568 S.E.2d 574 | Ga. Ct. App. | 2002
Joseph Walter Bridges pled guilty to a burglary charge on November 3, 1998, in Douglas County and was given a twenty-year sentence; he was ordered to serve eight of the twenty-year sentence in confinement. After sentencing, he remained in the Douglas County jail awaiting transfer to a state prison facility. After about three days, Bridges was transferred to the Newton County jail on a superior court bench warrant in an unrelated case. The paperwork sent with Bridges stated that he was “under sentence requiring state time to be served.” About a week after being transferred to the Newton County facility, Bridges was allowed to post bond on the Newton County charge. Once Bridges posted bond, he was given his possessions and left the jail without incident.
A short time later, Douglas County received calls that Bridges was out of jail. The bondsman could not find Bridges at any of the addresses he gave to the bonding company. On December 3, 1998, an investigator with the Metro Fugitive Squad began searching for
Bridges was charged in Newton County with escape. After a jury trial, he was convicted of the charge. He appeals from the conviction, claiming: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict because there was no evidence showing that he had criminal intent to commit escape or that his departure was unauthorized; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion for directed verdict of acquittal when the state failed to show that he escaped from the state’s custody within the layperson’s meaning of the word “escape”; and (3) the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial because the state presented prejudicial testimony in violation of a motion in limine. Each of these arguments is without merit, so we affirm the conviction.
1. On appeal, a defendant no longer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict.
A person commits the offense of escape when he, having been convicted of a felony, intentionally escapes from lawful custody or from any place of lawful confinement.
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “escape” in several ways, such as “[a]n unlawful departure from legal custody without the use of force,” or “[a] prisoner’s departure from legal custody as a result of an officer’s negligence.”
Similarly, Webster’s New International Dictionary defines “escape” as “[t]he unlawful departure of a prisoner from the limits of his custody . . . often . . . without prison breach, being called negligent when without the custodian’s consent and voluntary when with
We are not persuaded by Bridges’ argument that there was no escape because jail officials authorized his departure. First, the fact that a custodian’s negligence may have made his premature departure possible does not mean there was no escape.
Nor are we convinced that a lack of evidence showing criminal intent mandates reversal. Criminal intent may be inferred from all of the circumstances connected with the act for which the accused is being prosecuted.
Here, the jury could have found from the evidence presented that when Bridges walked away from state custody, he knew that his eight-year sentence imposed just days earlier had not yet been served. Moreover, criminal intent to avoid lawful confinement could be inferred from the fact that Bridges gave the bondsman inaccurate information regarding his anticipated residence and place of employment, that he could not be found at any of the addresses given, and that he could not be found by the fugitive squad for over a year. Contrary to Bridges’ contention, a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime of escape beyond a reasonable doubt.
2. The denial of a motion for directed verdict of acquittal should be affirmed if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
3. We reject Bridges’ claim that the trial court’s denial of his motion for mistrial based on a violation of his motion in limine warrants reversal.
Before trial, Bridges filed three motions in limine. He sought to: (1) restrict the state’s witnesses from discussing the factual circumstances surrounding the underlying burglary conviction; (2) prohibit the state from allowing its witnesses to use the word “escape” and from eliciting from witnesses an opinion as to the ultimate issue — whether Bridges did, in fact, escape; and (3) prohibit the state from introducing any evidence regarding what actions the Metro Fugitive Squad took to take him back into custody after he left the jail, other than the circumstances immediately surrounding his arrest. The trial court granted the first motion, and granted in part and denied in part the second motion. The trial court denied the third motion, which is the one at issue on appeal, finding that evidence regarding the fugitive squad’s efforts to find Bridges was relevant to the issue of Bridges’ knowledge and intent concerning whether he was lawfully out of jail.
At trial, the state asked an investigator with the Metro Fugitive Squad about the fugitive squad’s procedures in locating fugitives. The witness summarized the squad’s information-gathering process, and the state asked the investigator if he had some or all of that information available to him when he was looking for Bridges. The investigator unresponsively remarked that “Mr. Bridges had been chased by our squad before. In fact, when he was caught and sent to Douglas County on the sentence that he had there —.” Defense counsel objected to this testimony and moved for a mistrial.
This unsolicited testimony, while it may have been objectionable on other grounds, did not violate the trial court’s ruling on the motion in limine, inasmuch as the only motion in limine which was even remotely related to this testimony had been denied. Bridges has not enumerated as error the trial court’s denial of the motion in limine, nor has he enumerated any other error related to the investigator’s testimony. Accordingly, no other issues will be addressed.
Judgment affirmed.
Moten v. State, 252 Ga. App. 222 (1) (554 SE2d 553) (2001).
Id.
Id.
OCGA § 16-10-52.
Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed. 1999), p. 564.
Id.
Id.
Webster’s New Inti. Dictionary (2nd ed. 1959), p. 871.
See Johnson v. State, 246 Ga. 126, 128 (V) (269 SE2d 18) (1980); Holt v. State, 143 Ga. App. 438, 439 (1) (238 SE2d 763) (1977); Black’s Law Dictionary, supra.
Dunn v. State, 248 Ga. App. 223, 226 (2) (546 SE2d 27) (2001).
See Woods v. State, 232 Ga. App. 367, 368 (1) (501 SE2d 832) (1998).
Dunn, supra.
See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979); see generally Holt, supra.
Miller v. State, 233 Ga. App. 814, 816 (2) (506 SE2d 136) (1998).
See generally Gay v. State, 233 Ga. App. 738, 740 (3) (505 SE2d 29) (1998).