Bridgefield Casualty Insurance Company v. The Cincinnati Insurance CompanyBridgefield Casualty Insurance Company v. The Cincinnati Insurance Company
In this insurance dispute, Plaintiff Bridgefield Casualty Insurance Company sues Defendant The Cincinnati Insurance Company for equitable subrogation and equitable contribution. Pending before the Court are the parties’ cross motions: Plaintiff Bridgefield Casualty Insurance Company‘s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 142) and Defendant The Cincinnati Insurance Company‘s Motion for Final Summary Judgment (Doc. 143). The parties filed responses in opposition (Docs. 154, 155) and replies (Docs. 157, 158). Upon due consideration of the parties’ submissions, including the Stipulation of Agreed Material Facts (Doc. 160), deposition transcripts, affidavits, memoranda of counsel and accompanying exhibits, and for the reasons that follow, Cincinnati Insurance Company‘s Motion for Final Summary Judgment (Doc.
I. BACKGROUND AND FACTS1
A. Stipulated Facts
This action arises from a personal injury claim and underlying lawsuit (the “underlying lawsuit“) following an accident at a construction site on December 12, 2019, in which Jasmine Juarez was injured. Doc. 160 ¶ 1. On that date, Ms. Juarez was an employee of Juarez Concrete Solutions Corporation (“Juarez Concrete“). Id. ¶ 2. Juarez Concrete was a subcontractor of C-Squared Certified General Contractor, Inc. (“C-Squared“) for an intersection improvement project in Charlotte County, Florida (the “Project“). Id. The subcontract is dated July 12, 2019. See Doc. 145-7. C-Squared was the general contractor on the Project. Id.; see also Doc. 160 ¶ 3. While delivering concrete to one of the Project‘s job sites, Ms. Juarez was injured when a Caterpillar Track Loader (the “Loader“) operated by John Yoho, a C-Squared employee working in the course and scope of his employment, collided with her. Doc. 160 ¶ 4. Ms. Juarez was working in the course and scope of her employment with Juarez Concrete at the time of the accident. Id.
Cincinnati contends that, on February 19, 2019, C-Squared requested cancellation of the umbrella coverage part of the Cincinnati Policy, which was effectuated as of that same date. Doc. 160 ¶ 7. Cincinnati‘s responses to requests for admission served in January 2025 admitted that an umbrella policy was issued to C-Squared bearing policy number ENP 051 26 42/EBA 0512642 with a policy period of January 1, 2019 to January 1, 2020, and that the umbrella policy generally provided excess/umbrella coverage to C-Squared pursuant to the terms and conditions of the policy. Id. Cincinnati, in its December 23, 2019 reservation of rights letter, referenced “pertinent sections” of the umbrella policy and did not reference any cancellation or cancellation provision. Id. The Settlement Agreement, to which Cincinnati was not a party, but which Cincinnati reviewed and provided comments on, states in ¶ 10 that Cincinnati issued commercial general and umbrella liability insurance policies to C-Squared that were in effect on the accident date. Id.
C-Squared is a Florida company subject to the provisions of Florida Statutes, Title XXXI, Chapter 440, including Florida Statutes 440.10 and 440.11. Doc. 160 ¶ 9. Messrs. Yoho and Floyd are not employers of Ms. Juarez. Id. ¶ 10.
Cincinnati received notice of the accident on the date it happened—December 12, 2019. Id. ¶ 11; see also Doc. 145-8. On December 23, 2019, Cincinnati issued a reservation of rights letter to C-Squared. Doc. 160 ¶ 12; Docs. 142-4; 145-9. Around March 2020, Cincinnati assigned William Boltrek as defense counsel on behalf of C-Squared, Mr. John Yoho, and Mr. Larry Floyd. Doc. 160 ¶ 13. Mr. Boltrek was later replaced by attorney Michael Reed, who filed an appearance on behalf of all three defendants (C-Squared, Yoho, and Floyd) in the underlying lawsuit. Id.; see also Doc. 142-5 (Cincinnati‘s claim notes between December 2019 and September 2020).
On September 2, 2020, Ms. Juarez made a time-limit settlement demand of $1 million to resolve her claims against C-Squared and its employees via letter to Mr. Boltrek (the “Demand“). Doc. 160 ¶ 14; Doc. 145-10 at 2–3. The Demand was supplemented on September 22, 2020, with additional damage and investigation information. Doc. 160 ¶ 14; Doc. 145-10 at 4–5. On September 24, 2020, Cincinnati‘s coverage counsel, David Glenny, provided a copy of the Demand to Bridgefield via letter. Doc. 160 ¶ 15; Doc 142-3; Doc. 145-11.
