MEMORANDUM OPINION
On Sеptember 20, 1984, a suicide bomber drove a truck packed with explosives through the gates of the United States Embassy Annex building in East Beirut, Lebanon, killing fourteen people and wounding thirty-five. The attack was carried out by Hezbollah, a terrorist organization that operates in Lebanon. 1 This action has been brought by a surviving victim of the attack, Richard Paul Brewer, and his mother, Joyce Louise Leydet. Plaintiffs allege that defendants, the Islamic Republic of Iran (“Iran”), the Ministry of Information and Security of Iran (“MOIS”), and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (“IRGC”), provided “material support and resources” for Hezbollah’s attack and, therefore, have waived their sovereign immunity under the “state sponsor of terrorism” exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (the “FSIA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611. Plaintiffs argue that defendants, having been stripped of immunity, are liable under federal law for causing personal injuries. In this motion for default judgment, plaintiffs are seeking $12 million in compensatory damages for Mr. Brewer, $3.5 million in compensatory damages for Ms. Leydet, and $300 million in punitive damages. 2
Plaintiffs initiated this action on March 28, 2008, and effected service on December 7, 2008, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(4). Defendants failed to respond, and the Clerk of Court entered a default on April 6, 2009. Before plaintiffs can be awarded any relief, this Court must determine whether plaintiffs have estab
*47
lished their claims “by evidence satisfactory to the court.” 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e);
see also Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. BACKGROUND
This action arises from the terrorist bombing of the U.S. Embassy Annex building in East Beirut, Lebanon on September 20, 1984. On that morning, a suicide bomber in a station wagon drove up a hill toward the Embassy, avoiding several concrete barriers designed to prevent such an approach.
See Wagner v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
When the bomb detonated, plaintiff Richard Paul Brewer, a United States Marine, was on guard duty on the second floor of the compound. (Brewer Decl. ¶¶ 18-19). 4 When he heard gunshots and yelling, he stood up to investigate. (Brewer Decl. ¶ 19.) After hearing more gunshots and a car engine revving, he headed for the balcony and yelled for people in his vicinity to get down. (Brewer Decl. ¶ 19.) At the moment he set foot on the balcony, the vehicle outside exploded. (Brewer Decl. ¶ 20.)
Brewer was knocked unconscious by the blast for 30-45 minutes. (Brewer Decl. ¶ 21.) When he finally came to, he went to the third floor to look for two of his friends who were also servicemen at the Embassy — Mike Wagner and Ken Welch. (Brewer Decl. ¶ 23.) 5 Brewer found Welch and Wagner lying on the floor and approached them to offer assistance. (Brewer Decl. ¶ 23.) However, he immediately discovered that Welch was dead and Wagner was unconscious and covered with blood. (Brewer Decl. ¶ 23.) As Brewer was thinking of the best way to get Wagner to safety, Wagner died in front of him. (Brewer Decl. ¶ 23.) Though he “felt a tremendous shock and sense of rage building up” at the loss of his friends, Brewer *48 seized upon his training and went back downstairs to help with the rescue effort. (Brewer Decl. ¶¶ 23-24.) In awarding Brewer the Navy Achievement Medal for his actions in the aftermath of the blast, the Navy described what happened next.
Despite being badly wounded and badly shaken, Sergeant [Brewer], with utter disregard for his own safety, courageously began evacuating the most severely wounded frоm the dangerous, unstable building. He then took up a security post outside the building and refused to be relieved until he was ordered to the hospital for treatment. Realizing the myriad tasks led [sic] to be done in the wake of the bombing, Sergeant [Brewer] insisted on immediately returning to duty, tirelessly assisting his fellow Marines in the clean up efforts for three sleepless days. Sergeant [Brewer]’s boundless endurance, deep sense of responsibility, and selfless dedication to duty reflected credit upon himself and were in keeping with the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service.
(Brewer Deck ¶ 27, Ex. A). In addition to the Navy Achievement Medal, Brewer also received a Superior Honor Award from the United States Department of State (Brewer Deck ¶ 27, Ex. B) and a Purple Heart for his injuries. (Brewer Deck ¶ 27, Ex. C.)
