50 Minn. 168 | Minn. | 1892
The defendants were formerly the owners of certain real estate situate in the town of Tower, including a store building
Although the agreement, assuming that it included the personal property, as well as the real estate, was entire in its nature, it related to subjects so different that different modes of carrying it into execution were appropriate, if not necessary. As to the personal property, all that was necessary to transfer the title was the agreement of sale and the payment of the price. The real estate could only be legally conveyed by deed. That was the ordinary and legally proper purpose of such an instrument. If the deed had not contained the clause above recited, there would be not much reason to support a claim that the deed of the real estate was intended by the parties to embrace, and become the exclusive evidence' of, all which they might have agreed upon or intended to accomplish, so as to exclude oral evidence of a sale of the personal property as well as of the real estate. Such an instrument would not be legally presumed to have been intended to have a wider or different effect than
But we do not think that the clause concerning the shelving in the-building gave to this deed any other effect in this particular than it-would have had if this clause had been omitted. If such a clause had been inserted with respect to one or more articles of personal property, as chairs, of such a nature that there could be no doubt as to-whether they constituted a part of the realty so as to pass under a-deed conveying the real property, the result would probably be different. But the most satisfactory conclusion, as to the reason for introducing this clause in the deed, is that it was because of some uncertainty or doubt as to whether the shelving was properly a part of the-realty, or only personal property, and to prevent any controversy or question concerning that matter. By the technical language of the-deed, the shelving was included as a part of the real property, “this-grant ” being declared to include it. From this it is not to be conclusively presumed that the deed was not intended merely as a conveyance of what was deemed to be, or to belong to, the real estate,, but also to be the repository of all that the parties had agreed upon or done, so as to exclude parol evidence of a sale of personal property as a part of the same transaction. The question considered in Beaupre v. Dwyer, 43 Minn. 485, (45 N. W. Rep. 1094,) was as tn
There was nothing prejudicial to the defendants in the testimony that after the transaction embracing the alleged sale was completed, and the price paid, the clerks in the store of the defendants assisted the plaintiff in making a list of the property in controversy. If that had any bearing upon the issue, which is doubtful, it could only go-to show a merely technical or constructive delivery. But no delivery was necessary, for, as is admitted, the entire price of the sale — whatever was embraced in the sale — had already been paid. The issue-was as to the express agreement of the parties, which was completed before the transaction to which this evidence relates.
Judgment affirmed.