On September 25, 2020, Mr. Boltrek informed counsel for Ms. Juarez via letter that Cincinnati‘s coverage counsel stated “that there is no coverage for the incident under the Commercial General Liability Policy.” Doc. 160 ¶ 17; Doc. 145-12. On September 29, 2020, Cincinnati declined Ms. Juarez‘s Demand via letter to counsel for Ms. Juarez. Doc. 160 ¶ 18; Doc. 142-6; Doc. 145-13.
On October 14, 2020, Ms. Juarez filed the underlying lawsuit, asserting causes of action for: (1) gross negligence against John Yoho; (2) gross negligence against Larry Floyd; and (3) vicarious liability against C-Squared. Doc. 160 ¶ 19; Docs. 142-7; 145-5 (Juarez Complaint). On October 14, 2020, Bridgefield denied C-Squared‘s demand for defense and indemnity for Ms. Juarez‘s claim under the Bridgefield Policy, asserting, among other issues, that Ms. Juarez was not an employee of C-Squared. Doc. 160 ¶ 20; Doc. 145-14 (denial letter). On October 22, 2020, C-Squared renewed its request for defense and indemnity under the Bridgefield Policy via letter from Mr. Reed. Doc. 160 ¶ 21; Doc. 145-15. On October 28, 2020, Bridgefield again denied
On February 1, 2021, C-Squared, Mr. Yoho, and Mr. Floyd filed a joint answer in the underlying lawsuit. Doc. 160 ¶ 23. On February 3, 2021, Ms. Juarez and C-Squared entered a Settlement Agreement (the “Settlement Agreement” or ”Coblentz Agreement).2 Doc. 160 ¶ 24; Docs. 142-8; 155-6; 145-17. Cincinnati, through coverage counsel, provided comments and suggested edits to the Settlement Agreement before it was finalized. Doc. 160 ¶ 25; see also Docs. 142-9–142-11.
Bridgefield was not notified of the Settlement Agreement before it was finalized. Doc. 160 ¶ 26. The Settlement Agreement provides that the parties to the Settlement Agreement (Ms. Juarez and C-Squared) agreed that (i) if the $1,000,000.00 demand was promptly tendered by Bridgefield, Ms. Juarez would have accepted the same in exchange for a full release of C-Squared and Messrs. Yoho and Floyd; (ii) the “facts represented herein” were “intended to be truthful and that each party [wa]s relying on the statements made by the other party/parties to th[e] Agreement as inducement to resolve the claims“; (iii) “The Cincinnati Insurance Company . . . issued commercial
As required under Paragraph 4 of the Settlement Agreement, C-Squared assigned “all of its rights against Bridgefield” to Ms. Juarez via the Assignment Agreement (Doc. 145-20) dated February 15, 2021, in exchange for Ms. Juarez‘s agreement in the Settlement Agreement not to execute on the arbitration award, sue on it, record a judgment lien certificate, commence or prosecute any execution, levy, garnishment, attachment, proceedings supplementary or any other collection efforts or actions on the arbitration award against C-Squared, Yoho, and/or Floyd. Doc. 160 ¶ 31.
On February 22, 2021, the parties to the underlying lawsuit filed a Stipulation for Entry of Final Judgment and Order (Doc. 142-16) that (i) informed the trial court that the underlying lawsuit “has been amicably resolved by written settlement agreement and binding arbitration on damages“; (ii) requested that the trial court enter
On April 26, 2021, Ms. Juarez only in her capacity as assignee of C-Squared filed an amended complaint in the underlying lawsuit naming only Bridgefield as a defendant and asserting a claim against Bridgefield for breach of contract. Doc. 160 ¶ 34; Docs. 155-2; 145-21. On December 28, 2021, Ms. Juarez only in her capacity as assignee of C-Squared filed a Second Amended Complaint against Bridgefield and added a claim for bad faith, which was abated “pending a determination of coverage.” Doc. 160 ¶ 35.
