139 Tenn. 97 | Tenn. | 1917
delivered the opinion of the Court. ”
The hill was filed to attach a fund belonging to- the defendant company in the First National Bank of Kingsport. There was a motion to dismiss the bill and in the alternative a demurrer in case the motion should fail. It was agreed between the parties that if the motion should be sustained the demurrer should'not he considered an entry of appearance. The chancellor disallowed the motion and overruled the demurrer, but, under the statute applicable to the subject, granted an appeal to this court.
The defendant company is a foreign corporation that has not complied with our statutes authorizing such corporations to do business in the State, hut its president and secretary and treasurer and several of its directors, all mentioned in the bill,' reside in Tipton county, of this State. It has no office or place of business in Sullivan county, but has property there, consisting of about $10,000 on deposit in the First National Bank of Kingsport in that county, which hank is made a defendant.
The complainant sues on a contract for personal services which will presently he more particularly mentioned.
■ The business of the .corporation, as described in the bill, was the making of glass burial caskets and also other articles of glass. It contemplated building a factory for these -purposes at Kingsport and had obtained an option on ten acres of silicate- lands.
“But it has complied with the act of September 27, 1913, being chapter 31 of the printed acts of said year and familiarly known as the ‘Blue Sky Law.’ ”
Among other requirements of the statute referred to, such corporations as it applies to were required to file with the Secretary of State an authorization to accept service of process when suit should be brought in any county of the State. The defendant company filed such authorization, and on process being sent to him, directed to the sheriff of Sullivan county, where the bill was filed, the Secretary of State acknowledged service in the name of the defendant company. This is the first ground on which the complainant insists that the court acquired jurisdiction of the defendant company. The chancellor held
The complainant’s chief claim to effective jurisdiction over the defendant is based on his attachment of its funds in the hands of the First National Bank of Kingsport, on the ground of the defendant’s non-residence. At this point it is necessary that we set out the motion to dismiss, which was made in the chancery court. That motion reads:
“Come all the defendants, and appearing specially for the purpose of denying the jurisdiction of the court in this cause, except First National Bank, and moved the court to dismiss the bill in this cause as to them, because it appears from the bill and record in the cause that this court has not jurisdiction of the persons of these defendants, because it is alleged in the bill that said company is a foreign corporation with officers and agents in Tipton county, Tenn., upon whom process can be served, and that the other defendants are residents of Tipton county, Tenn., and this suit must be brought in the county where said officers and agents of said De Camp Glass Casket Company reside, or are found, and in the county where said other defendants reside or are found.”
The predicate of the motion is that, where there is an office or agency in any county of the State, the
It is not a sound proposition that because suit may he brought and personal service had on an agent of a non-resident corporation, in one or more counties of this State, where it has an office or agency, on causes of action growing out of or connected with the business of such corporation, an action may not be commenced against it, on those or other causes of action, by original attachment in another county where it has no such office or agency, but in which it has property located. The reverse is true. To hold differently would, in our judgment, be a perversion of our statutes, and would greatly narrow the remedies of our citizens against non-resident corporations. A non-resident corporation might own real or personal property, or both, in many counties of the State, with an office or agency in only one. It would be unreasonable to require a citizen of the State having a demand against such non-resident to go to a distant part of the State, to bring his suit, when there is property in his own county out of which satisfaction might be had. Indeed, such a requirement would make it necessary for the citizen, before- bringing his attachment suit, to make inquiry in every county of the State for the purpose of ascertaining whether his non-resident debtor had an office or agency located in any one of the counties. It does not appear why he should be subjected
In Shannon’s Code (Thompson’s Edition) section 4515, it is provided that:
“In actions commenced by the attachment of property without personal service of process, . . . the attachment may be sued out or suit brought in any county where the real property, or any portion of it, lies, or where any part of the personal property may be found.”
Section 5211 declares:
“Any person having a debt or demand due at the .commencement of an action . . . may sue out an attachment at law or in equity, against the property of a debtor or defendant in the following 'cases: (1) Where the debtor or defendant resides out of the State. ’ ’
These two sections lay down the general rule for obtaining effective jurisdiction or non-resident defendants ; that is, by attachment of their properties in any county of the State where it may be found. We now reach another class of cases, those covered by sections 4539 to 4541, inclusive. This class is one in which a suit may be brought against a corporation, either resident or non-resident (Coke & Coal Co. v. Southern Steel Co., 123 Tenn., 429, 131 S. W., 988, 31 L. R. A. [N. S.], 278), in the county where the company has its chief office, by service of process on certain designated officers or agents in a prescribed order of precedence. Then comes the Acts of 1859-60, chapter 89, now em
“The service of process may be made on any agent or clerk employed therein in all actions brought in such county against said company growing out of the business of, or connected with, said company’s or principal’s business.”
