[¶ 1] Shawn Brew appeals from a judgment granting'him a divorce from Jennifer Brew, distributing their marital - property, and ordering him to pay child' support. Shawn Brew argues the district court’s property distribution is inequitable, the court improperly calculated his child support obligation, and the court erred in ordering him to pay attorney’s fees. We affirm. ,
I .
[¶ 2] Shawn ■ and Jennifer Brew were married in July 1997,. They have two children together. The older child was born in 1998 and was still a minor at the time of trial. They owned a farming and ranching operation' and a trucking business.
[¶ 3] In September 2015, Shawn Brew sued Jennifer Brew for divorce. In May 2016, Jennifer Brew moved to compel discovery, claiming she had made numerous attempts to get Shawn Brew to respond to interrogatories and demands for production of certain documents before seeking court ‘intervention. The district court granted Jennifer Brew’s motion to compel and ordered Shawn Brew to provide Jennifer Brew with certain requested documents. The court also ordered Shawn Brew to pay Jennifer Brew $500 in attorney’s fees under N.D.R.CÍV.P, 37(a)(5)(A) for failing to timely provide discovery responses.
[¶4] On August 7, 2016, Shawn-Brew filed a pre-trial statement and requested the court award equal residential responsibility of the children. On August 8, 2016, a pretrial conference was held. On August 15, 2016, Jennifer Brew moved to bifurcate the issue of primary residential responsibility, claiming Shawn Brew disclosed for the first time at the pretrial conference that he intended to contest primary residential responsibility of the children and no discovery about. the. issue -had been done. On August 16, 2016, the parties filed a stipulation, - agreeing Jennifer Brew would have ■' primary residential responsibility and decision-making authority of the children. A trial was held on the remaining issues, including property distribution, spousal support, and child support.
[¶ 5] The district court granted the parties a divorce. The' court distributed the marital property, including 603 acres of farmland, and ordered Shawn Brew to receive a net award of $660,886 and Jennifer Brew to receive a net award of $732,258. The court awarded primary residential responsibility of the parties’ children to Jennifer Brew-and ordered Shawn Brew to pay $2,998 per month in child support for two children, which would be reduced to $1,949 per month after the older child turns eighteen or is no longer attending high school. The court found Jennifer Brew was in need of spousal suppoi’t but Shawn Brew did not have the ability to pay, and the court reserved jurisdiction to potentially award spousal support in the future. The court ordered Shawn Brew to pay $5,000 in attorney’s fees.
[¶ 6] Shawn Brew filed an “Opposition to Court’s Property Distribution,” arguing the property was not properly distributed and requesting the court- reconsider its distribution of the farmland. The court treated Shawn Brew’s filing as a motion to reconsider and denied the motion.
II '
[¶7] Shawn Brew argues the district court erred in distributing the marital property. He claims the court relied on an unwarranted presumption and the distribution was not equitable.
A
[¶ 8] Shawn Brew claims the district court relied on an unwarranted presumption
[¶9] Shawn Brew quoted portions of a transcript for a pretrial conference in his brief and included a page from the transcript in his appendix in support of his argument that the district court relied on a presumption. The transcript is not included in the record. Parties may only include items in the appendix that are part of the record. N.D.R.App.P. 30(a)(1). This Court will not consider documents in an appendix that are not in the certified record. Ihli v. Lazzaretto,
[¶ 10] Jennifer Brew moved to strike the parts of Shawn Brew’s brief and appendix referring to the pretrial conference transcript, and she requested attorney’s fees. This Court has discretion in deciding whether to administer sanctions for failing to comply with the Rules of Appellate Procedure. N.D.R.App.P. 13; Ihli,
[¶ 11] “When the record does not allow for intelligent and meaningful review of an alleged error, the appellant has not carried the burden of demonstrating reversible error.” Holden v. Holden,
B
[¶ 12] Shawn Brew argues the property distribution is inequitable because Jennifer Brew received a net award worth $71,372 more than the property he was awarded. He contends the court erred by finding the farmland the parties purchased from Jennifer Brew’s father was a gift and awarding Jennifer Brew 447 of the 603 acres of farmland.
