158 Ga. 886 | Ga. | 1924
Lead Opinion
(After stating the foregoing facts.)
When the documentary evidence set forth in the statement of facts was offered in evidence the plaintiffs objected to its admission, on the grounds: (1) That the return of appraisers recited the name of the deceased to be J. L. Brownlee, and not C. L. Brownlee; (2) that the order providing for citation was without date and specified the deceased to be C. L. Brownlee and the beneficiaries to be Florence Brownlee and six minors; (3) that the judgment of the ordinary was void for the reason that it contained no date, nor does it appear therefrom that it was signed in the regular term of the court of ordinary or at chambers; (4) that the description contained in said return of appraisers, being “50 acres, more or less,” was too indefinite and uncertain. The grounds of objection were overruled. The first objection, that the name of the deceased is recited to be “J. L.” instead of C. L. Brownlee in the return of the appraisers, is without merit, in view of evidence introduced showing that the letter J was used for the letter C by mistake, and that the return of the appraisers dealt with the estate of C. L. Brownlee, the decedent, and set apart the same for the purposes indicated in the return.
The second and third exceptions to the evidence are also without merit. The fact that the order providing for citation was without date, and that the number of minors should have been
The fourth objection is that “the description contained in said return of appraisers, being ‘50 acres, more or less/ is too indefinite and uncertain to afford a basis for recovery.” In the case of McSwain v. Ricketson, 129 Ga. 176 (58 S. E. 655), it was said: “The judgment setting apart the year’s support being, in effect, a conveyance to her of the interest of her deceased husband in the property, the description of the property must be such as to render it capable of identification. If the description is so vague and indefinite that the property cannot be identified, the title to the estate is not divested by the judgment setting apart a year’s support. That certainty which is required in a deed, or other conveyance, is also required in a judgment setting apart a year’s support, certainly so far as land is concerned. If the judgment now in question had purported on its face to have set apart all of the property, or all of the lands, of the deceased, parol evidence would have been admissible to show what lands were owned by the deceased. But there is nothing in the judgment to indicate that it was the intention of the commissioners to set apart the entire estate.” And a similar doctrine is laid down in other eases. In the instant case the decedent owned as much as 75 acres of land; and it appears as a fact established in this record that 25 acres of this land, subsequently to the date of the judgment approving the return of the appraisers, was ordered to be sold, because a sale was necessary for the purpose of paying the debts of the estate.
But while the return of the appraisers in the present case was defective in the respect pointed out, we are further of the opinion that the amendment to the return of the appraisers was admissible in evidence, and, having been admitted, it cured the defect. The return of the appraisers was not entirely void; it had the effect of setting apart as a part of the year’s support certain articles of personalty; and the defective description of the land which the appraisers attempted to set apart could be amended, and was amended. The introduction in evidence of the amendment was objected to upon the grounds, that the original return of the appraisers and the judgment based thereon were void; that the petition to amend the return of the appraisers and the judgment
Judgment affirmed.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting. The -item in the return of the appraisers setting apart a year’s support, which designates a tract of land merely as “50 acres, more or less, $250,” is too vague and indefinite in description to be capable of enforcement; and the return of the appraisers is not subject to amendment after there has been a judgment entered upon their return. In my opinion, the failure to date the order for citation, and the order and judgment of the ordinary being without any date at which it purported to have been rendered, as well as the fact that the number of minors for whose benefit in part the year’s support was being-allowed exceeded the number of minors actually in existence, and the further fact that no notice of the application to amend the return had been given, required that the amendment tendered in evidence should be rejected.