On December 12, 2022, Bridgefield moved for summary judgment (Doc. 145-22) on the breach of contract claim asserted by Ms. Juarez in her capacity as assignee of C-Squared in the underlying lawsuit. Doc. 160 ¶ 36. On February 7, 2023, the trial court in the underlying lawsuit issued an order denying Bridgefield‘s Motion for Final
Pursuant to paragraph 3 of the Release and as a condition of settlement, the parties agreed to present an order vacating the prior order denying Bridgefield‘s Motion for Summary Judgment. Doc. 160 ¶ 39. On April 13, 2023, at the request of the parties, the trial court in the underlying lawsuit entered an Order Vacating Prior Order Denying Bridgefield Casualty Company‘s Motion for Final Summary Judgment. Id. ¶ 40; Doc. 154-2. Thereafter, Ms. Juarez as assignee of C-Squared filed a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal with Prejudice in the underlying lawsuit on May 4, 2023, providing notice “that this action is dismissed with prejudice as to all defendants.” Doc. 160 ¶ 41.
Cincinnati served responses to Bridgefield‘s requests for admission in this action on January 27, 2025. Id. ¶ 42; Docs. 142-18; 154-1. Cincinnati served amended responses to Bridgefield‘s requests for admission on April 4, 2025, but did not make
B. Litigation
1. Jasmine J. Juarez v. C-Squared Certified General Contractor, Inc.; John Yoho, and Larry Floyd, Case No. 2020-CA-908, in the Circuit Court of the 20th Judicial Circuit in and for Charlotte County, Florida
In the Complaint filed by Ms. Juarez against C-Squared and its employees, she alleges a claim for vicarious liability against C-Squared for Yoho and Floyd‘s conduct and claims of gross negligence against the individuals for the incident that occurred December 12, 2019, that caused Ms. Juarez‘s personal injuries. C-Squared‘s insurer Cincinnati assumed the defense, under a reservation of rights, of C-Squared and its employees sued in the action. Cincinnati‘s coverage counsel asserted there was no coverage available under Cincinnati‘s policies for the claims brought by Ms. Juarez. C-Squared‘s other insurer Bridgefield denied a defense or indemnification to C-Squared and its employees.
Cincinnati‘s retained counsel for C-Squared negotiated a settlement of the litigation in which a consent judgment was entered against C-Squared following a determination of Ms. Juarez‘s injuries through arbitration. Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, Ms. Juarez agreed not to execute or seek to collect on the judgment against C-Squared or its employees in exchange for an assignment of C-Squared‘s rights against Bridgefield. Specifically, the Settlement Agreement provided:
Juarez agrees and covenants not to record the arbitration award, sue on it, record a judgment lien certificate, commence or prosecute any execution, levy, garnishment,
attachment, proceedings supplementary or any other collection efforts or actions on the arbitration award against C-Squared or any of its employees, officers or directors, including but not limited to Yoho and Floyd, or against Cincinnati.
Doc. 145-17 at 5.
2. Jasmine J. Juarez, as assignee of C-Squared Certified General Contractor, Inc. v. Bridgefield Casualty Insurance Company, Case No. 2020-CA-908, in the Circuit Court of the 20th Judicial Circuit in and for Charlotte County, Florida
After entering into the Settlement Agreement and armed with her assignment of rights, Juarez, standing in the shoes of C-Squared, amended her complaint to assert a single claim for breach of contract against Bridgefield only. The lawsuit alleged that Bridgefield improperly denied coverage and refused to defend C-Squared for the bodily injury claim brought against it by a statutory employee. The amended complaint sought consequential damages arising from the breach, including the amount of the Arbitration award. Ms. Juarez filed a Second Amended Complaint asserting a bad faith claim against Bridgefield, which was abated pending a ruling on the breach of contract claim. Bridgefield filed a motion for summary judgment arguing it owed no duty to defend or indemnify and did not breach its contract with its insured. The state court judge rejected Bridgefield‘s arguments and denied the motion although the motion was subsequently vacated per agreement of the parties.
Thereafter, Bridgefield entered into a confidential settlement with Ms. Juarez settling the breach of contract claim alleged in her Amended Complaint. The General
all claims, counterclaims, causes of action, suits, damages, expenses, liabilities and demands of any kind whatsoever in law or in equity, regardless of whether known or unknown, asserted or un-asserted, liquidated or un-liquidated, accrued or un-accrued, matured or not yet matured, contingent or vested, whether in contract or tort, whether arising by statute, under the common law, or in equity, or under any other theory, of any nature whatsoever, arising at any time through and including the date of this Agreement to include, without limitation, all claims for coverage, bad faith, or attorneys’ fees arising in any part out of the facts and circumstances alleged within any of the pleadings in the lawsuit currently styled Jasmine J. Juarez v. Bridgefield Casualty Insurance Company, Case No. 2020-CA-000908.