A. Extent of Brewer’s Injuries
Brewer suffered bоth physical and mental injuries that have persisted to this day. As a direct result of the attack, Brewer twice lost consciousness (Brewer Deck ¶21) and sustained numerous cuts, contusions, and lacerations, but no broken bones. (Brewer Deck ¶ 25.) His immediate treatment consisted of blood transfusions, intravenous re-hydration therapy, and stitches. (Brewer Deck ¶ 26.) After spending three days assisting in the recovery efforts, he was airlifted to a U.S. military hospital in Germany where he was treated for intense headaches and ringing in the ears, symptoms commonly associated with blast injuries. (Brewer Deck ¶ 28.) Brewer fulfilled the rest of his military obligations in Quantico, Virginia for another year and was honorably discharged from the Marine Corps in September 1985. (Brewer Deck ¶ 29.)
Upon returning home to the United States, Brewer felt anxious, depressed, and jittery so he isolated himself and became dependent on alcohol. (Brewer ¶ 30.) He was unable to stop thinking about the friends he lost in the terrorist attack. (Brewer Deck ¶ 30.) He took some criminal justice courses in hopes of becoming an FBI or Secret Service agent, but dropped out of classes because he was bored and restless. (Brewer Deck ¶ 31.) He then enrolled in the State Police Academy of Massachusetts and became a State Trooper in 1988, eventually being promoted to detective. (Brewer Deck ¶¶ 31-33). In 1990, he married and moved out of his mother’s home. (Brewer Deck ¶ 32.)
Despite enjoying his work as a detective, Brewer was drinking heavily and having problems in his marriage. (Brewer Deck ¶ 34.) Because of an inability to control his “dangerous or inappropriate” impulses, he was forcеd to resign from his job and his marriage ended in a divorce. (Brewer Deck ¶ 35.) He found work as a private security guard, but continued to feel isolated. (Brewer Deck ¶ 36.) He struggled to resist impulses to use his firearm inappropriately and worried that minor disputes would cause him to use the weapon. (Brewer Deck ¶ 36.) For those reasons, he left the security business and got a degree in special education and history in 1997. (Brewer Deck ¶ 37.) He had an urge to return to Beirut to teach history, but the experience was not what he expected. (Brewer Deck ¶ 38-39.) Brewer *49 left Beirut and upon his return to United States, he met his current wife. (Brewer Decl. ¶ 38-39.) Brewer now has two children and has found work as a high school history teacher in Portland, Maine. (Brewer Decl. ¶ 39-40.)
Despite “establishing] a normal family life in [his] community,” Brewer has continued to experience pain and suffering as a result of the terrorist attack in 1984. (Brewer Decl. ¶ 41.) He still suffers from depression, excessive drinking, lack of impulse control, inability to concentrate, headaches, and ringing in the ears. (Brewer Decl. ¶ 42.) In the mid-1990’s, Brewer was diagnosed with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) but did not seek serious treatment for it until 2007 when he realized that he “owed it” to his wife and children. (Brewer Decl. ¶ 45.) He suffers from constant back pain and migraine headaches although these physical ailments are secondary to the psychological stress he continues to endure. (Brewer Decl. ¶ 46.) He suffers from nightmares and must be constantly careful not to let his “inner rage” erupt during minor confrontations. (Brewer Decl. ¶ 46.) He numbs his pains with alcohol, but is worried that his behavior is taking its toll on his wife and family. (Brewer Decl. ¶ 47.)
In 2009, Dr. Benjamin C. Grasso, a Board-cеrtified psychiatrist with the Veterans Administration in Saco, Maine examined Brewer. Dr. Grasso found that Brewer displays evidence of “hypervigilance,” including darting eyes, checking for exits, exaggerated reactions to quiet everyday sounds occurring in the outdoor hallway, constant foot tapping, and an overall sense of restlessness. (Grasso Decl. ¶ 10.) Brewer also continues to endure “hyperarousal, emotional numbing and avoidance, nightmares, daytime flashbacks, impulsivity, terror mixed with rage, impaired short term memory, impaired concentration, migraine headaches, lability of mood, and an inability to enjoy the usual circumstances of family life, social life, and employment because of [PTSD] and Traumatic Brain Injury.” (Grasso Decl. ¶ 12.) These symptoms will never disappear (Grasso Decl. ¶ 13), and Brewer “may be on the verge of significant further deterioration in functioning or even a break down.” (Grasso Decl. ¶ 14.)