The residue of the section contains a limitation on its scope, expressed as follows:
“But this section shall apply only to cases where the suit is brought in such counties in which such agency, resident director, or office is located.”
That is to say, it shall not forbid cases covered by the preceding sections (4539-4541), nor original attachment suits brought in other counties where there is no office or agency, and where property of a non-resident defendant is found. Under the authority conferred by these four sections (4539-4542), any one who has a lawful demand against a corporation, resident or non-resident, growing out of or connected, with the business of such corporation, may bring his suit in the county where the office or agency is maintained, and secure jurisdiction of it by personal service of process on the designated officer or agent. The right is not confined to matters growing out of a particular office or agency; it is broad enough to embrace any right
To present as comprehensive a view as we can, in the limited space at our disposal, of the phase of our.
Section 2549 of Shannon’s Code (Thompson’s Edition) presents the case of a foreign corporation that has complied with our statutes but has no office or agency in this State. It is provided that such corporation may be proceeded against by attachment in the manner laid down in the section.
There is still another statute to which we may advert, Acts of 1887, chapter 226. This concerns the case of a foreign corporation not domesticated and which has neither property nor a localized business in this State, but has transacted, in the State, some matter of
It is believed that the foregoing discussion presents a fairly adequate view of the several methods by which foreign corporations may be sued in our State. It is apparent that, as the defendant company was a non-resident corporation owning property located in Sullivan county, a debt due from the defendant bank to it (Dillingham v. Insurance Co., 120 Tenn., 302, 108 S. W., 1148, 16 L. R. A. [N. S.], 220), it was subject to be proceeded against in that county by original attachment levied on that debt, and it is immaterial that it had officers and directors who resided in Tipton county, this State. It was not necessary that the suit should have been brought in the latter county. Indeed, we do not see how the corporation could have been brought before the court by service upon the resident directors in Tipton county, since it does not appear from the bill that it was at that time doing any business in Tennessee. Toledo Railways & L. Co. v. Hill, 244 U. S., 49, 37 Sup. Ct., 591, 61 L. Ed., 982, 987; International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U. S., 579, 585, 34 Sup. Ct., 944, 58 L. Ed., 1479, 1482; St. Louis S. W. R. Co. v. Alexander, 227 U. S., 218, 33. Sup. Ct., 245, 57 L. Ed., 486, Ann. Cas., 1915B, 77.
The same observations cover the point now first made here that there was no publication for the defendants. We add that before there was time for publication, after the levy of the writ, the defendants appeared in court and made the motion ¿to dismiss, which we have just considered.
The defendants, other than the company — that is, the 'officers and directors — were made defendants in .their personal capacity for the purpose of obtaining alternative relief against them. Their motion to dismiss is the same as that of the company, and rests on no other ground than that the company was not properly in court. That point having been decided adversely to their contention, the motion must be decided against them, as well as against the company.
The motion having been disallowed, the defendants must now be treated as having made their per
The ground of the demurrer is that the hill shows, on its face, that the contract was not reduced to writing as required by the statute of frauds. The contention is that it should have been signed by both parties, that is, by the company, the employer, and by the complainant, the employee; that, not having been so signed, it was void and unenforceable.
The contract consists of a letter written by the company to the complainant, offering him employment for two years, as its general superintendent, for a consideration therein mentioned. The letter was written April 4th. Complainant alleges in the bill that, he accepted it on April 13th. Several letters written later in the month to the company by the complainant, and one in June of the same year, fully recognize the contract as binding on him. Without affirming or denying the proposition of law to the effect that both must sign a contract of the hind appearing in this case, we are of opinion that complainant’s letters, just referred to, sufficiently meet any requirement for his acceptance in writing, if any such legal necessity exists.
Waiving a decision of the legal question, we may add that we have no ease in our State where it has arisen. We have numerous cases that arose between vendor and vendee, under subsection 4 of our statute of frauds on the subject of the sale of lands, and the making of leases for a longer term
We may add that a strong analogy to cases arising under subsection 5 may be found in those of our cases which arose under that clause of subsection 4, which applies to leases for a longer period than one year. We believe it has been the uniform practice, in our State, for lessors only to sign, notwithstanding the fact that leases very often contain numerous affirmative covenants on the part of the lessee. Practically the universal opinion of the members of our bar is that such leases, signed only by the lessor, when delivered to and accepted by the lessee, are good, and enforceable against- the latter although not signed by him. We would not hold differently at this late date. It has been universally considered in this State that the acceptance of such a lease, either verbally or by conduct, would complete the contract between the lessor and lessee and would' make it binding and enforceable on both. It is difficult to perceive why the analogy would not he controlling in the kind of a contract
The result is the decree of the chancellor is affirmed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings.