BREWER v A D TRANSPORT EXPRESS, INC
Docket No. 139068
Supreme Court of Michigan
Decided May 10, 2010
486 MICH 50
In an opinion by Justice CORRIGAN, joined by Justices CAVANAGH, YOUNG, and MARKMAN, JJ., the Supreme Court held:
At the time of Brewer‘s injury,
Affirmed.
Justice HATHAWAY, joined by Justice WEAVER, dissenting, would have granted Brewer‘s application for leave to appeal, believing that the Court would benefit from plenary review of the issues.
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION — SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION — OUT-OF-STATE INJURIES — STATUTES — RETROACTIVITY OF STATUTES.
The amendment of
Daryl Royal and Richard L. Warsh for Anthony J. Brewer.
Lacey & Jones (by Gerald M. Marcinkoski) for A. D. Transport Express, Inc., and Accident Fund Insurance Company of America.
Amicus Curiae:
Charles W. Palmer for the Michigan Association for Justice.
CORRIGAN, J. This case requires us to consider whether a recent expansion of the subject-matter jurisdiction of the Workers’ Compensation Agency over out-of-state injuries,
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE
Plaintiff Anthony J. Brewer, a Michigan resident, sought workers’ compensation benefits for an injury he allegedly suffered in Ohio in 2003 while working for defendant A. D. Transport Express, Inc., as a truck driver. Defendant denied that plaintiff‘s contract of hire was made in Michigan, a necessary condition for the Workers’ Compensation Agency to exercise jurisdiction over plaintiff‘s out-of-state injury under the jurisdictional standard in effect when plaintiff was injured,
Defendant‘s trucking company is headquartered in Canton, Michigan, but it has satellite offices in Kentucky and New Jersey and provides transportation services nationwide. Plaintiff‘s payroll and employment records showed the Canton office address, but the magistrate found that these facts did not satisfy plaintiff‘s burden of proof to establish jurisdiction. The record contained no evidence of what contact, if any, plaintiff had with the Canton office during the hiring process. Moreover, plaintiff‘s employment required him to drive to destinations in both Michigan and Ohio. The magistrate thus concluded that speculation would be required to find that the contract of hire was made in Michigan and dismissed plaintiff‘s petition.
The Court of Appeals denied plaintiff‘s application for leave to appeal for lack of merit in the grounds presented.1
Plaintiff applied for leave to appeal in this Court. We directed the clerk to schedule oral argument on the application and directed the parties to “address whether the legislative change to
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether the amendment of
III. ANALYSIS
At the time of plaintiff‘s injury,
The bureau [now the Workers’ Compensation Agency] shall have jurisdiction over all controversies arising out of
injuries suffered outside this state where the injured employee is a resident of this state at the time of injury and the contract of hire was made in this state. Such employee or his dependents shall be entitled to the compensation and other benefits provided by this act. [Emphasis added.]
We discussed the history of this jurisdictional provision in Karaczewski v Farbman Stein & Co, 478 Mich 28, 33-38; 732 NW2d 56 (2007). The essential point is that beginning with the first enactment of a provision in 1921, the text of
In Karaczewski, the majority opinion overruled Boyd and held that
Following this Court‘s decision in Karaczewski, the Legislature enacted 2008 PA 499, effective on January 13, 2009, amending
The question we must resolve is whether the amendment of
Here, 2008 PA 499 contains no language that would clearly manifest a legislative intent to apply the new jurisdictional standard retroactively. The amendment merely states the new jurisdictional standard; it contains no language suggesting that this new standard applies to antecedent events or injuries. Therefore, the amendment applies only to injuries occurring on or after the effective date of the amendment, January 13, 2009.
In addition, this Court has recognized that “providing a specific, future effective date and omitting any reference to retroactivity” supports a conclusion that a statute should be applied prospectively only. See White v Gen Motors Corp, 431 Mich 387, 398-399; 429 NW2d 576 (1988) (opinion by RILEY, J.), relying on Selk v Detroit Plastic Prods (On Resubmission), 419 Mich 32, 35 n 2; 348 NW2d 652 (1984). As discussed, in adopting 2008 PA 499, the Legislature provided a specific, future effective date of January 13, 2009, and omitted any reference to retroactivity.
Moreover, the amendment of
We thus conclude that the amendment of
IV. CONCLUSION
We hold that the amendment of
CAVANAGH, YOUNG, and MARKMAN, JJ., concurred with CORRIGAN, J.
HATHAWAY, J. (dissenting). We dissent from the majority‘s decision in this matter. Leave to appeal was not granted in this case. Rather, oral argument on plaintiff‘s application for leave to appeal in this Court was heard in order to determine whether we should grant leave to appeal, deny leave to appeal, or take other peremptory action. Having reviewed the limited briefing and having heard limited oral argument, we would grant leave to appeal because we believe that the Court would benefit from plenary review of the issues before rendering a decision.
WEAVER, J., concurred with HATHAWAY, J.