Dr. Edgar Garcia-Rill, a Professor in the Departments of Neurobiology and Developmental Sciences, and Psychiatry, at the University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences, reviewed Brewer’s medical records and concluded that Brewer “suffers from severe [PTSD] which ... severely limit[s] his ability to enjoy the normal pleasures and satisfactions of everyday life.” (Garcia-Rill Rep. at 3, attached as Exhibit 6 to Pl.’s Mot.) He shows symptoms of Traumatic Brain Injury, “which adds to and exacerbates his difficulties.” (Garcia-Rill Rep. at 3.) His symptoms are further worsened by “survivor’s guilt” [from] discovering the bodies of two of his closest friends who were [killed] in the blast.” (Garcia-Rill Rep. at 3.) Dr. Garcia-Rill concluded that “beyond any reasonable doubt, these deficits аnd impairments are caused by Mr. Brewer’s exposure to the bomb blast caused by the terrorist attack in Beirut of September 20, 1984.” (Garcia-Rill Rep. at 3.) Brewer’s future is characterized as “severely limited” and the chances of other illnesses, such as accelerated aging and alcoholism, will increase over time. (Garcia-Rill Rep. at 3.) Brewer is currently rated as 70% disabled as a result of his PTSD by the Department of Veterans Affairs. (Garcia-Rill Rep., Ex. C)
B. Extent of Leydet’s Injuries
Joyce Louise Leydet, Brewer’s mother, also seeks damages for her pain and suffering. She is, and has always been, a *50 United States citizen. (Leydet Decl. ¶ 3.) Richard Brewer was her youngest of seven children, and Ms. Leydet described him as “joyful” and “happy-go-lucky” in high school. (Leydet Decl. ¶ 5.) When Ms. Leydet heard the news of the terrorist bombing on television, she saw images of someone in a marine uniform covered in blood and believed it was her son. (Leydet Decl. ¶ 10.) Later that night, a Marine recruiter came to her house and informed her that Brewer was injured, although he could not describe the nature of his injuries. (Leydet Decl. ¶ 11.) Leydet recalls this period of not knowing her son’s condition as a “terrible ordeal of anxiety and worry” for herself and her family. (Leydet Decl. ¶ 13.) Brewer called three days later to inform his mother that he was wounded but recovering. (Leydet Decl. ¶ 14.) When Brewer returned from overseas, he “was never really the same” according to Ms. Leydet. (Leydet Decl. ¶ 16.) He screamed when he heard a car backfire on the street, (Leydet Decl. ¶ 16), was “moody and silent for long periods,” and seemed “depressed and anxious.” (Leydet Decl. ¶ 17.)
Ms. Leydet describes her life since the bombing as being “saddened and deeply and negatively impacted by the physical and psychological trauma” inflicted on her son. (Leydet Decl. ¶ 21.) She “especially feel[s] the loss of [her] happy, healthy young son, who seemed to have limitless possibilities before him, and who has been replaced by a different Richard who has to struggle to get through each day.” (Leydet Decl. ¶ 22.) The entire experience has caused her “deep emotional distress.” (Leydet Decl. ¶ 23.)
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW I. JURISDICTION UNDER THE FSIA
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611, is the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in United States.
Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp.,
A. Service of Process
As this Court explained in Ben-Rafael v. Islamic Republic of Iran:
The FSIA establishes the requirements for proper service upon a foreign state or a political subdivision of a foreign state. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(j)(l). The FSIA prescribes four methods of service, in descending order of preference. Plaintiffs must attempt service by the first method (or determine that it is unavailable) before proceeding to the second method, and so on. See 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a).