Doc. 145-24 at 2.
3. Bridgefield Casualty insurance Company v. The Cincinnati Insurance Company, Case No. 8:23-cv-2465-CEH-LSG, in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida
After settling the breach of contract claim with Ms. Juarez, as assignee of C-Squared, Bridgefield brought the instant action against Cincinnati for equitable subrogation and equitable contribution. In its complaint, Bridgefield alleges it did not owe any of the underlying personal injury damages but settled with Ms. Juarez in order to protect its insured C-Squared. Alternatively, Bridgefield argues that even if it owed a portion of the underlying settlement, it paid more than its pro rata share and therefore should be able to recover from C-Squared‘s co-insurer, Cincinnati, who Bridgefield contends should have indemnified C-Squared for Ms. Juarez‘s damages.
1. Bridgefield‘s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 142)
Bridgefield moves for summary judgment on both counts of its Complaint arguing that Cincinnati, not Bridgefield, is the entity responsible for the settlement of the underlying tort suit filed by Ms. Juarez against the parties’ mutual insured, C-Squared. In its equitable subrogation claim, Bridgefield seeks reimbursement from Cincinnati for the full amount of the settlement it paid to Ms. Juarez. Bridgefield contends that its employer liability coverage does not apply because Ms. Juarez‘s gross negligence claims against Messrs. Yoho and Floyd fell within an exception to the workers’ compensation immunity statute. Alternatively, in its contribution claim, Bridgefield seeks reimbursement for the amount it paid above its pro rata share. Even if Bridgefield owes a portion of the settlement, Bridgefield claims that Cincinnati owes two-thirds of the amount Bridgefield paid on the underlying claim because: (1) Cincinnati‘s CGL policy applies; (2) Cincinnati‘s business auto coverage applies; (3) Cincinnati‘s commercial umbrella coverage applies; and (4) the employer‘s liability exclusion in the Cincinnati Policy does not apply to covered employees.
Bridgefield argues that Cincinnati denied coverage for the only viable claims that Ms. Juarez had, which was against the individual employees, and then Cincinnati improperly shifted obligations to Bridgefield through the Coblentz agreement. Bridgefield contends it was forced to step in and resolve the judgment against C-Squared through payment of the settlement amount, which Bridgefield argues it is
2. Cincinnati‘s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 143)
Cincinnati moved for summary judgment in its favor arguing that Bridgefield cannot recover on its equitable subrogation claim for payments Bridgefield made to resolve its own bad faith actions. Contrary to Bridgefield‘s representations that its settlement payment was made on behalf of C-Squared for damages owed to Ms. Juarez, Cincinnati argues that the settlement payment was made on behalf of Bridgefield for damages it owed to C-Squared due to its own breach of its insuring agreement. Cincinnati cites to Ms. Juarez‘s Amended Complaint to argue that Bridgefield was not paying money to Ms. Juarez individually for her injuries, as her injuries were not the subject of the Amended Complaint. Instead, Bridgefield‘s payment was to Ms. Juarez, as assignee of C-Squared, in satisfaction of the claim against Bridgefield for breaching its contract with its insured.
Additionally, Cincinnati contends that the contribution claim also fails because the settlement amount paid by Bridgefield was to satisfy Bridgefield‘s own obligation to its insured and Cincinnati was not a joint obligor for Bridgefield‘s breach of its insurance policy. Cincinnati argues that Bridgefield is trying to position itself as the carrier who stepped up and undertook the duty to defend and indemnify, which was not the case. Rather, it was Cincinnati who accepted the duty to defend, pursuant to a reservation of rights, and negotiated a settlement where neither C-Squared, nor its employees, would be exposed to payment of a judgment. Thus, Cincinnati argues that
Cincinnati next argues that Bridgefield cannot prevail on its claims because Cincinnati is the one who made a payment greater than its obligation by undertaking the expense of C-Squared‘s defense in the underlying litigation while Bridgefield refused to defend or indemnify. Therefore, Bridgefield cannot show it made a payment on behalf of its insured where the only payment made was in satisfaction of its breach of contract in failing to defend or indemnify.
Cincinnati submits that none of its policies provided coverage to C-Squared. The umbrella policy had been cancelled ten months before the accident happened. As for the CGL Policy, it contained a standard workers’ compensation and employer‘s liability exclusion, which precluded coverage for injuries to an employee, such as Ms. Juarez who was considered a statutory employee. Finally, the Cincinnati auto policy did not provide coverage because the accident did not involve a “covered auto.”