[¶ 13] A district court’s property division is treated as a finding of fact, which is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard of review. Gabaldon-Cochran v. Cochran,
[¶ 14] When a divorce is granted, the district court is required to make an equitable distribution of the parties’ assets and debts, whether held jointly or individually. N.D.C.C. § 14-05-24(1); Allmon v. Allmon,
[T]he respective ages of the parties, their earning ability, the duration of the marriage and conduct of the parties during the marriage, their station in life,the circumstances and necessities of each, their health and physical condition, their financial circumstances as shown by the property owned at the time, its value at the time, its income-producing capacity, if any, whether accumulated before or after the marriage, and such other matters as may be material. The trial court is not required to make specific findings, but it must specify a rationale for its determination.
Allmon, at ¶ 7 (quoting Rebel v. Rebel,
[¶ 15] A property division does not need to be equal to be equitable, but a substantial disparity must be explained. Gabaldon-Cochran,
[¶ 16] The district court included all of the parties’ assets and debts in the marital estate and made findings about the Ruff-Fiseher factors. The court found the marriage was a long-term marriage, Shawn Brew is a farmer and operates a trucking business, and Jennifer Brew works for the county and part-time for a sewing business. The court found both parties are less financially secure since the separation, their financial needs are similar, and both parties are in good health. The court allocated $909,544 in assets and $248,658 in debt to Shawn Brew, for a net' award of $660,886. The court allocated $870,917 in assets and $138,659 in debt to Jennifer Brew, for a net award of $732,258.
[¶ 17] The court considered whether there was evidence to support a deviation from an equal division and explained:
Perhaps the most significant evidence in support of a deviation from an equal division is the fact that substantially all of the agricultural real estate owned by the parties came by way of a purchase of 603 acres of farmland, which has been in Jennifer’s family now for three generations. Those 603 acres were purchased in 1999 from Jennifer’s father for $100,000. The parties have essentially stipulated that such farmland is now worth more than 10 times that figure. Jennifer testified, and Shawn did not dispute, that the purchase price was extremely favorable to the parties as buyers at that time of the purchase. While there is no evidence in the record of the appraised value of that farmland in 1999, the Court is satisfied and finds that the purchase price was significantly below then prevailing prices.
The court also found the parties’ marital home was gifted to them by Shawn Brew’s mother, and the court awarded the home to him. The court said a division of assets more favorable to the party to whom the gift was made may be appropriate. The court noted the parties agreed Jennifer Brew would keep the mineral interests her father conveyed to her and Shawn Brew would be entitled to the proceeds from a mineral trust created by his mother, even though the income from the trust had historically been greater than the income from Jennifer Brew’s minerals and Shawn Brew was receiving significantly greater value and likely greater income as a result. The court also found both parties agreed the trucking business should be awarded to Shawn Brew, neither party offered evidence to establish the value of the business,
[¶ 18] The district court explained its unequal distribution at great length. The court considered the source of the property and awarded both parties property they received from family members. We have said all property must be included in the marital estate, even if it was a gift or inherited; but the property’s origin may be considered in equitably dividing the estate. Feist v. Feist,
[¶ 19] Moreover, the court considered other factors in awarding Jennifer Brew a greater share of the farmland. The Ruff-Fischer factors require the court to consider the parties’ financial circumstances, the value of the property, and the property’s income-producing capacity in dividing the property. See Langwald v. Langwald,
[¶ 20] The assets Shawn Brew received were worth more than the assets Jennifer Brew received, and he also received the debt associated with the property he received, which was a greater share of the parties’ debts. Shawn Brew testified he was willing to assume all of the debt the court allocated to him, including the parties’ largest debt for an operating and equipment loan, which he testified was his debt. Jennifer Brew was allocated all of the debt related to the purchase of the farmland.
[¶ 21] The district court adequately explained its property distribution. The court’s findings are supported by the evidence and we are not left with a definite and firm conviction a mistake has been
I—I HH J—»
[¶ 22] Shawn Brew argues the district court erred in calculating his child support obligation. He contends the court should not have calculated his income by averaging ■ his self-employment 'income from the past five years because his self-employment activity has not been operated on a substantially similar scale for five years, the' trucking business hauled water for fracking in the past, and his prior income is no longer sustainable with the downturn in the oil industry. He claims the court should have imputed his income because he is underemployed.
