Bridgeforth v. StateBridgeforth v. State
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Samford, Bricken
INTOXICATING LIQUORS 230(4) —PROSECUTION—EVIDENCE—FOUNDATION.
In prosecution for violation of prohibition law, testimony of two witnesses for the state that accused was in possession of the premises where they found liquor sufficiently connected accused with both the premises and the possession of the liquor to render their testimony admissible, notwithstanding testimony of several witnesses for accused that she was not in possession of such premises.- INTOXICATING LIQUORS
238(2) —PROSECUTION—QUESTION FOR JURY.
In prosecution for violation of prohibition law, testimony of state‘s witnesses as to finding liquor on accused‘s premises held sufficient to go to the jury and, if believed, to convict. - CRIMINAL LAW
1121(2) —APPEAL—RECORD—REFUSAL OF AFFIRMATIVE CHARGE.
Where all the evidence is not set out in the record, error cannot be predicated upon refusal to give the general affirmative charge for accused, since the appellate court will presume that omitted evidence justified such refusal.
Bricken, J., dissenting.
Appeal from Law and Equity Court, Morgan County; Thomas W. Wert, Judge.
Alice Bridgeforth was convicted of violating the prohibition law, and appeals. Affirmed.
H. V. Cashin, of Decatur, for appellant. W. L. Martin, Atty. Gen., and P. W. Turner, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
BRICKEN, J. After a careful consideration of this case, I have reached the conclusion that the court should have directed a verdict for the defendant as requested in writing. But the other members of the court do not concur in this conclusion, their views being stated by SAMFORD, J., and in accordance therewith the judgment of the lower court must be affirmed. My views are as follows:
The defendant was convicted for the offense of violating the prohibition law. A careful examination of the entire case fails to disclose any evidence, the tendency of which connects the defendant with either of the offenses charged in the affidavit. There was no evidence offered on the trial, nor was there any attempt to show that the defendant sold, offered for sale, or otherwise disposed of prohibited liquors. The evidence of the state consisted solely in the testimony of the officers who found some whisky buried in a barn in the city of Decatur. The barn was in the same neighborhood where the defendant lived and conducted her restaurant, but there was no testimony that in any manner connected the defendant with either the control or possession of this whisky, nor the control or possession of the premises upon which it was found.
The measure of proof in this case, as in all criminal cases, is that the evidence must satisfy the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of one of the offenses comprehended in the affidavit. There was no such evidence in the instant case, and nothing in the case upon which a verdict of guilty could be predicated.
Opinion of the Court.
SAMFORD, J. The defendant was charged with a violation of the prohibition law, was tried, convicted, and from the judgment of conviction she appeals.
On the trial, J. V. Mays, a witness for the state, testified as follows: That some time last January he made a raid on the premises of defendant on Bank street, in Decatur, Ala., and found 12 quart bottles of whisky, in the barn at the back of her restaurant, buried in the ground in the barn; that it was the barn on her premises, right back of where she lived and ran a restaurant; that the barn was occupied by her; that she had a horse and buggy in the barn, and it was in this barn that he found the whisky; that the north side of the barn was separated from the south side by a hog wire fence; that there was a hole in this wire partition fence; and that witness went through this hole into the south side of the barn, and it was on the south side of the barn that he found the whisky. J. A. Forman, another witness for the state, testified that he was the sheriff of Morgan county; that on or about the 15th of January, 1916, he made a raid on the defendant‘s premises on Bank street, in Decatur, Ala., in Morgan county, and found a quantity of whisky in a barn at the back of the defendant‘s house where she kept a restaurant; that there was a barn about 30 feet wide at the back of the place; he went in the north part of the barn and then through a hole in the wire partition between the two sides of the barn to the south side of the barn, where he found the whisky; that it was buried in the ground, covered with dirt and dust; that there were 12 quart bottles and more; that the defendant was in possession of the premises, and she had an old carriage, and a horse was in the barn also; it was her horse.