Finally, Cincinnati argues that Bridgefield‘s action here is an attempt to relitigate the issue of coverage, which was already decided by the state court. Notwithstanding that Bridgefield negotiated for the underlying summary judgment order to be vacated, Cincinnati argues that the state court still denied summary judgment and that decision was never reversed.
Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
When the moving party has discharged its burden, the nonmoving party must then designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 324. Issues of fact are “genuine only if a reasonable jury, considering the evidence present, could find for the nonmoving party,” and a fact is “material” if it may affect the outcome of the suit under governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248–49 (1986). In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the court must consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. However, a party cannot defeat summary judgment by relying upon conclusory allegations. See Hill v. Oil Dri Corp. of Ga., 198 F. App‘x 852, 858 (11th Cir. 2006).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Equitable Subrogation
In Count I of its Complaint, Bridgefield sues Cincinnati for equitable subrogation alleging that it settled the underlying lawsuit to protect its own interests and to obtain a satisfaction of judgment in favor of C-Squared (Bridgefield and Cincinnati‘s mutual insured). Doc. 1 at 7–8. Bridgefield asserts that Cincinnati acted only in its own best interests by allowing a multi-million-dollar judgment to be entered against their joint insured C-Squared and in not providing any substantive defense to Ms. Juarez‘s claims in arbitration. Bridgefield contends it was not acting as a volunteer
Cincinnati responds that Bridgefield may not assert a claim for equitable subrogation because the payment Bridgefield made was not made on behalf of C-Squared. Rather, Bridgefield‘s payment was to Ms. Juarez, who was standing in C-Squared‘s shoes. It follows, Cincinnati argues, that Bridgefield cannot subrogate a claim on behalf of C-Squared for a settlement paid due to its own breach of its insuring agreement.
Under Florida law, “[s]ubrogation is the substitution of one person in the place of another with reference to a lawful claim or right.” W. Am. Ins. Co. v. Yellow Cab Co. of Orlando, 495 So. 2d 204, 206 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986) (quoting Boley v. Daniel, 72 So. 644, 645 (Fla. 1916)). In relation to insurance, “[s]ubrogation is the right of the insurer to be put in the position of the insured in order to pursue recovery from third parties legally responsible to the insured for a loss paid by the insurer.” Monte De Oca v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 897 So. 2d 471, 472 n.2 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004) (citation omitted).
Florida courts recognize “two types of subrogation: conventional subrogation and equitable or legal subrogation.” Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Radio Station WQBA, 731 So. 2d 638, 646 (Fla. 1999). Equitable subrogation, which is at issue here, is a doctrine in equity that “is not created by a contract but by the legal consequences of the acts
To maintain an action for equitable subrogation under Florida law, a party must prove five elements: “(1) that it made the payment at issue to protect its own interests, (2) the payment was non-voluntary, (3) it was not primarily liable for the debt paid, (4) it paid the entire debt, and (5) subrogation would not work any injustice to the rights of a third party.” Nova Info. Sys., Inc. v. Greenwich Ins. Co., 365 F.3d 996, 1005 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Dade County Sch. Bd., 731 So. 2d at 646). Although Bridgefield must prove these five elements in order to prevail on its equitable subrogation claim, it neither addresses nor argues these elements in its motion.4 See Doc. 142.
Bridgefield cannot satisfy the third element because it cannot establish that it was not the one primarily liable for the debt. “As a result of equitable subrogation, the party discharging the debt stands in the shoes of the person whose claims have been discharged and thus succeeds to the right and priorities of the original creditor.” Dade
Bridgefield also argues that it made the payment on behalf of C-Squared and is therefore subrogated to C-Squared‘s indemnity rights against its tortfeasor employees, Messrs. Yoho and Floyd. This argument fails as well. First, this lawsuit is not brought by Bridgefield against Floyd and Yoho. Second, the underlying breach of contract claim was brought by Ms. Juarez, as assignee of C-Squared‘s rights, and Bridgefield‘s settlement of that breach of contract claim did not bestow upon it rights from C-Squared. Rather, Bridgefield paid to satisfy its own breach of duties owed to C-Squared. In that regard, the claim that was asserted against Bridgefield was for Bridgefield‘s breach of contract in failing to defend C-Squared in the underlying lawsuit. Ms. Juarez brought the claim, not in an individual capacity for her personal injuries, but instead as an assignee of C-Squared‘s rights against its insurer. Ms. Juarez‘s Amended Complaint alleges that “Bridgefield breached its duties under the Policy by refusing to defend or indemnify C-Squared against Ms. Juarez‘s claim.” Doc. 155-2 ¶ 30. Although Bridgefield argues that it was required to pay a debt that Cincinnati was primarily required to pay, the record does not support this argument
B. Equitable Contribution
In Count II of its Complaint, Bridgefield sues Cincinnati for equitable contribution. Doc. 1 at 8–9. Bridgefield claims that Cincinnati and it shared a common obligation to their mutual insured, C-Squared, and that Ms. Juarez‘s claims were covered by policies issued by both insurers. Because Bridgefield paid the full amount of the settlement to resolve Ms. Juarez‘s claims against C-Squared and because Cincinnati did not pay anything toward the settlement, Bridgefield argues its payment exceeded its pro rata share of the indemnity obligations owed on behalf of C-Squared. Thus, Bridgefield seeks contribution from Cincinnati for Cincinnati‘s share of the settlement Bridgefield paid. Cincinnati argues that Bridgefield‘s subrogation claim fails because it cannot establish that Cincinnati was a joint obligor for Bridgefield‘s breach of contract.