[¶ 23] Our standard for reviewing a district court’s child support decision is well established:
Child support determinations involve questions of law-Which are subject to the de novo standard of review, findings of fact which are subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review, and may, in some limited areas, be matters of discretion subject to the abuse of discretion standard of review. A court errs as a matter of law if it does not comply with the requirements of the child support guidelines. As a matter of law, the district court must clearly set forth how it arrived at the amount of income and level of support.
Rathbun v. Rathbun,
[¶ 24] Child support determinations are governed by the child support guidelines, N.D. Admin. Code ch. 75-02-04.1. Raap v. Lenton,
The district court has discretion to calculate an obligor’s child support payments through the child support guidelines under N.D. Admin. Code ch. 75-02-04.1. Langwald v. Langwald,2016 ND 81 , ¶ 16,878 N.W.2d 71 . However, “[e]ach child support order must include a statement of the net income of the obligor used to determine the child support obligation, and how that net income was determined.” N.D. Admin. Code § 75-02-04,1-02(10). “Without ordering the parties to present more information and making specific findings of fact, a [district] court cannot arbitrarily ignore the guidelines simply because it feels the obligor’s tax returns do riot adequately reflect the obligor’s income.” Kobs v. Jacobson,2005 ND 222 , ¶ 8,707 N.W.2d 803 (citing Knoll v. Kuleck,2004 ND 199 , ¶ 5,688 N.W.2d 370 ; N.D. Admin. Code § 75-02-04.1-05(3)).
Raap, at ¶ 7.
[¶ 25] Section 75-02-04.1-05, N.D. Admin. Code, governs how net income from self-employment is calculated for child support purposes. “Net income from self-employment means total income, for internal revenue service purposes, of the obligor.... ” N.D. Admin. Code § 75-02-04.1-05(1). The child support guidelines anticipate an obli-gor’s income from self-employment may fluctuate over time, and provide:
Self-employment activities may experi- • enee significant changes in production and income over.time. To the. extent that information is reasonably available, the average of the most recent five years of each self-employment activity, if undertaken on a substantially similar, scale, must be used to determine self-employment income. When self-employment activity has not been operated on a substantially similar scale for five years, a shorter period may be used.
N.D. Admin. Code § 75-02-04.1-05(4).' The guidelines also authorize a court to use profit and loss statements if the obligor’s tax returns are not available or do not reasonably reflect income from self-employment. N.D. Admin. Code § 75-02-04.1-05(3). We have said, “To the extent that information is reasonably available, the average of the most recent five years of each self-employment activity, if undertaken on a substantially similar scale,
[¶ 26] Here, the district court considered the parties’ arguments about how child support should be calculated and concluded it was required to average Shawn Brew’s income under N.D. Admin. Code § 75-02-04.1-05 because he is self-employed. The court said the parties’ tax returns for the previous five years were received into evidence, neither party offered profit and loss statements for the trucking business, and Shawn Brew suggested child support should be based upon minimum wage income but it would be inappropriate to disregard tax returns to calculate support based on imputed income. The court explained it was required to determine Shawn Brew’s average income using the tax returns unless his self-employment activity had not been operated on a substantially similar scale for five years. The court found:
While the Court might be able to conclude that [the trucking business] is not currently operated on a substantially similar scale as it was in any one particular year, the Court is not prepared to conclude that, on balance, it is not being operated on a substantially similar scale as demonstrated by an average of those years. Furthermore, the Court is concerned that Shawn’s spending belies his protestations that the business is not profitable and supports Jennifer’s argument that he is impoverishing himself to affect the Court’s rulings on child and/or spousal support.