The defendant‘s testimony tended to show that the south side of the barn was not in the possession of the defendant, but that it was owned by the estate of one Lampkin, and was at the time of the raid in the possession of the Lampkin estate.
[1] The bill of exceptions then states that the state introduced a copy of an application for writ of injunction by defendant to Morgan county law and equity court, during the year 1912, to restrain and enjoin A. B. Lampkin for the rental of the property upon which the said whisky was found, but the copy of the application for the writ does not anywhere appear in the record. The defendant objected to the introduction of this document,
The copy of the application for a writ of injunction not being in this record, we cannot pass upon the question as to whether or not it was properly excluded.
[2, 3] The court did not err in refusing to give the general affirmative charge as requested in writing by the defendant, for two reasons: In the first place, the testimony of the two witnesses examined by the state was sufficient to go to the jury, and, if believed by the jury, to support a verdict of conviction; and, second, it affirmatively appears that all of the evidence before the trial court is not set out in the record, and therefore this court will presume that the document omitted in itself was sufficient to justify a refusal of the general affirmative charge as requested.
We find no error in the record, and the judgment of the lower court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
BRICKEN, J., dissenting.
CRIMINAL LAW 678(1) —ELECTION BETWEEN ACTS CHARGED.
Where there is only one count in an indictment for violation of the prohibition law, the state may be required to elect which transaction it will rely on for conviction, where witnesses testify to several sales of intoxicating liquors.- INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION
132(2) —ELECTION OF OFFENSE BY STATE—ALTERNATIVE ACTS CONSTITUTING A VIOLATION.
Under an indictment for selling, offering for sale, keeping for sale, or having in possession for sale intoxicating liquors, the state cannot be required to elect under which alternative it would proceed;Acts 1915, p. 30, § 29 1/2 , authorizing an indictment to state in the alternative several acts of a kindred nature that constitute a violation of the statute.
Appeal from Circuit Court, Coosa County; S. L. Brewer, Judge.
William Joyner was convicted of violation of the prohibition law, and he appeals. Affirmed.
Certiorari denied 201 Ala. 696, 77 South. 1000.
Riddle & Riddle, of Talladega, for appellant. W. L. Martin, Atty. Gen., and P. W. Turner, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
BRICKEN, J. The indictment under which the defendant was tried and convicted contained one count only, and was as follows:
The grand jury of said county charge that, before the finding of this indictment, William Joyner sold, offered for sale, kept for sale, had in his possession for sale, or otherwise unlawfully disposed of spirituous, vinous, or malt liquors contrary to law, etc.
[1] On the trial of the case, the state introduced three witnesses, each of whom testified that they had bought whisky from the defendant at different times, but within the period covered by the indictment. At the conclusion of the state‘s testimony, the defendant moved the court to require the state to elect on which transaction the defendant was being tried. This motion was granted, and properly so, as the indictment contained only one count, and, notwithstanding the several alternative averments, but one conviction could have been had under this single count in the indictment charging different violations of the prohibition law in the alternative; and the state elected to prosecute on the transaction as testified to by Moses Jacobs, the first witness introduced by the state.
[2] Thereupon the defendant again moved the court to require the state to elect under which alternative of the indictment they would prosecute defendant. The court denied this motion, and refused to require the state to elect under which alternative of the indictment it would proceed, and to this action of the court the defendant duly excepted. This motion was properly denied. Beason v. State, 72 Ala. 191; Herring v. State, 75 South. 646.1 The witness Moses Jacobs only testified to one transaction, to wit, the purchase from the defendant of one-half pint of whisky for which the witness paid 50 cents; the whisky being purchased in the defendant‘s place of business, where he sold soft drinks and other articles of merchandise, in Goodwater, Ala.
Under the law, when the court required the state to rely on a single transaction, the defendant received full benefit of the doctrine of election, and was not entitled to require the state to elect on which alternative averment in the indictment it would rely. To so hold would emasculate the statute authorizing the indictment to state in the alternative several acts of a kindred nature that constitute a violation of the statute.