136 Wis. 336 | Wis. | 1908
Tbe following propositions are affirmed and submitted by appellant’s counsel as grounds for a reversal: (1) Tbe verdict and finding tbat tbe fence as constructed for tbe north boundary of lots 12 and 17 some thirty or forty years before tbe controversy arose was properly placed is not supported by any credible evidence. (2) Tbe court in instructing' tbe jury gave prejudicial significance, as evidence, to tbe location and maintenance of tbe fence referred to. We will consider such propositions briefly.
It is the settled law tbat in controversies as to tbe proper locations of corners or boundaries of lots or blocks in platted lands tbe original location of monuments must prevail, regardless of whether tbe same coincide with the courses and distances laid down on tbe plat, and tbat in determining such locations if such monuments have disappeared they must be established by tbe best evidence tbe nature of tbe situation is susceptible of. So, in such circumstances, where careful measurements by courses and distances would presently locate tbe disputed points is not controlling. It is evidentiary only, and of controlling or little or no weight according to circumstances. Nys v. Biemeret, 44 Wis. 104; Lampe v. Kennedy, 49 Wis. 601, 6 N. W. 311; Racine v. J. I. Case P. Co. 56 Wis. 539, 14 N. W. 599; Racine v. Emerson, 85 Wis. 80, 55 N. W. 177; Madison v. Mayers, 97 Wis. 399, 73 N. W. 43; Galesville v. Parker, 107 Wis. 363, 83 N. W. 646; Smith v. Beloit, 122 Wis. 396, 100 N. W. 877; Pereles v.
The original markings of the block in question having been removed, as they unquestionably were, many years before the controversy arose, the evidence as to the construction of the fence designed to be on the north line of lots 12 and 17 at a time so near that of the original survey as to render it quite probable that they were then in place, or their location readily ascertainable by a person of ordinary intelligence and experience, and the evidence of acquiescence in the location of such fence for some thirty or forty years, was competent, and at least with other evidence offered and received, particularly evidence that a stone existed at the easterly end of such fence some years after it was constructed, which people regarded as a landmark, was sufficient to warrant the conclusion that such old fence was properly placed and the disputed boundary fifty feet south of it, notwithstanding the very positive evidence of the surveyor, who, by his measurements from monuments located some distance from the vicinity of the lost corner, supposed by him to he monuments set in making the original survey, supported appellant’s contention. In such a case such circumstantial evidence may have so much greater probative force than mere measurements by courses and distances as to prevail over the latter as matter of law, as indicated in some of the cases cited.
What has been said perhaps sufficiently answers the contention of counsel that the court gave unwarranted significance to the circumstances referred to. The jury were
We are unable to discover tbat tbe court gave tbe undue significance to tbe old fence line claimed by counsel. It was fairly left to tbe jury to determine from tbe whole evidence whether tbe fence was built so as to accord witb tbe original survey, witb instructions tbat, if they determined it was, from a preponderance of tbe evidence, tbe finding would be controlling, since tbe disputed strip was by tbe uncontro-verted evidence on defendant’s side of a line located at tbe proper distance from such old fence line. Tbat was certainly correct, and tbe fact tbat the jury were, witb considerable particularity, instructed in tbat regard, so as to leave no room for them to proceed on any false theory, is commendable rather than subject to criticism.
By the Court. — Tbe judgment is affirmed.