlier event. The court must allow jurors to learn enough about the alleged discrimi- nation so that they can understand the retaliation claim. At the same time, the court must keep the jurors focused on the claim actually before them, avoiding a full trial-within-a-trial on the underlying discrimination claim. For this reason, we allow district judges to exclude extraneous evidence relevant only to the discrimination claim. See, e.g., Abuelyaman v. Illinois State Univ ., 667 F.3d 800, 810 n.5 (7th Cir. 2011). More gener- ally, we a ord trial judges “wide latitude” in making these had a duty to keep out irrelevant evidence, notwithstanding passing ref- erences to other accommodations Ford was receiving. See Houlihan v. City of Chicago , 871 F.3d 540, 553 (7th Cir. 2017) (“the Rules of Evidence do not simply evaporate when one party opens the door on an issue”). Even where one party has “opened the door” to evidence that would otherwise stay out, whether and to what degree to allow rebuttal are matters com- mitted to the trial judge’s discretion, which may consider the need to keep the trial focused on relevant evidence and issues.
sorts of relevance determinations. Hasham v. California State Bd. of Equalization , 200 F.3d 1035, 1050 (7th Cir. 2000). The dis- trict court acted well within that discretion here.
2. Jury Instruction No. 20 Ford’s nal argument relates to Jury Instruction 20, which stated in full: “The ADA does not entitle a disabled employee to the accommodation of her choice. Rather, the law entitles her to a reasonable accommodation in view of her disability and her employer’s needs.” Ford does not contend that this instruction provided an inaccurate statement of law, nor could she. See Rehling v. City of Chicago , 207 F.3d 1009, 1014 (7th Cir. 2000); see also Seventh Circuit Pa ern Civil Jury In- structions 4.07(a) (2017 rev.). Ford instead argues that the presence of Jury Instruction 20 implied that she was given a choice among di erent accommodations, when in fact the Sheri ce denied her request for a schedule accommo- dation, full stop.
Ford argues, in other words, that Jury Instruction 20 was extraneous and therefore prejudicial. It is true that “a jury should not be instructed on a defense for which there is so li le evidentiary support that no rational jury could accept the defense.” Eastern Trading Co. v. Refco, Inc ., 229 F.3d 617, 621 (7th Cir. 2000). When a losing party complains of such sur- plusage in the jury instructions, “reversal requires a showing that the jury probably was confused.” Id. at 622. We have said that “[t]he requirement of prejudice is critical” in such cases because we must a ord district judges discretion to submit even marginal issues to the jury. Burzla v. Thoroughbred Mo- torsports, Inc ., 758 F.3d 841, 849 (7th Cir. 2014).
Ford cannot show prejudice here. Her concerns bear on the unreasonable hardship prong, under which the Sheri ’s O ce could refuse to provide an otherwise reasonable ac- commodation. The jury’s special verdict found that Ford had failed to show the schedule change was a reasonable accom- modation in the rst place. Testimony that the rotating sched- ule was actually more predictable and e ective cross-exami- nation of Ford’s doctor provided evidence supporting the jury’s verdict. The jury thus did not reach the undue hardship issue, so we are con dent that Instruction 20’s correct state- ment of the law did not unfairly a ect the outcome of the trial.
Conclusion
The district court properly granted partial summary judg- ment as to some of plainti ’s claims and then exercised its dis- cretion fairly to manage the trial on the remaining claims. The judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
[1] Ford received a “letter of reprimand,” while Hendricks received only a “letter of caution,” because Ford unlike Hendricks had prior disciplinary history. Specifically, Ford had been reprimanded for an incident on Janu- ary 7, 2013 not otherwise relevant to this case.
[2] It appears that at some point in July or August 2015, Shanklin re- placed Nesbitt as lieutenant for the visitation clerks. The parties do not discuss this second change in supervisors.
[3] The ADA incorporates by reference the enforcement provisions of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a), so Morgan guides our decision on Ford’s ADA claims.
[4] The Sheriff’s Office does not contend that any part of Ford’s lawsuit was time-barred. Ford filed her first of two charges of discrimination with the EEOC in March 2015.
[5] Ford relies on a statement from the unpublished second ruling in Bright to discount these rulings: “A hostile work environment is actionable as sex discrimination; there are not distinct ‘claims’ for hostile work envi- ronment and sex discrimination.” 342 F. App’x 208, 209 (7th Cir. 2009). Quoted out of context, this statement seems to contradict the Supreme Court’s holding in Morgan that “[h]ostile environment claims are different in kind from discrete acts.” 536 U.S. at 115. But the second ruling in Bright dealt with an unusual circumstance where the district court had narrowly limited the issues for retrial. Our non-precedential order did not declare, and could not have declared, that all employment discrimination claims must succeed or fail as one at summary judgment.
[6] The First, Third, Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits have assumed without deciding that such claims are possible. See Murray v. Warren Pumps, Inc ., 821 F.3d 77, 86 n.1 (1st Cir. 2016); Walton v. Mental Health Ass’n of Southeastern Pennsylvania , 168 F.3d 661, 666–67 (3d Cir. 1999); Brown v. City of Tucson , 336 F.3d 1181, 1190 (9th Cir. 2003); Cooper v. CLP Corp .,
[7] Ford also alleges a possible incident in September 2015, but the Sher- iff’s Office did not have notice of it, as we discuss below regarding the merits of the summary judgment order.
[8] Although EEOC interpretive guidance does not receive deference under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. , 467 U.S. 837 (1984), it does “reflect a body of experience and informed judg- ment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance” and is therefore “entitled to a measure of respect.” Richardson v. Chicago Transit
[9] See Mannie v. Potter , 394 F.3d at 982; Fox v. General Motors , 247 F.3d at 177; see also 1 Janet Arterton & Gary Phelan, Disability Discrimination in the Workplace § 2:18 n.8 (2019) (surveying circuits).
[10] An employer can still avoid strict liability for a supervisor’s harass- ment if it did not involve a “tangible employment action” and the em- ployer can prove an affirmative defense. See Jackson v. County of Racine , 474 F.3d 493, 501 (7th Cir. 2007), citing Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth , 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
[11] The Sheriff’s Office argues that Ford exhausted her administrative remedies only as to the first of the four denied promotions, which was the only one that preceded her second EEOC charge, filed March 15, 2016. The three later denials occurred after she filed that second EEOC charge. We disagree with this defense. Ford alleged the three later denials were in part retaliation against her earlier ADA-protected activity. We have long held that an employment-discrimination plaintiff can include in her court com- plaint allegations of discrimination that are “like or reasonably related to” the allegations in her EEOC charge, which typically means the new claims must describe the same conduct and implicate the same individuals as those in the charge. E.g., Cheek v. Western and Southern Life Ins. Co ., 31 F.3d 497, 501 (7th Cir. 1994). More specifically, we have long held that a plaintiff need not file a new charge alleging post-charge retaliation by the em- ployer. E.g., Malhotra v. Cotter & Co. , 885 F.2d 1305, 1312 (7th Cir. 1989) (“we join the other circuits that have spoken to the question in adopting the rule that a separate administrative charge is not prerequisite to a suit complaining about retaliation for filing the first charge”), superseded by statute on other grounds; McKenzie v. Illinois Dep’t of Transportation , 92 F.3d 473, 482–83 (7th Cir. 1996) (collecting cases); Luevano v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc ., 722 F.3d 1014, 1030 (7th Cir. 2013) (“to avoid futile procedural technicalities and endless loops of charge/retaliation/charge/retaliation,
[12] We do not find persuasive Ford’s alternative argument that the Sheriff’s Office opened the door to such evidence. The district judge still