The preferred method of service is delivery of the summons and complaint “in accordance with any special arrangement for service between the plaintiff and the foreign state.” 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(1). If no such arrangement exists, then delivery is to be made “in accordance with an applicable international convention on service of judicial *51 documents.” Id. § 1608(a)(2). If neither of the first two methods is available, plaintiffs may send the summons, complaint, and a notice of suit (together with a translation of each into the official language of the foreign state) “by any form of mail requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed and dispatched by the clerk of the court to the head of the ministry of foreign affairs of the foreign state concerned.” Id. § 1608(a)(3). Finally, if mailed service cannot be accomplished within thirty days, then the statute permits plaintiffs to request that the clerk of the court dispatch two copies of the summons, complaint, and notice of suit (together with a translation of each into the foreign state’s official language) to the Secretary of State, who then “shall transmit one copy of the papers through diplomatic channels to the foreign state and shall send to the clerk of the court a certified copy of the diplomatic note indicating when the papers were transmitted.” Id. § 1608(a)(4). “Strict adherence to the terms of 1608(a) is required.” Transaero, Inc. v. La Fuerza Aerea Boliviana,30 F.3d 148 , 154 (D.C.Cir.1994).
The first two methods of service are inapplicable to this case because there is no “special arrangement for service” between the U.S. and Iran, § 1608(a)(1), and Iran is not a party to any “international convention on service of judicial documents.” § 1608(a)(2).
On June 24, 2008, plaintiffs requested the Clerk of the Court to effect service upon defendants pursuant to § 1608(a)(3), and the Clerk certified that she performed the requested mailing on July 10, 2008. However, no certification of service was received within thirty days, so on September 16, 2008, plaintiffs requested that the Clerk transmit the proper documents to the State Department for diplomatic service pursuant to § 1608(a)(4). 6 On September 29, 2008, the Clerk certified that she had complied with plaintiffs’ request by mailing the proper documents to the State Department and requesting that they attempt service upon defendants through diplomatic channels. On March 26, 2009, the State Department informed the Court that service had been properly effected upon all three defendants, effective December 7, 2008. 7 Defendants did not respond or make an appearance within sixty days, § 1608(d), and the Clerk entered default on April 6, 2009. Because plaintiffs complied with the requirements of § 1608, service was proper, and this Court has personal jurisdiction over defendants.
B. Terrorism Exception to Sovereign Immunity
The “state sponsor of terrorism” exception to sovereign immunity was recently amended by the enactment of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (“2008 NDAA”), Pub.L. No. 110-181, 122 Stat. 3, § 1083, which repealed § 1605(a)(7) of Title 28 and replaced it with § 1605A. This exception strips immunity where:
money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death that was caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabo *52 tage, hostage taking, or the provision of material support or resources for such an act if such act or provision of material support оr resources is engaged in by an official, employee, or agent of such foreign state while acting within the scope of his or her office, employment, or agency.
28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1). The key feature of the revised terrorism exception is that it creates a private federal cause of action against a “foreign state that is or was a state sponsor of terrorism ... and any official, employee, or agent of that foreign state ...” 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(e). 8 If immunity is waived, the Act provides for “economic damages, solatium, pain and suffering, and punitive damages.” 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c)(4).
However, before considering whether defendants’ conduct falls within the statute, two requirements must be met. § 1605A(a)(2). First, the foreign state must have been “designated as a state sponsor of terrorism at the time of the [terrorist] act.” § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). Here, Iran was formally dеclared a state sponsor of terrorism on January 23, 1984 in accordance with section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C.App. 2405(1). See 49 Fed. Reg. 2836-02 (statement of Secretary of State George P. Shultz). Second, the claimant must have been “a national of the United States” at the time of the terrorist act. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(i)(II). Brewer and Leydet have always been U.S. citizens. Thus, these requirements have been met, and this Court “shall” hear their claim. § 1605A(a)(2).
