156 P. 433 | Or. | 1916
delivered the opinion of the court.
1-3. Under the provisions of Section 6616, L. 0. L., the state board of control, now the state water board, is required to appoint a water-master for each water district. Section 6617 defines his duties. Section 6619 specifies that his compensation shall be at the
“Each water-master shall keep a true and just account of the time spent by him in the duties of each county, respectively, in which his duties may extend, and he shall present a true copy thereof, verified by oath, to the County Court sitting for the transaction of county business of the county in which his work may be performed.- And the County Court shall, upon approval thereof by the superintendent of the water division, allow and pay the same; provided, any water-master may be suspended by an order of the County Court of any county in which his district may lie in case said court shall find and enter an order to the effect that said water-master is claiming more time than the public service requires, and during such suspension such water-master shall receive no pay.”
Section 6621 is as follows:
“When arrangements are not made for employment of a water-master at a monthly rate, as provided in Section 6619, the said water-master shall begin his work upon-written demand being made upon him therefor by one or more water users. Such written demand for his services shall be attached to his bill for services and forwarded with it to the county commissioners of the proper county. Where the said water-master is employed by the month he shall begin work and terminate his services as the superintendent of his water division may direct. The division superintendent may, under any condition, call upon the water-master for work within his district whenever the necessity therefor may in his judgment arise.”
4-6. It is claimed that the allegations that the plaintiff was the duly appointed, qualified and acting water-master of the water district of Crook County and was actively employed in performing the duties of his office practically cover the requirements of the statute, but all may be conceded and yet the requirement of the statute that he attach the demand of the water users to his bill is not complied with. It is not sufficient that he should have been appointed, qualified, or acting, or even actively employed, in the duties of his office. He might have been all the first three, and actively performing the work of a water-master, without the demand of the water users or the order of the division superintendent, and in such case the work would be merely voluntary. The word “duly,” unless its use is given a different significance by statute, states a mere conclusion of law and adds nothing to the force of the allegation. In addition to this objection
The judgment is reversed and the proceeding dismissed, without prejudice to plaintiff.
Reversed.