110 Ala. 274 | Ala. | 1895
Lead Opinion
Bill in equity by Leo Tritsch, a shareholder of the Bridgeport Development Company, against that company and its officers and directors, and the National Park Bank, for the' appointment of a receiver of the assets of the company, an accounting from other'defendants for assets misappropriated, to enjoin the enforcement of a large judgment obtained by the National Park Bank against the company and for general relief. The appeal is by the defendants from the order of the chancellor affirming the appointment of a receiver made by the register.
The Bridgeport Development Company is a body corporate organized, under the general laws of Alabama in October, 1891, to buy and sell real estate ; erect buildings, and sell or rent the same, and to have, enjoy and exercise the powers conferred upon such corporations by Chap. 2, Title 1, Part 2 of the Code of Alabama. The bj^-laws of the company provide that its business shall be to purchase, hold and possess real estate and buildings in the city of Bridgeport, Ala., and to sell at pub-
The complainant afterwards amended his bill, and alleged that the defendant company was projected and organized by the officers and directors of said Bridgeport Land and Improvement Company for the purpose of selling a part of its real estate in Bridgeport, and on November 3, 1891, the defendant company by said Aldhouse, its vice-president, entered into a contract with the improvement Company, through said Olcott, its president, for the purchase of 900 additional lots in Bridgport, 300 lots having been theretofore sold to defendant company, for which the defendant company agreed to pay $225,000, and the selling company undertook to convey said lots to defendant company by proper warranty deed, upon payment of the purchase money as stipulated in a written agreement exhibited with the amended bill, at the time of which agreement, it was well known to said Ol-cott and Aldhouse and the other officers and directors of both said companies,'that said Improvement Company, the vendor, had no title to about 200 of said lots, but that the same were subject to a lien for the purchase money due to the person or persons from whom the said Improvement Company had bought the same, and that that company had no power to convey the same, but they, in disregard of their obligation to the stockholders, subsequently accepted a deed from the Improvement Company and undertook and agreed to pay it the full contract price for said lots. That after the acceptance of said deed, the defendant company issued to said Im-pi-ovement Company paid up stock to the amount of $119,000, in payment for said 200 lots at $250 apiece, and of a balance due for the other lots sold to defendant
We have thus condensed the phraseology of the bill, and set forth the several grievances complained of as causes for the appointment of a receiver, in order that they may appear as concisely as practicable, and their bearing upon the question of the appointment of a receiver made plain. It will be remembered that this appeal involves nothing but the question of the propriety of the appointment of a receiver. ' The complainant must, therefore, show by his bill not only some equitable ground of relief, but that a receivership is necessary in furtherance of that relief. Although the bill may contain equity, yet if the relief sought may be as well obtained without disturbing the possession of the property involved, it is most clear a receiver will not be allowed. Again, in Roman v. Woolfolk, 98 Ala. 219, we stated some principles which govern the appointment of receivers. We need not repeat what we there said, except to say, that a minority of stockholders will not be permitted to displace corporate authority and control, by substituting therefor the policy, management and control of the courts, except in plain cases of such fraud or maladministration as works manifest oppression or wrong to them, and, we will add, when the displacement of corporate control plainly appears to neces
Upon examination of the allegations of the bill, all of which we have herein substantially set forth, it will be seen that not a grievance is charged which did not occur long prior to the election of the present board of directors, and at a time, as we have seen, when only two of the five members of the present board were in office, except the following, if when properly analyzed it can be called a grievance, viz. : That the company is insolvent and unable to «carry on its business, and that it became, and, for at least two years last past, has been the duty of its directors, trustees and managers to wind up its affairs and prevent further loss ; but they have failed to take any steps looking to a winding up thereof, as a [art of the wrongful, unlawful and fraudulent scheme and conspiracy to prevent their misdeeds coming to light and to prevent their being called to justice and account for the same, and to enable the property of the company to be slaughtered and purchased by themselves, or their interest, to the exclusion of the stockholders.
Reversed, rendered and remanded.
Rehearing
ON Application pop Rehearing.
In our former opinion we considered the
As set forth in the former opinion, the bill makes many charges of negligence and misconduct on the part ol those in control and management of the Development Company. We have examined the answers and affidavits of the respondents and others in their behalf, and find them to contain, in the main, only very general denials of any of the charges, and express admissions of the most important ones. The record establishes the fact that the Development Company was projected, promoted and organized by the officers and others managing and controlling the Bridgeport Land & Improvement Company — a body corporate already organized and owning a large body of land, at Bridgeport. That company, it seems, paid Cunningham and Henry Morgenthan 150 city lots to organize the Development Company. Olcott was president of the .Improvement Company, and Aid-house was made vice-president of the Development
We thus have a general'view of the status of the company when it began business, and the field of administration which lay before it. The subsequent administration, occupying the time from October, 1891, to October, 1894, is the subject matter of the complainant’s
It is again admitted that to secure money borrowed
Upon these considerations, ■ we are constrained to grant the application for a rehearing. Our former judgment of reversal will be set aside, and a judgment here rendered affirming the order sustaining the appointment of the receiver.
Affirmed. .