For defendants’ conduct to fall within the “state sponsor of terrorism” exception, they must have participated in an “extrajudicial killing” or provided “material support or resources for such an act.” § 1605A(a)(1);
see also Acosta v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
1. Extrajudicial Killing
Whether this terrorist bombing by Hezbollah constituted an “extrajudicial killing” warrants little discussion.
9
As al
*53
ready determined by two judges of this Court, the attack on the U.S. Embassy Annex was a “deliberate and premeditated act” that killed fourteen people and “[tjhere is no evidence that it was judicially sanctioned by any lawfully constituted tribunal.”
Wagner,
2. Material Support
Similarly, the issue of whether defendants provided material support to Hezbollah in carrying out the attack on the Embassy Annex has already been decided in
Wagner
and
Welch.
In
Wagner,
representatives of the Estate of Michaеl Wagner, a U.S. Navy Petty Officer who was killed in the attack, sued Iran and MOIS under the FSIA for damages related to Wagner’s death. Although that case was analyzed under the pre-2008 NDAA “state sponsor of terrorism” exception, the district court made findings about defendants’ “material support” for the attack.
Wagner,
The testimony of retired U.S. Ambassador Robert B. Oakley and Dr. Patrick L. Clawson, Director of Research at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, together with declassified intelligence materials from the U.S. Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency admitted into evidence by the Court, conclusively establish the identity of the perpetrators of the September 20, 1984, bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut ... to be the militant Islamic fundamentalist Shi’ite organization known as Hizballah, the Lebanese organization publicly committed to the expulsion of the American presence in Lebanon by terrorist means, as well as to the post-war reincarnation of Lebanon as an Islamic fundamentalist state. Hizballah, in turn, has been shown to be an agency or instrumentality of the Iranian MOIS, employed (somewhat less publicly) by the MOIS to achieve similar ends-by terrorist means when necessary-as well to establish Iranian ascendancy as the premier Islamic patron of the Shi’a population in Lebanon.
Id. at 132. The Court therefore found Iran and MOIS liable under the FSIA for the death of Petty Officer Michael Wagner and assessed over $16 million in compensatory damages and $300 million in punitive damages. Id. at 138.
Six years later in Welch, the Court found Iran and the IRGC liable tо the estate of Army Chief Warrant Officer Kenneth V. Welch for his death in the same terrorist attack. United States Magistrate Judge Kay held an evidentiary hearing on plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment to assess whether plaintiffs had produced “evidence satisfactory to the court” to sustain its burden for a default judgment. Welch, No. 01-863, Kay Report at 6. At that hearing, Dr. Bruce D. Tefft, a counter-terrorism specialist, testified that “Hezbollah was created by [Iran’s] special committee on terrorism in 1983, as a sort of wholly-owned subsidiary that was financed, trained, and equipped by the Iranian government in an effort to influence affairs in Lebanon.” Id. at 10. With respect to this specific attack, “[s]atellite reconnaissance photographs taken by. the United States government of Lebanon revealed an identical, life-size model оf the *54 Embassy Annex in the training camps in the Beka’a Valley.... There was a winding driveway with concrete barriers and a replica of the building itself. The model was built to use for practice before committing the actual terrorist attack.” Id. at 12. It was Dr. Tefft’s expert opinion that Iran was responsible for the attack, and, indeed, as found by the Magistrate Judge, Hezbollah claimed responsibility for the attack, and Iran takes credit for the actions of Hezbollah. Id. Based on this evidence, Magistrate Judge Kay concluded “that defendants provided ‘material support or resources’ for the ‘extrajudicial killing’ committed at the embassy.” Id. at 15. 10
In the present case, plaintiffs have cited the testimony from
Wagner
and
Welch
at length, recognizing that the FSIA does not require this Court to relitigate issues that have already been settled. Instead, this Court “mаy take judicial notice of related proceedings and records in eases before the same court.”
See Estate of Heiser v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
3. Causation
The next question is whether defendants’ support of Hezbollah caused plaintiffs’ injuries.
See
28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c). The causation requirement under the FSIA is satisfied by a showing of proximate cause.
Kilburn v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,
In sum, subject matter jurisdiction over defendants is proper under § 1605A, and plaintiffs have provided satisfactоry evidence to sustain a cause of action for damages.