The court said it was not persuaded to deviate from N.D. Admin. Code § 75-02-04.1-05(4), and even if it were to deviate, the determination of child support would be based upon profit and loss statements and no profit and loss statements were offered. The court averaged Shawn Brew’s income from the trucking business over a five-year period using tax returns from 2011-2015, included other sources of income, and determined his annual net income for child support purposes is $139,846. The court ordered Shawn Brew to pay $2,998 per month in child support for two children or $1,949 per month for one child.
■ [¶ 27] The district court calculated Shawn Brew’s net income from self-employment by averaging his income from the trucking business for the past five years using the parties’ tax returns for 2011 to 2015. The court said it could not conclude the trucking business was not being operated on a substantially similar scale when it considered the business over the past five years and did not consider only the most recent years. The parties’ tax returns support the court’s findings.
[1128] The guidelines allow the court to consider profit and loss statements if the tax returns do not reasonably reflect income from self-employment. N.D. Admin. Code § 75-02-04.1-05(3). The district court explained it could not deviate from the average calculated from the parties’ tax returns because profit and loss statements were not offered into evidence. Shawn Brew did not offer any profit and loss statements, which may more accurately reflect the current status, except one for January to June 2016. We have said, “The guidelines must be applied using common sense and in consideration of the circumstances.” Rathbun,
[¶ 29] Shawn Brew claims he is underemployed and N.D. Admin. Code § 75-02-04.1-07(3)(a) should be used to impute his income and calculate his obligation. An obligor is “underemployed” if “the obligor’s gross income from earnings is significantly less than this state’s statewide average earnings for persons with similar work history and occupational qualifications.” N.D. Admin. Code § 75-02-04.1-07(l)(b). An obligor is presumed underemployed if his gross income is less than six-tenths of the statewide average earnings for persons with similar work history or occupational qualifications or is equal to 167 times the federal hourly minimum wage. N.D. Admin. Code § 75-02-04.1-07(2). A self-employed obligor may be underemployed as long as the obligor’s income meets the requirements of the underemployment provisions of the child support guidelines. Entzie,
IV
[¶ 31] Shawn Brew argues the district court erred in ordering him to pay Jennifer Brew $5,000 in attorney’s fees. He claims he cannot afford to pay attorney’s fees and they were awarded only because he conceded residential responsibility of the children.
[¶ 82] The district court has broad discretion to award attorney’s fees in divorce proceedings under N.D.C.C. § 14-05-23. Lewis v. Smart,
A district court also has inherent authority to sanction a litigant for misconduct, Sanctions must be reasonably proportionate to the misconduct. When sanctioning a party for .misconduct, a district court should consider and make findings on the culpability or state of mind of the party against whom sanctions are being imposed, the prejudice to the moving party, the impact of the prejudice bn the moving party’s ability to present or defend the party’s case, and the availability of less severe sanctions.
, A district court has discretion in awarding attorney fees as a sanction, in divorce actions. An .award of. attorney fees as a sanction will not be disturbed on appeal unless the court abuses its discretion. A court abuses its discretion when it acts in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable manner, when it misinterprets or misapplies the law, or when its decision is not the product of a rational mental process leading to. a reasoned determination.'
Id: (quoting Kelly v. Kelly,
[¶ 33] Jennifer Brew requested the court award her $21,000 in attorney’s fees because Shawn Brew engaged in obstructive and unwarranted litigation tactics throughout the course of the proceedings. The court awarded her $5,000 in attorney’s fees, explaining:
Without discussing each aspect of the proceedings, it is the Court’s sense that Shawn has, in fact, been, unnecessarily obstructive and/or combative. As an illustrative example, having never earlier indicated an intention to seek primary residential responsibility, Shawn’s counsel indicated he was seeking residential responsibility for the first time at the pretrial conference. Then, at the start of trial, abruptly conceded that Jennifer should be awarded residential responsibility. The Court concluded that the sole purpose for that tactic was to be difficult ’ notwithstanding, or perhaps because, such would cause Jennifer to have to expend significant trial preparation time to make trial presentation adjustments to deal with what seems to have been a stunt.
For that reason, the Court believes that it is appropriate to order, and the Court does order, that. Shawn be required to pay a portion of Jennifer’s attorney fees.
V-
[¶ 35] We affirm the judgment.
[¶ 36]