This litigаtion appears before us for the second time. In its first appearance in
Professional Practices Comm. v. Brewer,
A complete and detailed recitation of the facts giving rise to this litigation is given by the federal district court in
Brewer v. Purvis,
816 FSupp. 1560 (M.D. Ga. 1993), aff’d,
Brewer originally filed a state court complaint under 42 USC § 1983 against the Clarke County School District, its superintendent, the Georgia High School Association and its executive director, the
PPC, Schaсht, and Good.
Professional Practices Comm. v. Brewer,
supra at 731. The action was removed to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia, which granted summary judgment on some issues and allowed some claims to continue in federal court.
Brewer v. Purvis,
supra at 1580. The district court also remanded to the state court Brewer’s claims
In Professional Practices Comm. v. Brewer, supra, this Court reversed in part and affirmed in part the trial court’s denial of summary judgment to the PPC, Schacht, and Good. While holding thаt the trial court improperly denied summary judgment on any claim asserted under 42 USC § 1983, we affirmed the denial of summary judgment on the remaining state law tort claims because appellees failed to raise the issue below. Id. at 732. On remand, appellees renewed their motion for summary judgment on the state law claims, and Brewer also moved for summary judgment. In two orders, the trial court denied Brewer’s motion and granted summary judgment to appellees.
1. In ruling on appellees’ motion for summary judgment, the trial court relied upon OCGA § 9-12-40 and the earlier rulings of the federal district court. In resolving this appeal, we must first consider the scope and effect of the district court’s earlier rulings and its remand of the state law claims. The district court relied upon Georgia’s Eleventh Amendment immunity to determine that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the claims against the PPC, Brewer v. Purvis, supra at 1569, and that Schacht and Good were also entitled to immunity in their official capacities. Id. at 1570. It therefore remanded those claims to the Clarke County Superior Court. Id. at 1571. The district court reserved ruling on the claims against Schacht and Good in their individual capacities and directed Brewer to submit an additional brief on the subject. Id. In a subsequent order, the district court granted summary judgment on this issue, noting that in its previous opinion it held “that Brewer had not been deprived of his property interests without due process of law in his teaching position and that he did not have a property interest in his coaching position.” The district court also noted that “[t]he only other potential property interest that the Plaintiff has is his teaching certificate. That interest, however, is the subject of Plaintiff’s claims against the PPC and Good and Schacht in their official capacities, which were remanded to the state court.”
In granting summary judgment, the trial court relied upon the findings of the district court, citing OCGA § 9-12-40: “A judgment of a
court of competent jurisdiction shall be conclusive between the same parties and their privies as to all matters put in issue or which under the rules of law might have been put in issue in the cause wherein the judgment was rendered until the judgment is reversed or set aside.” Res judicata and collateral estoppel are related and similar, but separate, doctrines. “The former, also known as claim preclusion, requires a plaintiff to bring all his claims against a party (or its privies) arising out of a particular set of circumstances in one action; while the lаtter, sometimes called issue preclusion, prevents relitigation of an issue already litigated by the parties (or their privies). In other words, under the doctrine of res judicata, a judgment on the merits in a prior suit bars a second suit involving the same parties or their privies based on the same cause of action. Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, on the other hand, the second action is upon a different cause of action and the judgment in the prior suit precludes relitigation of issues actually litigated and necessary to the outcome of the first action.” (Citatiоns and punctuation omitted.)
Sorrells Constr. Co. v. Chandler Armentrout & Roebuck, P.C.,
The trial court was correct in holding that collateral estoppel prevents issues decided in the federal action from being relitigated in this state action against Schacht and Good or their employer, the PPC. “Privies are in law so connected with a party tо the judgment as to have such an identity of interest that the party to the judgment represented the same legal right.”
Langton v. Dept. of Corrections,
2. As the district court correctly observed, the remaining issue is Brewer’s property interest in his teaching certificate. “Both the Georgia and Federal Constitutions prohibit the state from depriving ‘any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.’ ” (Footnote omitted.)
Atlanta City School Dist. v. Dowling,
In this case, as in
Gee,
the statutory scheme “more than satisfies the requirements of procedural due process.” Id. “In cases such as this, due process requires that some form of a hearing must be held before one is finally deprived of their property interest in a professional license.” Id. But Brewer’s teaching certificate was never revoked or even suspended. After the hearing required by procedural due process, the hearing tribunal of the PPC declined to impose the recommended suspension. Because the review process not only was available but redressed any procedural due process deprivation that Brewer may have suffered, he cannot maintain this claim.
Dowling,
supra at 219; see also
Rogers v. Ga. Ports Auth.,
3. Brewer also contends that he may maintain a claim for deprivation of a state constitutional liberty interest on the basis of injury to his reputation. The rule governing such claims in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has been adopted by this Court: “Under federal law, a рlaintiff can recover for a deprivation of reputational liberty upon proof of the following elements: (1) a false statement (2) of a stigmatizing nature (3) attending a governmental employee’s discharge (4) made public (5) by the governmental employer (6) without a meaningful opportunity for employee name clearing.
Buxton v. City of Plant City, Fla.,
871 F2d 1037, 1042-43 (11th Cir. 1989). [Cit.]” (Punctuation omitted.)
Maxwell v. Mayor &c. of Savannah,
4. (a) We next consider the trial court’s grant of summary judgment, based upon the statute of limitation, on Brewer’s defamation claims. To thе extent that Brewer’s claims seek damages for injury to reputation, we agree with the trial court that such claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitation. Actions for injuries to the reputation must be brought “within one year after the right of action accrues.” OCGA § 9-3-33. Brewer’s complaint was not filed until February 7, 1991, more than one year after the PPC’s report was submitted in an open meeting on February 1, 1990.
Brewer argues that the cause of action did not arise until injury occurred. This contention was considered and rejected in
Cunningham v. John J. Harte Assoc.,
(b) To the extent that Brewer seeks damages for tortious interference with his employment contract, the one-year statute of limitation for defamation actions is inapplicable, even if the interference allegedly was accomplished through defamation.
Lee v. Gore,
The portion of that Code sectiоn relevant here states: “The following communications are deemed privileged: (1) Statements made in good faith in the performance of a public duty.” While the privileges provided in OCGA § 51-5-7 are ordinarily asserted in defense to a defamation claim, they may also be asserted as a defense to a claim for tortious interference with contractual relations.
NationsBank v. SouthTrust Bank,
As noted above, the PPC and its employees acting in their official capacity were authorized by statute to investigate alleged violations of law, rules, regulations, or standards by certified teachers. They also werе authorized to present their report and recommendations to the Clarke County School District under former OCGA § 20-2-797 (a).
In order to overcome this privilege, Brewer must show actual malice in making the statements.
Kitfield v. Henderson, Black & Greene,
5. Finally, Brewer complains that the trial court erred in entering its own order rather than merely reducing to writing a verbal ruling made at the motion hearing by a predecessor trial judge before
his retirement.
5
But that verbal ruling was never reduсed to writing, and it is axiomatic that “what the judge orally declares is no judgment until the same has been reduced to writing and entered as such. [Cits.]”
Tyree v. Jackson,
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
A trial court has discretion to consider a second motion for summary judgment after having previously denied summary judgment.
Etheridge v. Fried,
OCGA §§ 20-2-790 through 20-2-800 were repealed by Ga. L. 1998, p. 750, effective July 1, 1998.
After a full evidentiary hearing, a hearing tribunal of the PPC declined to impose a suspension but instead recommended a public reprimand.
In
Rogers,
the plaintiff asserted only statе law claims seeking reinstatement and supplemental salary payments. Neither that opinion nor the case’s earlier appearance,
Ga. Ports Auth. v. Rogers,
That ruling granted in part and denied in part appellees’ motion for summary judgment.