II. DAMAGES UNDER THE FSIA
A. Compensatory Damages
Plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment seeks $300 million in punitive damages, $12 million for Brewer’s pain and suffering, and $3.5 million for Leydet’s pain and suffering. The FSIA authorizes economic, solatium, pain and suffering, and punitive damages against a
*55
foreign state and its officers, employees, or agents.
See
28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c). Because Brewer survived this attack, his claim for pain and suffering should be compared to awards in similar cases where the plaintiff has survived the attack.
See Blais v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
1. Brewer’s Damages
Brewer, in seeking $12 million in damages, compares the pain and suffering that he endured, and continues to endure, with two other cases in which a victim survived a terrorist attack but suffered injuries that will likely last for a lifetime. Brewer argues that an award of $7 million is a “fair minimum” based on
Campuzano v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
At the other end of the spectrum, Brewer asserts that $20 million in cоmpensatory damages is a “fair maximum” when comparing his damages to those of Paul Blais, a pilot in the United States Air Force who was severely injured in the terrorist bombing of a residential complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia in 1996.
Blais,
Based on the $7 million awarded in Campuzano and the $21.8 million awarded *56 in Blais, Brewer asserts that $12 million in this case is “justified and well-supported by applicable precedent.” (Pl.’s Mot. at 23.) Howеver, a review of damage awards in other terrorism cases and a comparison Brewer’s pain and suffering with the plaintiffs in those other cases suggests that an award of less than $12 million is appropriate.
Damages of $12 million were awarded in at least two other cases in which the plaintiffs suffered more severe injuries than Brewer. In
Mousa v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
the plaintiff was awarded $12 million for pain and suffering after sustaining severe burns and blast injuries to her lungs, skull, face, and hand from a suicide bombing of a bus in Israel.
The request of $12 million would also appear to be too high when one compares Brewer’s pain and suffering with the plaintiff in
Haim,
who was awarded $11 million. There, the plaintiff survived the terrorist bombing of a bus in Israel in 1995, but “[a]s a result of the explosion, shrapnel punctured [plaintiffs] body and skull in several locations, and other parts оf his body were wounded and bleeding. [He] suffered from tremendous pain and a loss of vision.”
Brewer’s pain and suffering can be compared to cases in which plaintiffs were awarded damages ranging anywhere from $4 million to $7 million, although his injuries do not fall neatly within that range. At $4 million in damages, Brewer’s injuries are somewhat similar to those sustаined by each of two plaintiffs who were shot while trying to apprehend an assassin in New York.
Acosta,
At $7 million in damages, Brewer’s pain and suffering is comparable to, if not more *57 severe than, Ms. Rubin’s pain and suffering in Campuzano. Like Brewer, Ms. Rubin suffers from ringing in the ears, some memory loss, and PTSD. However, she had no obvious physical injuries, whereas Brewer lost consciousness twice and required blood transfusions and stitches.
While the above cases suggest that Brewer’s damages could arguably bе more than the $7 million awarded in
Campuzano,
the
Peterson
case, arising from a similar bombing in Beirut in 1983, complicates the analysis. There, several plaintiffs received awards of $7 million or less for injuries that are arguably more severe than Brewer’s.
Peterson,
As the above cases demonstrate, there is no exact comparison, and, indeed, strict application of precedent could lead to conflicting conclusions about an appropriate award. This Court readily aсknowledges that it is “undeniably difficult” to assess the amount of compensatory damages for the pain and suffering of surviving victims of terrorist attacks, especially where severe mental anguish is involved.
Blais,
Since this terrorist attack in 1984, Brewer has battled depression, anxiety, alcoholism, and many other ailments. Although he is currently married with two children and has a career as a teacher, the attack continues to hamper his ability to enjoy life’s daily pleasures. He has experienced severe and permanent pain and suffering and his outlоok for the future is described by physicians as “severely limited.” Taking into account all of these factors and the apparent permanency of his injuries, this Court finds that Richard Paul Brewer is entitled to $7 million in compensatory damages for the pain and suffering he has endured as a result of the 1984 terrorist attack on the U.S. Embassy Annex in East Beirut.
