145 A.D. 51 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1911
The following is the opinion of the county judge:
The plaintiff recovered judgment in the City Court of the city of Schenectady for damages for the breaking of a piece of of plate glass, alleged to. have been caused by the negligence of defendant as a carrier. The glass was shipped by Sutphen <⅛ Myer, at New York city, to plaintiff at Schenectady, N. Y., via defendant’s railroad. The case is here for a new trial.
The contract of shipment was set forth in a bill of lading, which contained a condition to the effect that defendant should not be liable for damage to the glass by breakage or from any cause, if it should be necessary or was usual , to carry such property upon open cars, and the words “loaded and secured
G-eneral words in a contract of carriage are not sufficient to release a carrier from the consequences of itsnegligence. If such a result is intended,' it must be expressly provided for in the contract. (Mynard v. Syracuse, etc., R. R. Co., 71 N. Y. 183; Canfield v. B. & O. R. R. Co., 93 id. 537; Rathbone v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co., 140 id. 48.) So that, notwithstanding the provisions of the bill of lading, defendant’s liability for. negligence in the handling and transportation of the glass remains unaffected. The burden of proving that defendant was negligent undoubtedly rests upon plaintiff. He is not required, howevei, to point out the precise act or omission in which the negligence consists. Proof of the nature of an accident may afford prima facie proof of negligence. (Lamb
The glass was delivered to defendant May 4, 1907, in good condition and properly packed, loaded and secured on a platform car. It reached Schenectady May 9, 1907, and was delivered to plaintiff May 13, 1907. The box at this time was secure. on the car and was not broken. It was not opened until two days thereafter and then it was discovered that the glass was broken. If the- glass was not broken after its delivery to plaintiff, then the evidence is sufficient to make out a prima facie case of negligence and to throw upon defendant the burden of proving that it exercised due care. (Canfield v. B. & O. R. R. Co., 93 N. Y. 537; Rieser v. Metropolitan Express Co., 45 Misc. Rep. 632; Campe v. Weir, 28 id. 243; Bowden v. Fargo, 2 id. 551.) That it was not broken after such delivery is apparent. The care exercised in unloading and carting the box and in placing and bracing it against the abutment, where it remained apparently undisturbed until it was opened; the condition of the box and of the packing at the time of unpacking, the thickness of the glass and its position and condition, broken as it was into small pieces at that time, are facts which not only preclude the inference that it may have been broken after the delivery to plaintiff, but show clearly that it was not then broken.
The defendant has presented no proof of care and has offered no. explanation. So that the evidence discloses a prima facie