The doctrine of equitable contribution “attempts to distribute equally among those who have a common obligation, the burden of performing that obligation.” Nova Info. Sys., 365 F.3d at 1006 (quoting Fletcher v. Anderson, 616 So. 2d 1201, 1202 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)). When a party has paid in excess of its pro rata share of the obligation, it is entitled by law to contribution from the other parties for their share. Fletcher, 616 So. 2d at 1202. Bridgefield maintains that it and Cincinnati had a “common obligation” to indemnify C-Squared for the damages claimed by Ms. Juarez. Bridgefield‘s argument is unavailing. Bridgefield cannot obtain contribution from Cincinnati here because the settlement payment Bridgefield made, for which it seeks contribution, was for its own breach of contract. Doc. 145-24.
C-Squared, the insured, and its employees, including Yoho and Floyd, along with Cincinnati, were released by Ms. Juarez in the underlying Settlement Agreement negotiated by C-Squared‘s counsel. Cincinnati argues that Bridgefield cannot show that its payment to Ms. Juarez was made on Cincinnati‘s behalf or on behalf of their mutual insured C-Squared and its employees, Yoho and Floyd, and therefore no “shared” obligation existed between the insurers.
In the Amended Complaint, Ms. Juarez named only Bridgefield as a defendant. As assignee of C-Squared, she sued Bridgefield for breaching its policy of insurance issued to C-Squared by refusing to defend or indemnify C-Squared against Ms. Juarez‘s claim. Doc. 145-21. Although the order denying Bridgefield‘s summary judgment on the breach of contract claim was vacated, the breach of contract case was ultimately settled. Bridgefield is correct that the vacated order would have no res judicata effect. The Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly held that a vacated opinion or order is “officially gone” and therefore cannot provide a basis for res judicata. Zuniga v. Comm‘r of Soc. Sec., 772 F. App‘x 870, 871 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing United States v. Sigma Int‘l, Inc., 300 F.3d 1278, 1280 (11th Cir. 2002)). Nevertheless, in settling the breach of contract action, Bridgefield extinguished a debt it owed for, among other things, its failure to defend and indemnify its insured C-Squared. Bridgefield can point to no evidence in the record to show that Cincinnati was obligated to pay for or contribute to the payment for Bridgefield‘s breach of its duties under its policy of insurance with C-Squared. As Cincinnati points out, only Cincinnati retained a lawyer for C-Squared and paid for C-Squared‘s defense. Bridgefield did not. Instead, Bridgefield denied C-Squared and its employees a defense or indemnity. Cincinnati, not Bridgefield, was the one that negotiated a settlement that resolved the claims against C-Squared and its employees such that no judgment could be enforced against C-Squared or its employees.
Bridgefield argues that Yoho and Floyd did not release Cincinnati for their claims, but Bridgefield‘s argument misses the mark. Yoho and Floyd were released by Juarez who was the one who sued them for their negligence. As a result of the Settlement Agreement, Yoho and Floyd were no longer exposed to personal liability, nor was C-Squared exposed to vicarious liability for their alleged conduct. Bridgefield‘s settlement of its breach of contract claim was not an obligation owed by Cincinnati. Because no “common obligation” existed between Bridgefield and Cincinnati as it relates to the settled breach of contract claim, Bridgefield‘s equitable contribution claim fails.
In the insurance context, whether there is a common obligation for purposes of an equitable contribution claim is generally a question of coverage. Hiscox Ins. Co. Inc. v. Watford Specialty Ins. Co., 647 F. Supp. 3d 1318, 1321 (S.D. Fla. 2022). (citing Cincinnati Specialty Underwriters Ins. Co. v. KNS Grp., LLC, 561 F. Supp. 3d 1298, 1316 (S.D. Fla. 2021) (denying claim for equitable contribution after finding an absence of coverage). This case, however, comes before the Court in an unique procedural posture. It is not before the Court in the typical fashion wherein an insurer is uncertain as to its rights and responsibilities under a policy of insurance and seeks a declaratory judgment. And, notwithstanding the Coblentz Agreement consummated by Ms. Juarez and C-Squared, this action is not before the Court to challenge the validity of the consent judgment entered below that was based on that Agreement. Instead, this case comes to the Court following the settlement of the breach of contract claim for Bridgefield‘s failure to defend and indemnify C-Squared. For the reasons discussed above, Bridgefield‘s payment to Ms. Juarez, as assignee of C-Squared, for its breach of its duty to defend was not a payment that Cincinnati was primarily liable for, nor was it a shared obligation between Bridgefield and Cincinnati. Even if the Court were to consider the availability of coverage, Bridgefield‘s claims still fail because no coverage exists under Cincinnati‘s policies of insurance.
Despite the extensive and convoluted course of discovery related to Cincinnati‘s umbrella policy,6 it is undisputed that the umbrella policy was cancelled ten months before this accident happened, specifically on February 19, 2019, at the request of the agent Atlas. See Doc. 145-27; see also Doc. 145-2 at 363-366. Bridgefield denies knowledge of the cancellation until recently, but it was provided copies of the cancellation endorsement multiple times, before and after this action was filed. Bridgefield argues that Cincinnati‘s admission that the umbrella policy was in effect binds Cincinnati to that admission and waives Cincinnati‘s right to deny the existence of coverage. Doc. 142 at 22. Bridgefield does not cite any legal authority for this proposition. Further, in Cincinnati‘s “admission” which Bridgefield relies on (Doc. 142-18 at 3-4), Cincinnati indicates that the umbrella policy (and the CGL policy) do not afford coverage. Id. at 4. And while the admission response also indicates that the policy was issued with a policy period of January 1, 2019 through January 1, 2020, the response does not go so far as to state that the policy was in effect during that entire period. Indeed, the record reflects that Cincinnati has consistently taken the position
2. The Auto Policy
Bridgefield argues that Cincinnati‘s Commercial Auto Policy provides coverage because the Loader that backed into Ms. Juarez would be a “covered auto” under Cincinnati‘s Auto Policy.8 Doc. 142 at 6, 13-14, 20-21. As a preliminary matter, it is clear that the Loader is not listed on the Schedule of Vehicles. See Doc. 155-1 at 587-592. Turning to Cincinnati‘s Auto Policy, it defines “Auto” as:
1. A land motor vehicle, “trailer” or semi-trailer designed for travel on public roads or
2. Any other land vehicle that is subject to a compulsory or financial responsibility law or other motor vehicle insurance law where it is licensed or principally garaged.
However, “auto” does not include “mobile equipment.”
Doc. 155-1 at 604. Thus, Bridgefield claims that the “Loader” is either a “land motor vehicle” or it is an “other land vehicle that is subject to a compulsory or financial
Cincinnati responds that Caterpillar Track Loader at issue would be considered “mobile equipment,” under the policy. In pertinent part, “mobile equipment” means any of the following land vehicles, including any attached machinery or equipment:
1. Bulldozers, farm machinery, forklifts, and other vehicles designed for use principally off public roads; . . .
…
3. Vehicles that travel on crawler treads.
Doc. 155-1 at 605.
Cincinnati submits that the Loader is “mobile equipment” as it was made for use principally off public roads. It argues that Bridgefield proffers no evidence to suggest otherwise. While neither party directs the Court to any deposition testimony that discusses the Loader in detail, there are photographs of the Loader in the record. See Doc. 142-7 at 4, 6. It is obvious from review of the photographs that the equipment at issue had crawler treads and was designed for off-road use. As indicated above, the policy states: “‘auto’ does not include ‘mobile equipment.‘” Doc. 155-1 at 604. As the Loader would be mobile equipment, it is not a covered auto under the policy.
Alternatively, because C-Squared is a licensed contractor, Bridgefield contends that C-Squared was obligated to comply with the financial responsibility law that requires insurance. In support, Bridgefield cites to
3. The CGL Policy
Cincinnati argues that its CGL Policy does not provide coverage due to workers’ compensation immunity and the standard workers’ compensation and employer‘s liability exclusions contained in its policy which preclude coverage for injury to an employee. In relevant part, the Cincinnati CGL Policy includes the following exclusions:
2. Exclusions
…
d. Workers’ Compensation and Similar Laws
Any obligation of the insured under a workers’ compensation, disability benefits or unemployment compensation law or any similar law.
e. Employer‘s Liability
Bodily injury to:
(1) an “employee” of the insured sustained in the “workplace“;
(2) An “employee” of the insured arising out of the performance of duties related to the conduct of the insured‘s business; …
In response to Bridgefield‘s first argument, Cincinnati argues that Ms. Juarez would be a statutory employee of C-Squared such that the above Policy exclusions apply to her. The concept of a statutory employee under Florida law derives from
In case a contractor sublets any part or parts of his or her contract work to a subcontractor or subcontractors, all of the employees of such contractor and subcontractor or subcontractors engaged on such contract work shall be deemed to be employed in one and the same business or establishment, and the contractor shall be liable for, and shall secure, the payment of compensation to all such employees, except to employees of a subcontractor who has secured such payment.
In response, Bridgefield argues that a district court opinion from the Southern District of Florida has rejected that a statutory employee automatically qualifies as an “employee” under the definition in the Cincinnati Policy. Doc. 142 at 5 (citing Wellington Specialty Ins. Co. v. Serv., No. 08-22745-CIV, 2010 WL 11505215 (S.D. Fla. June 7, 2010), aff‘d sub nom. Wellington Specialty Ins. Co. v. Kendall Crane Serv., 434 F. App‘x 794 (11th Cir. 2011)). The Wellington opinion is not binding on this Court, but even more perilous to Bridgefield‘s argument is that Wellington is factually
Florida courts “have consistently held that the term ‘employee’ in insurance policies also includes statutory employees.” Amerisure Ins. Co., 545 F. App‘x at 854–55 (citing Revoredo, 698 So.2d at 892 and Dodge, 424 So. 2d at 40). Bridgefield fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to Ms. Juarez‘s status as a statutory employee of C-Squared. Because the employer‘s liability exclusion in the Cincinnati CGL policy applies to bar coverage to employees injured on the job and because Florida law treats
D. Duty to Defend and Indemnify Under Florida Law
In Florida, an insurer‘s duty to defend is determined solely from the allegations in the claimant‘s complaint against the insured where suit has been filed. Higgins v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 894 So. 2d 5, 10 (Fla. 2004). An insurer must defend its insured if the allegations could allow the insured to be covered by the insurance policy. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Universal Atlas Cement Co., 406 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). If the complaint alleges facts partially within and partially outside of an insurance policy‘s coverage, the insurer must still defend the entire suit. Khatib v. Old Dominion Ins. Co., 153 So. 3d 943, 947 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (citation omitted). Any doubt as to whether a duty to defend exists must be resolved in favor of the insured. Baron Oil Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 470 So. 2d 810, 814 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).
The duty to indemnify, however, is narrower than the duty to defend. U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Hayden Bonded Storage Co., 930 So. 2d 686, 691 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (citation omitted). While the duty to defend is triggered by the allegations in the complaint, the duty to indemnify is determined by the underlying facts developed through discovery
Bridgefield argues the “big lie” of the Coblentz Agreement is that it resolved claims against C-Squared although C-Squared was never exposed to a judgment. Doc. 142 at 24. However, Bridgefield cannot now be heard to complain about the Coblentz Agreement, the amount of the settlement, or the fact that Bridgefield was not told or consulted about the agreement where it refused to defend its insured and left its insured to its own devices to resolve the claims asserted against it.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED and ADJUDGED:
1. Plaintiff Bridgefield Casualty Insurance Company‘s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 142) is denied.
3. The Clerk is directed to enter Judgment in favor of Defendant The Cincinnati Insurance Company and against the Plaintiff Bridgefield Casualty Insurance Company on Plaintiff‘s claims for equitable subrogation and equitable contribution.
4. The Clerk is further directed to terminate pending motions and deadlines and close this case.
DONE and ORDERED in Tampa, Florida on September 1, 2026.
Charlene Edwards Honeywell
United States District Judge
Copies furnished to:
Counsel of Record
Unrepresented Parties