2. Leydet’s Damages
In
Peterson,
Judge Lamberth set out a framework which provides that a parent of a serviceman injured in a terrorist attack is ordinarily entitled to $2.5 million.
Peterson,
The award in
Blais,
however, was characterized in
Peterson
as “exceptional” be
*58
cause of the severity of the son’s injuries, his five weeks in a coma and vegetative state, and the fact that the parents gave up their jobs to take full-time care of their son.
Peterson,
B. Punitive Damages
Prior to the 2008 NDAA, punitive damages were only available against officials, employees, or agents of a foreign state, but not the foreign state itself.
See
28 U.S.C. § 1605 Note (The “Flatow Amendment”) and 28 U.S.C. § 1606;
see also Roeder,
The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that punitive damages are intended “to punish [a defendant] for his outrageous conduct and to deter him and others like him from similar conduct in the future.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908(1) (1977). To determine the proper amount of punitive damages, courts consider four factors: “(1) the сharacter of the defendant’s act, (2) the nature and extent of harm to the plaintiffs that the defendants caused or intended to cause, (3) the need for deterrence, and (4) the wealth of the defendants.”
Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
There is no reason to depart from settled case law regarding the amount of punitive damages in terrorism cases. Taking into account the Restatement factors аnd the nature of the attack, this Court finds defendants Iran, MOIS, and the IRGC to be jointly and severally liable for punitive damages in the amount of $300 million.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment is GRANTED and the Court enters judgments in the amounts specified above. A separate Order and Judgment accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
Notes
. This organization has several alternate spellings, including "Hizbollah” and "Hizballah.”
. Mr. Brewer’s wife and sons, who are named as plaintiffs in the complaint, are not seeking relief in this motion. Accordingly, this Court need not address their claims.
. This “satisfactory to the court” standard is the same as the standard for entry of default judgment against the United States under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(e).
See Hill v. Republic of Iraq,
. At the time, Brewer was known as Richard Paul Leydet. (Brewer Decl. ¶ 3.)
. As discussed herein, the estates of Wagner and Welch were the plaintiffs in two other civil actions pertaining to this attack.
See Wagner v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
. On December 1, 2008, after plaintiffs had already initiated service under § 1608(a)(4), the Clerk received a return receipt indicating that delivery of the original summons and complaint had been returned as undeliverable.
. The State Department enlisted the help of the Foreign Interests Section of the Embassy of Switzerland because the U.S. does not maintain diplomatic relations with the government of Iran. (See Return of Service Affidavit from the United States Department of State [Dkt. # 14]).
. Prior to the 2008 NDAA, there was no federal cause of action against a foreign state for acts of terrorism. The predecessor to the current exception, then codified at § 1605(a)(7), when read with the Flatow Amendment, § 1605 Note, provided a private right of action against
individual officers, employees, and agents
of a foreign state, but not against the foreign state itself.
See Cicippio-Puleo v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
. The FSIA refers to the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 ["TVPA”] for the definition of "extrajudicial killing.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(h)(7). The TVPA provides that "the term 'extrajudicial killing’ means a deliberated killing not authorized by a previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples. Such term, however, does not include any such killing that, under international law, is lawfully carried out under the *53 authority of a foreign nation.” 28 U.S.C. § 1350 Note.
. Judge Kollar-Kotelly, the presiding judge, adopted Magistrate Judge Kay’s report.
. Compensatory damages of $3.5 million were also awarded to the father of a surviving victim of a 1995 terrorist bombing in Israel in
Haim.
There, the father of Mr. Haim (whose injuries are described above) was initially led to believe that his son was killed.
. In their motion for entry of default judgment, it is unclear whether plaintiffs seek $300 million in punitive damages against
each
defendant for a total of $900 million or jointly and severally against all three defendants for a total of $300 million. However, punitive damages in terrorism cases are typically awarded jointly and severally regardless of how many defendants are named and eligible to pay punitive damages.
See, e.g., Acosta,