2 Tenn. 99 | Tenn. Sup. Ct. | 1807
Lead Opinion
The words spoken were, "he committed a misdemeanor in the State of North Carolina, for which he was arraigned and tried for his life," that "he was arraigned at the bar in the State of North Carolina, and I will show it in black and white."
The declaration then proceeded to state that there was an election to be held for Lieutenant-Colonel Commandant of the county of Dickson, that the words were spoken with a view to injure the plaintiff in his election and good name, per quod many voters refused to vote for him.
A witness, having been called, was asked what effect the report had upon the election.
The question was objected to. But one case respecting an election is recollected at present, which is in Lord Raymond's Reports, and that as well as can be recollected was a suit brought by a freeholder whose vote was refused.
That was with respect to a member of parliament, but no difference in principle can be perceived in the case. The loss of an election in both cases must be *100 conceived injurious, for which the law will afford redress. If it were an injury to the voter to be deprived of his vote, tending to the loss of his favorite candidate, it would surely be an injury to that candidate to be deprived of votes by defamation.
The heart which is nourished by the blood issuing from the wounds of mangled reputation ought to be mended by the wholesome correction of law, if neither moral nor religious precept can effect it.
The rule as to evidence seems to be, that a witness must generally depose as to his knowledge of facts. In some cases, however, evidence of common reputation is received; this case, however, is believed to be one not of the kind; the witness ought to state whether to his knowledge or belief, founded on reasons offered, the report was the cause of the plaintiff's losing votes, and how many.
Two witnesses were offered by the defendant for the purpose of showing that one of the plaintiff's witnesses had acknowledged he had received money of the plaintiff for swearing for him.
Addendum
There was no impropriety in the *101 plaintiff's paying his witness; it would be laudable in any case, but in some cases, where witnesses are poor, it is honorable.
Addendum
This testimony, which is intended to show, that one of the plaintiff's witnesses has forsworn himself, cannot, as it occurs to me, be received. To impeach a man's credit when on oath, his general reputation as to swearing may be inquired into, but not to descend to particular facts, for it cannot be supposed that witnesses could be prepared to meet such imputations, there being no notice on record. As between parties to a suit, the pleadings completely apprise them of the points to be discussed, but not so of witnesses.
Addendum
was not decided, but it seemed to him that any evidence, relating to the same subject about which the witnesses had been deposing to-day, may be received.
Addendum
The witnesses were qualified, and deposed that they heard the plaintiff's witness say that he had received a part of his attendance of the plaintiff, by whom he was summoned.
Addendum
In order to sustain this action, it must be proved that the plaintiff lost his election by the report; one, two, or even ten votes might not have occasioned the loss of the election. In relation to the loss of the plaintiff's election, he ought not to complain to a court of justice. The nature of our government is such that every citizen ought to be free to canvass the virtues, vices, and talents of any candidate for office, nor for any thing that is said on such occasions ought an action to lie. POWEL, J., was inclined to think that the words were actionable in themselves without a perquod. The nature of our government will not authorize any man, under any circumstances, to slander the reputation of another.
Addendum
A special verdict has been proposed, to which I have no objection. Slander is no more justifiable when spoken of a man with a view to his election than on any other occasion. Unhappy indeed would any people be, where, in the exercise of one right, you destroy as important a one.
The enjoyment of a fair and unsullied reputation is certainly the greatest blessing a rational being can enjoy in this sublunary state of existence; an attempt to deprive a person of it ought, and must, in all civilized states and nations, be considered as a serious injury.
In the exercise of elective rights, it is immoral to slander a candidate. Let his talents, his virtues, and such vices as are likely to affect his public character, be freely discussed, but no falsehoods be propagated. In the course of the argument, it has been stated that the plaintiff should prove by voters the loss of his election. This, consistent with the principles of our government, cannot be done, as it would seem. The Constitution provides that votes shall be given by ballot, and hence it results that we cannot compel a voter to disclose whom he voted for. If he does it voluntarily, his evidence may be received. *102 Therefore proof of the loss of an election cannot be required. I am strongly inclined to think that, if the loss of votes on that ground is proved, the law will consider it as an injury, but then the words must be actionable in themselves.
If with a view to an election, a person should falsely, maliciously, and scandalously report of a candidate a charge, importing a crime for which his life or limb might be jeopardized, he ought to be responsible, and for more than ordinary damages if votes were lost.
Verdict for plaintiff.
Reasons in arrest of judgment which were overruled at December term, 1808. Vide, 4 Bos. Pull. 47.
